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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis concerns enhancing improvisation in crisis management. It has been established 
during literature studies and interviews of naval officers that managing critical situations is 
not only depending on contingency plans and technology but also the crew`s ability to 
improvise. This due to the very nature of most crises; chaotic surroundings with limited time 
to act and shortage of vital and relevant information and possible escalation of initial 
incidents. 
The study reveals the importance of engineering knowledge, skills, experience and intuition 
during everyday operations on board. This is obtained by a mix of experienced crew working 
together with less experienced ones. Building and maintaining safety attitude will contribute 
to such development. Rotating or alternating roles are one option to achieve crew`s ability to 
perform tasks outside their initial profession when required in an emergency. 
Involving the whole ship`s crew in risk assessment and contingency planning are vital to the 
understanding of safety and how things and systems work. Participation in contingency 
exercises will also be of importance to achieve skills and knowledge, especially if exercises 
are performed with a reduced crew requiring the remaining to take charge of tasks not initially 
committed to. 
The use of shore-based simulators for contingency exercises are also discussed in this thesis. 
It is said to be an excellent tool for training crisis management and improvisation. 
The thesis also contains two real-life examples of improvisation in emergencies. 
 
 
I wish to thank Mikel Dominguez Cainzos for his patience and thorough guidance. Thanks 
also to my informants who have willingly spent time off duty and sheared openhearted and 
vital information to this study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior to incidents or accidents most organizations have worked out two main sets of plans1 in 
order to avoid or manage unfortunate events or accidents. Plan one is to organize the daily 
operations to avoid dangerous incidents or accidents to occur. This includes systems, 
equipment, procedures and training, also named barriers. However, thinking that one can 
secure one-selves one hundred percent from incidents or accidents is not realistic. This is 
stated by James Reason: “The procedures necessary to guide the preparation of, say 
minestrone soup, can be conveyed in a few sentences. But the procedures necessary to 
guarantee that this task will be performed with absolute safety could fill several books, and 
even then, it is unlikely that all possible scenarios would have been covered”.2 Hence 
contingency-plans are made to handle unfortunate situations. This is plan two. Such plans are 
often developed based on risk-estimates (what we imagine may go wrong and named risk -
assessment and/or experience and mainly consists of various procedures as well as the use of 
different kinds of safety equipment. Training procedures and use of equipment are very often 
or mostly drills and performance of these procedures based on anticipated incidents or 
accidents. In the real-world incidents seldom follow estimated paths, they tend to have their 
own life depending on various circumstances. An example on this would be the fire om board 
the MV Nordlys3. Equipment may fail, human resources may be reduced or not available due 
to severe casualties or loss of life. This calls for the remaining crew set to handle or manage a 
situation to improvise to cope and achieve a successful outcome. In this thesis I aim to look 
upon to what extent and how contingency includes improvisation and hopefully provide the 
readers some advice or recommendations on the topic. 
My interest of this topic originates from my experience as abled bodied seaman4 and officer at 
sea, on-shore based operations in the Norwegian Coast Guard and as lecturer in contingency 
and crisis-management subjects at Bodin maritime college and North University in Bodø, 
Norway.  
My first experience on improvisation in crises-exercises took place in 1984 when I served on 
board a ship in the Norwegian Coast Guard. Up to that year, all exercises I had taken part of 
 
1 See more detailed description in sections: “Contingency and crisis-handling/management in general” and “A 
preliminary view on the topic – improvisation” in this thesis. 
2 Reason 2016 p. 74 
3 See AIBN report 2013/02  
4 Able bodied seaman (AB): Fully experienced deckhand 
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involved all crewmembers in exercises and drills aiming to train tasks specified in the alarm 
instructions and contingency plans. In `84, based on the lessons learned by news-reports and 
statements made by participants during and after the battle between UK an Argentine over the 
Falklands (Las Malvinas), we changed the organization of contingency-exercises on board my 
ship. The UK fighting ships found that not all resources were available after an incident. 
Equipment were inoperative due to damage and crewmembers were either injured or dead and 
therefore unable to contribute to the handling of incidents. Hence the remaining crew had to 
improvise to manage crises. This led to exercises where parts of the crew were withdrawn, 
leaving the remaining to improvise using less hands and limited access to contingency tools. 
Rather than just training drills and procedures this became the usual way to perform exercises. 
Some weeks later this way of training contingency paid off on a Coast-guard ship on which I 
served. After midnight a fire started in the front-section of the ship while in port. Several crew 
members were still ashore; many of them assigned to our contingency-plan to deal with such 
an incident in the specific section of the ship. The crew at hand on board had to cope and did 
so successfully by improvising. Drills and training on improvisation of the whole crew had 
made all of us understand the nature of a fire and how to extinguish it. Hence the situation 
was managed into a successful outcome. 
A different outcome is the fire on board the Norwegian coastal steamer the MV Nordlys 
where key emergency actions failed to be executed due to loss of key personnel whose tasks 
were to carry out these actions. The AIBN5 blamed the ship leaders and the company for not 
having performed exercises emphasizing loss of crew-members6, and recommend the 
company to establish procedures to ensure such on board-training.7 The self-experienced 
incident as mentioned above and the recommendations made by AIBN after the case of MV 
Nordlys  shows the relevance and necessity of training crew and staff `s capability to 
improvise in  crisis-situations.  
Contingency demands human resources and time and may be hard to organize within a ship`s 
or an onshore organization`s schedule. Hence drills on procedures might be the only available 
way to perform exercises. Contingency has been, is prevailing, and will probably always be a 
matter of cost vs benefit.  
 
5 AIBN: accident investigation board Norway 
6 AIBN: Report sjø 2013/02 p. 98 
7 AIBN: Report sjø 2013/02 p. 113 
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The purpose of this study 
 
In this study I aim to explore how improvisation is enhanced concerning crisis-management 
in the maritime domain (on board ships). I also focus on ways to implement improvisation in 
the training of sailors, both ratings8 and officers. The latter will concern training and exercises 
on board and by using simulators onshore. A specific outcome of this work will be a chapter 
concerning improvisation in crisis management and contingency in a new textbook for 
maritime studies I intend to write during the spring and summer of 2019. 
Research question 
How may improvisation be enhanced in contingency and crisis-management on board ships? 
Scope 
 
Due to my insight on the topic as former naval officer and instructor this study is limited to 
the maritime domain; ship-management on board. Remoteness is also an item special to ships 
when it comes to contingency and crisis-management. Weick and Sutcliffe points this out as 
follows: “Maritime organizations are accustomed to resilience because most of their 
operations consists of blue-water cruising away from land, rescuers, spare parts and expert 
diagnoses. If a rudder breaks, if the power goes off, the crew is dependent on its own 
resourcefulness to do something right now”.9  
The informants are or have been serving on board cruise-ships, off-shore vessels and High-
speed crafts. References to legislation are based on national Norwegian maritime regulations. 
This legislation, however, is based on international conventions developed by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)10 and ratified by the Norwegian government. 
European (EU) maritime legislation, developed by the EMSA11,  is also implemented in 
national regulations due to Norway`s agreements with the EU – the EEA12. 
Structure 
 
This thesis contains a theory chapter presenting theory on the topic including some recent 
studies on the topic: 
 
8 Ratings: Crewmembers other than officers (AB`s, OS`s, Motormen, Oilers to name some) 
9 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015:95,96 
10 IMO: United Nations council for developing conventions and standards on the maritime domain. 
11 EMSA: European Maritime Safety Association, a counseling organization to the EU. 
12 EEA: European Economic Area linking EFTA (European Free Trade Association) countries to the EU  
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Contingency and crisis management in general: Developing contingency plans, training 
exercises and drills. 
A view on the topic improvisation: When a crisis occurs, human and organizational behavior, 
planning for improvisation when a crisis occurs – a real life example, efficiency and financial 
requirements versus safety 
Method used to perform this survey is presented in the a chapter divided in categories: 
Design, sampling, selection of significant informants, analysis, quality, reliability validity and 
generability  
Findings and analysis are the next section. this chapter is divided into categories containing 
statements from informants in comparison to theory: 
On contingency, on improvisation, on exercises, on debriefs, on reduced resources, on time to 
perform exercises, on alternating jobs and roles, on competence and experience, on 
experience versus procedures and on safety attitude. This is followed by a real-life example 
on improvisation in a crisis. 
Conclusions are given in the following chapter divided in categories: General, enhancing 
improvisation in everyday operations, enhancing improvisation by contingency-exercises 
onboard and impediments to improvisation. Followed by a suggestion as to further research.  
Under Enclosures on will find: Bibliography, interview guide, list of figures and original 
statements from informants in Norwegian translated into English. 
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THEORY 
 
This section brings some definitions of special terms commonly used concerning contingency, 
it seeks to give a brief description on how contingency-plans are developed, brief descriptions 
of what may go wrong, some common human errors and behavior and thoughts on improvi-
sation. The topic of efficiency and financial demands versus safety is also mentioned in this 
chapter. In addition to books and papers on the topic, relevant marine casualty reports 
containing analyses and safety recommendations are referred to. 
Contingency and crisis management in general 
 
Within safety management built on culture [retrospective], both scientists and practitioners 
ask themselves what has happened in order to identify new hazards and how to manage them. 
Safety management built on Resilience Engineering, on the other hand, view upon the 
possibility of unfortunate events to occur, Hafting13. Contingency to manage crises nowadays 
are most commonly built on both statistics and likeliness of various incidents to occur and 
also assessment of the specific risks or hazards one faces on board the actual ship; risk-
assessment.  
Risk-assessment and the following planning demands a considerable use of resources and 
time to secure that organization, systems, procedures, equipment and training turns out to be 
useful tools for managing or handling incidents or accidents. 
In order to justify the relevance of contingency, plans and the process of developing such, to 
this thesis, I will refer to Hafting14where it is stated that new plans [developed during the 
management of crises - improvisation] are usually intentional actions based on former 
contingency plans15. General Dwight D. Eisenhower apparently stated during WWII: “A plan 
is nothing – planning is everything”, which I find supportive to Hafting16.  
To give the reader of this thesis some deeper insight in contingency planning I will try to 
describe the development of such plans in this section.  
 
 
13 Hafting (red) 2017:38 
14 Hafting (red) 2017:38 
15 Hafting (red) 2017:39 
16 Hafting (red) 2017: 38,38 
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Developing contingency plans 
 
To manage various unhappy incidents, crisis or unfortunate events organizations, such as a 
ship`s crew, must be well prepared in order to handle such events. A vital tool for engineering 
such preparedness would be contingency plans. Due to the scope of this thesis I find it useful 
to describe how such plans may be developed. This is stated by IMO conventions; SOLAS17, 
MARPOL18 and STCW19. Developing contingency plans are mandatory based on various 
prescriptions which states how and when risk-assessments should be performed and the 
frequency of revisions.20  
Prior to contingency planning one will have to perform an assessment of specific risks as a 
base for the work on contingency-plans. This would contribute to increase the possibilities of 
successful crisis – management. A risk-assessment starts with browsing known and probable 
risks and vulnerabilities concerning all ship operations. Findings are sorted out in limited 
sections as; various deck and engine-operations, risks of fire and/or explosions, risks of 
grounding, collision etc21. Assessment to be performed by the ship`s crewmembers with 
special expertise on each area accordingly in cooperation with a company`s land-based 
organization22.  
Such assessment may start from scratch not taking in account existing barriers23 
(organization, personnel, procedures and equipment) to limit the risk of accidents or 
unpleasant incidents; known as a naked assessment and recommended by Bestia Risk 
Consulting24. Naked assessment may lead to a better understanding of how systems work and 
why existing measures are formulated as they are. 
 
17 SOLAS: Safety of Life At Sea 
18 MARPOL: Marine Pollution convention 
19 STCW: Standards for Training, Certification and Watckeeping 
20 FOR-2005-01-01-8 – «Forskrift om arbeidsmiljø mv. på skip», FOR-1993-12-22-1239- «Forskrift om 
risikoanalyse for flyttbare innretninger», FOR-2014-07-01-1019 – «Forskrift om redningsredskaper på skip», 
FOR-2014-09-05-1191- «Forskrift om sikkerhetsstyringssystem for skip m.m». 
21 FOR-2005-01-01-8 – «Forskrift om arbeidsmiljø mv. på skip», FOR-1993-12-22-1239- «Forskrift om 
risikoanalyse for flyttbare innretninger», FOR-2014-07-01-1019 – «Forskrift om redningsredskaper på skip», 
FOR-2014-09-05-1191- «Forskrift om sikkerhetsstyringssystem for skip m.m». 
22 Skipssikkerhetsloven [ Law on Ships Safety] § 7. 
23 See the «Swiss Cheese» - model, Reason 1997 p. 12 
24 Bestia Risk Consulting, hand-out 2016 p. 20: https://www.bestia.no 
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A more common practice has been to perform the assessment starting with already established 
barriers. Barriers are, as described by Reasons “Swiss Cheese Model”25, special systems and 
equipment to manage crises, organization such as safe-operation procedures and plans as well 
as the skills, knowledge and experience of the crew. Such barriers aim to prevent unfortunate 
events or accidents to occur. What is crucial here is to use crew- or staff members to look 
upon operations on the actual ship or company to secure an efficient and safe outcome of the 
work. This is also stated by international (SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW- conventions) and 
national regulations. The Norwegian “Skipssikkerhetsloven” § 7 states that the company shall 
ensure that the master and crew are given the opportunity to participate in the establishing, 
performing and further developing of the safety management system26. 
 
Figure 1 – Swiss Cheese-model 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in the introduction of this thesis, a state of one hundred percent 
safety is acknowledged to be impossible to obtain. This fact leads to the term commonly 
named “residual risk” and described not only as risks not taken into account, but also risks 
considered prevented (barriers) within acceptable limits, Lunde27. Acceptable limits -
ALARP28 – meaning creating barriers to reduce risk to a reasonable and possible extent 
 
25 Reason 2016:9 
26 IMO: Safety of life at sea (SOLAS) chapter IX, International Safety Management – code (ISM-code), and the 
Norwegian “Skipssikkerhetsloven” § 7 (National legislation based on SOLAS/ISM-code by ratification of the 
SOLAS convention) 
27 Lunde 2016:34 
28 ALARP: As Low as Reasonable Possible. Based on a cost vs. benefit- analysis 
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regarding cost versus expected gain. The residual risk represents all what may go wrong in 
spite of safety routines and equipment. Lunde names some of these29: 
Wanted human actions: Acts of terror, sabotage or other criminal acts. Human errors: 
Lack of competence, [experience] or consciousness. Material failure: Failure of 
materials, equipment, systems or transferring. Other impact: Extreme weather 
conditions, catastrophic nature-events, epidemic outbursts or attacks by animals or 
other live organisms. Unidentified incidents: Risks not taken into account or not 
foreseen, “Black Swans30”. In this thesis I find it appropriate to mention a few central 
factors.  
 
Using routines from sources as other companies, or ships or general guidelines or neglecting 
to perform proper risk-assessment may turn out fatal pursuant to AIBN (2013/03). An 
investigation made by the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN), following a fatal 
accident on a chemical tanker, discovered that the company had failed to perform a proper 
risk-assessment for the actual vessel. The assessment had been performed by the master and 
head of company, not engaging the crewmembers of the ship. Operational procedures were 
had been developed based on recognized standards (ISGOTT31 and Tanker Safety Guide, 
Chemicals). This was criticized by the AIBN: 
“In the AIBN’s view, the factors addressed by ISGOTT and Tanker Safety Guide, Chemicals 
are relevant to the safe operation of vessels, but it is nonetheless necessary to carry out risk 
assessments and implement necessary company and vessel-specific measures.”32 
In the aftermath of the assessment, procedures and instructions are worked out as well as 
securing the availability of equipment necessary and mandatory for safe operations and crisis-
management. Mandatory requirements based on international and domestic regulations will 
be crucial when performing this work. All aiming to avoid unfortunate incidents or more 
serious accidents. Following the above, contingency plans to manage what is known as the 
residual risk to be established. 
 
29 Lunde 2016:34,35 
30 See section “Definitions” 
31 ISGOTT: International Safety Guide for Tankers and Terminals 
32 AIBN: Report sjø 2013/03, English version, p. 46 
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Training, exercises and drills 
 
Plans as described above are useful tools, but to be effective as such organizations will have 
to practice the performance to see if they work and to improve them if so needed. 
Training, exercises and drills serve to benefit the handling or managing and probability of 
successful outcome of all kinds of anticipated situations, including crises. Among other 
authors and experts on the subject, Lars Weisæth and Ragnar Kjeserud33 holds training in 
managing of unexpected situations [crises] to be important to deal with such events. 
Contingency is formalized in alarm plans and alarm instructions outlining tasks and 
procedures for each member of the crew and staff to handle various unwanted incidents or 
accidents. These tasks and procedures are to be objects for mandatory exercises stated by both 
International and national regulations34 pursuant to SOLAS chapter III35. As to instructions, 
Regulation 8 in chapter III of SOLAS states that for every person on board there shall be clear 
instructions to be followed in cases of emergencies. These instructions shall be written in 
English or in the language required by the flag-state of the ship. Alarm- and emergency-
instructions shall be placed at easy-to-see locations on board. The contents of such 
instructions are stated by Regulation 37 of SOLAS chapter III.  
Rule 19 in SOLAS chapter III sets mandatory requirements to emergency training and drills 
and apply to all ships;  
- Knowledge of safety installations and practice prior to mustering. All crew-members 
with dedicated duties in cases of emergency shall be familiar to their duties before the 
sea-voyage commences…Exercises shall, to the extent of practical possibility, be 
carried out as if it was a real state of emergency. Each crewmember shall participate in 
at least one abandoning ship drill and one fire drill every month. Such drills shall take 
place within 24 hours after leaving port if more than 25% of the crew have not 
participated in drills on board the actual ship the previous month. 
Regulation 19 also describes the minimum content of abandoning ship- and fire-drills. 
Further-more this regulation states requirements as to when education/training and instruction 
on board shall take place and the content of such training; 
 
33 Weisæth & Kjeserud 2008:17 
34 IMO: SOLAS chapter III, regulations 6.4.1, 8, 19, 26, 30 and 37 
35 Translation of SOLAS requirements into English by author based on Norwegian regulation-text 
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- Training in the use of the ship`s safety equipment shall be performed as soon as pos-
sible, not exceeding two weeks after the crewmember embarked for service. 
For RO-RO passenger-ships (ferries) there are special mandatory provisions, mainly related to 
safety-equipment and frequency of exercises. These are to be found in Regulation 26 of 
SOLAS chapter III.  
Pursuant to the above-mentioned regulations, there are four common ways to exercise or 
types of exercises described by Løvik:  
 Drills: 
- Crew and staff (or parts of them) drills on using safety-equipment, procedures and 
systems to make sure they are able to handle these automatically in an emergency. 
36 
 
 Table-top exercises: 
- Relevant participants from the crew and/or staff handles various emergency 
scenarios in an “round the table”- simulation. Intercom, cellphones and other 
means of communication may be used to make the simulation as realistic as 
possible. Safety-equipment are seldom used, but procedures may be evaluated.37 
The purposes of these two types of exercise are to prepare crew and staff for the next step – 
full-scale exercises pursuant to Løvik38. They also have the advantage of saving time so that 
schedules may be overheld. In the maritime industry schedules are very tight so as the 
financial margins. The term “time is money” is an everyday challenge in this branch.  
Leaders must weigh the costs of developing a safety culture, which may be considerable, 
against the financial demands of the trade. It is claimed by Perrow39 that leaders emphasize 
efficiency over safety 
 Simulations: 
- Simulations are central means within crisis- and contingency-training. Research 
indicates that simulations may provide better learning, increased motivation and 
improved performance. A simulation is based on a scenario aiming to present real 
 
36 Løvik 2017:93 
37 Løvik 2017:74 
38 Løvik 2017:75 
39 Hafting (red) 2017:25 
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phenomena. Participators are given defined roles, available resources etc. prior to 
the exercise starts40. The development of simulator-technology over the last years 
and continuing, have made such training more common and preferable. This may 
also be due to less expenses in training and the possibilities of increasing the 
severity of scenarios without running risks. Naval-officers serving certain trades41 
are regularly attending maritime training-centers to train and retrain contingency 
using navigation-simulators. Boin and McConnell points out benefits of simulation 
and exercises: “There is much to be gained from the prior specifications [planning 
for emergencies and crises]of roles and responsibilities; the allocation of 
materials, equipment and information systems; and the testing of systems under 
`trial`conditions through simulations and exercises”42.  
 
 Full-scale exercises: 
- The whole crew and/or staff (or parts of them) handles various emergency 
scenarios. This includes to follow procedures, handling equipment and organizing 
available resources. Often a ship-shore (company staff, authorities and various 
organizations concerning contingency) interaction is a part of such exercises43. 
A full-scale exercise requires a certain amount of use of human resources and time. Hence 
such exercises are not very often performed, especially when ship and onshore staff are 
participating in common scenarios. Improvisation may be emphasized in all three types of 
exercises. As to drills, they might be most useful to train unexperienced crewmembers in 
various techniques for handling safety-equipment. For the latter three types, more experienced 
personnel will be forced to use their creativity. 
Pursuant to Løvik44, exercises may be a combination of those mentioned above. What is 
important, he underlines, is that exercises must be planned to secure optimal learning. In 
addition to this, it is important to be aware of and clarify the level of an exercise. One must 
consider whether it is only one level or more to be included in an exercise. (Strategic, 
 
40 Eriksen 2011:144,145 
41 Mandatory training and retraining for officers serving on HSC (mandatory requirements) and ferries 
(company policy) 
42 Boin and McConnell 2007:52,53 
43 Løvik 2017:75 
44 Løvik 2017:75 
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operational or tactical level)45. Løvik46 defines the different levels. These are focused on 
society as a whole, so I have tried to translate into an onboard ship setting. The strategic level 
would be the shipboard, that is the leaders of the ship (Master, chief officer and chief 
engineer). Their tasks, pursuant to Løvik47, are to get a view over the situation, assemble 
knowledge and information, interpret states of the situation, coordinate information to crew, 
passengers, company and external aids, Løvik48 Operative level will be leaders of each section 
or domain-specific teams, for example leaders of fire-fighting teams, evacuation teams etc. 
(Junior officers, quartermasters or other personnel pointed out to lead specific teams.). Their 
tasks should be in situ coordination, communication and advice upwards and downward in the 
organization, distributing resources in situ and cooperation between teams. For both levels 
above, leadership should be emphasized. Tactical level or 1. Line consists of those performing 
the responses in situ. (Ratings, junior officers and others, often with special training as to 
handle different tasks as firefighting or maneuver lifeboats etc.). They are to perform the 
practical tasks in fighting a crisis both concerning manual work, making in situ decisions and 
handling safety-equipment. In this level, pursuant to Løvik49 knowledge and practical skills 
are trained and learned [experience being engineered].  
A view on the topic - improvisation 
 
Contingency-plans may be developed and exercised to the best of the organization`s ability 
and knowledge. One can however never anticipate all possible hazards or combinations of 
these 50. Hence there will be a need of improvisation to manage some incidents or accidents.  
Hafting 51state that when managing crises the leadership will meet situations not foreseen in 
plans. When the crisis occurs, the situation is chaotic and difficult to follow, and there is a 
great need of information52. During a crisis both leaders and operative personnel must act and 
make decisions based on insufficient oversight. Even if such decisions are not optimal, it is 
better to initiate actions to reduce damages caused by the crisis. The personnel must 
 
45 Løvik 2017:71 
46 Løvik 2017:30-32 
47 Løvik 2017:30 
48 Løvik 2017:30 
49 Løvik 2017:30-32 
50 Reason 1997/2016:74 
51 Hafting (red) 2017:38 
52 Hafting (red) 2017:38 
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improvise to find solutions while in the midst of the situation. Improvisation is crisis 
management as it develops53. 
In this section my intention is to explore theories describing and explaining the foundations of 
improvisation. I have divided this section in five sub-sections: When a crisis occurs, human 
and organizational behavior, planning and efficiency and financial requirements vs. safety.  
Browsing available literature, books, articles and papers, has shown me that not much have 
been said on this matter. Nevertheless I have been able to find some enlightening and 
interesting thoughts on the subject though. Webb and Chevreau54 clarifies some aspects of 
improvisation: Initially they claim improvisation to be present in all social settings, including 
both routine and non-routine. Routine, they say, requires a minimum of improvisation, whilst 
in crises the demand to improvise increases dramatically. Crises disrupt, breach or challenge 
social orders because no existing routines are at hand to cope with it. If there was no demand 
for improvised actions, they point out, there would be no distinction between a crisis and a 
normal situation55. They describe routine and crises to be situated along a continuum. “At one 
end of the continuum lie routine social settings that involve purely conventional activities, and 
at the other end lie crisis situations56”. They continue to explain: “Routine settings involve 
higher degrees of conventionality and lower degrees of improvisation, while crises involve 
higher degrees of improvisation and lower degrees of conventionality”57.  
When a crisis occurs 
Weisæth and Kjeserud58 defines a crisis as a situation of deviance which develops in such 
manner that it represents a serious threat to life and personal safety or threatens a company`s 
commercial interests. Ordinary problem-solving and routines will not be sufficient to handle 
the situations. On the use of computers where all contingencies and rules for response are 
programmed to make decisions, Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss states: “The frightening prospect with 
the `Star Wars` defense system, which requires that all contingencies be anticipated and rules 
for response be programmed  into a computer, is that the expert`s ability to use intuition will 
be forfeited and replaced by merely competent decision-making. In a crisis competence is not 
 
53 Hafting (red) 2017:38,39 
54 Webb and Chevreau 2006:68 
55 Webb and Chevreau 2006:68 
56 Webb and Chevreau 2006:68 
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good enough”59. Webb and Chevreau60 support this by claiming that technology may serve as 
supplement s but not as substitute for humans. 
Weisæth & Kjeserud61 continue by describing different particulars or signs of crisis-
situations: Serious threats to humans, organization or society. One or more values are at stake 
for persons, environment, material or reputation. Not all these values may be object to equal 
importance, which lead to the necessity of making priorities and facing dilemmas. Such 
dilemmas stress the decision-making process. Minor manageable incidents occurring 
simultaneously or leading to a chain-reaction may cause new situations or crises. This may 
strain the decision-maker`s capacity to handle a certain number of different situations 
simultaneously. Common incidents have shown several times to trig accidents and 
catastrophes. A high degree of uncertainty when estimating [or understanding] a situation that 
initially looks insignificant or harmless but may turn into a crisis. Especially in the time 
immediately prior to a crisis denial to acknowledge sign of danger occurs. This phenomenon 
is also described by Weick and Sutcliffe62, as “Reluctance to Simplify”, where early signs are 
diminished concerning their potential hazard. 
Other stressors when an incident or accident occurs might be: Reduced information and a high 
degree of uncertainty, signs at hand shows that something is wrong demanding decisions to be 
made based on limited information, reduced control and steerability; management might find 
themselves unable to influence the incidents leading to a crisis, a total lack of control tends to 
create a feeling of helplessness among leaders and scare them, escalation of the crisis either 
produced by initial management or by the crisis itself, denial of the critical situation drives the 
leader further on to a painful self-recognition, swift changes of the situation demand 
flexibility and smoothness by management, limited timeframes as to make decisions based on 
limited information or oversight, group- and media-pressure as disagreements within the 
leader-group and/or media demanding information and explanations may influence leaders 
handling capacity, long workhours may also reduce the capacity as to sound judgement63.  
Hafting also describes the crisis-situation to be chaotic and complex and there is an urging 
need of information64. The crisis seems to be new and often occurs inconvenient pursuant to 
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Weisæth and Kjeserud65. Contingency-plans are upheld by these authors to be based on 
yesterday`s crisis. Hence a need of creative problem-solving in a stressed situation were 
surroundings are complex. As a leader one might therefore be taken by surprise and be 
paralyzed by the amount of information and the dynamics of an ongoing crisis66. Webb and 
Chevreau states on crises: “They have the potential to…create ambiguity and confusion.”67.  
 
Figure 2 – Time versus Information (FalckNutec 2010) 
As the figure above aims to illustrate some of the particulars described by Weisæth and 
Kjeserud above68. Decisions on what actions to be taken shortly after an incident or accident 
has occurred, will most probably have to be made based on limited information. Time to 
gather further oversight of the situation will diminish the time available to make decisions and 
to execute them. There will also be limited space to alter actions that proves inappropriate to 
handle a situation as time passes by. The more facts on the situation one gets, the less time to 
act or alter actions to use. Escalation may create new situations or other obstacles, such as loss 
of crew or material resources, may occur and demand new decisions to me made and eating 
more of the time at hand to prevent ending up in a disaster69.  
 
65 Weisæth & Kjeserud 2008:23,24 
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67 Webb and Chevreau 2006:67 
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This element is also regarded by Mendonca et.al.: “The on-scene commander and support 
staff gather and analyze data, make decisions, and monitor their implementation and 
consequences. The activities required to respond to an incident are often dangerous and must 
be carried out under time pressure. Activation of emergency plans is based upon assessment 
of the potential impacts of an accident and the courses of action needed to eliminate or at 
least mitigate this impact”70. One must also consider the occurrence of unanticipated events 
arising during response operations71. Boin and McConnell72 also have some thoughts on this 
issue in their article. They enhance that crisis leaders will experience constraints in their effort 
to manage response actions due to lack of reliable information of the situation or the state of 
response network. Communication are mentioned as a typical fail, in the manner of technical 
break-down.  
Two real-life examples of crisis management:  
The onboard management in the aftermath of the Costa Concordia accident has been object to 
many comments world-wide and may have had some impact on the company`s reputation. 
Especially the master`s behavior during the rescue-operation was not regarded as an example 
to follow and he was later prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment for his acts or lack of 
such. According to the casualty report on the accident presented by the Italian MIT, the 
master`s performance where affected by errors. He omitted procedures, mainly the Decision 
Support System, he left the bridge as the first person and after a while he left the ship at an 
early stage of the emergency and when this was still going on. He failed to pay attention to  
the seriousness of the situation and hence disoriented his staff and DPA73 and lack of know-
ledge of vital equipment.74 This report also criticizes the master and crew for not following 
the ships SMS and used it as the tool it is meant to bee to help facing serious events75. 
[Violation; referring to Reason`s term misvention76].  
Another example on crisis management, is the case of the Norwegian coastal steamer the MV 
“Nordlys” after a fire outside the west coast of Norwegian. Most sadly, two of the 
crewmembers perished and another two members of the crew suffered severe injuries during 
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the accident. In their casualty report the accident investigation board of Norway (AIBN) 
stated: “The management system lacked procedures for training to deal with loss of 
personnel. The personnel also lacked training for such situations, which to a certain extent 
explain why safety-critical tasks were not attended to in connection with the fire. Among other 
things, the air supply and fuel supply were not shut off”77  
The AIBM casualty report 2013 continues: “…This accident has highlighted challenges 
relating to the performance of manual actions and compliance with procedures in an 
emergency situation, especially in the event of loss of personnel in complex, chaotic 
situations...If the supply of fuel and air had been shut off, the fire would probably gradually 
have died down by itself. The decision-support system on the bridge included a checklist in 
the event of fire that, among other things, entailed shutting off the fuel and air supply. The 
chief engineer was to muster to the bridge in an emergency situation, and he would normally 
be the one to follow up the checklist. However the chief engineer was put out of action as a 
result of the fire, and the fuel and air supply were not close off […] The main fire-
extinguishing system did not […] work as a barrier in relation to preventing escalation of the 
accident. The captain was responsible for deciding whether to release the system. The 
situation on the bridge was hectic and challenging in the minutes after the alarm was trigged. 
The fire caused å blackout, and the loss of engine power was assessed as critical because 
Nordlys was near Steinvåggrunnene (shallows) at the time. The AIBN believes that the focus 
on clarification of this situation may have led to a postponement of the decision as to whether 
the CO2 system in the engine room should be released. When the situation had been clarified, 
and the captain was able to address the issue of whether to release the CO2 system, however, 
he did not know whether there were any crew in the engine room. He therefore chose not to 
release the system. In the AIBN`s view, this is a difficult, but safety-critical, dilemma that will 
often be relevant in such situations…In the event of fire, it is up to the captain to decide 
whether to release the CO2 system to limit the extent of damage or not release the system to 
avoid endangering the lives if anyone could still be in the area. [The release of CO2 in 
confined spaces may be lethal to humans in situ]. Not only does this impose mental strain on 
the captain. It is also a dilemma that can reduce or remove the focus on making other 
decisions and carrying out required actions. Several actions that should have been 
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implemented were not initiated from the bridge were not initiated during the fire, such as 
closing of fire doors78 and watertight doors79…”80 
Human and organizational behavior 
 
Pursuant to Webb and Chevreau, another important point is that both individuals and 
organizations are engaged in improvisation. Individuals responding to a crisis “…often short-
curcuit or bypass established procedures, assume responsibility for things over which they 
have no authority, violate broader community norms, use makeshift tools or materials and 
perform their roles in new places”81.  Referring to Kreps et.al. (1994), Webb and Chevreau82  
say that roles are more likely to be improvised within the first twenty-four hours after an 
accident has occurred, actions by individuals having former disaster-experience and in newly 
formed organization. As to organizations, referring to Wachtendorf (2004), Webb and 
Chevreau suggest that: “…in responding to disasters organizations sometimes reproduce old 
structures and processes, continually adapt to changing circumstances and in some cases 
create new structures and processes in performing necessary functions”83.  
Pursuing the statement of James Reason84 in the introduction of this thesis, he continues by 
presenting the terms “bad rule – situations” or “non-rule - situations”. There will always be a 
possibility of circumstances, both when concerning normal operations and the occurrence of 
unfortunate incidents or accidents, where established plans, instructions, procedures cover nor 
being applicable to the actual situation85. Hence improvisation will turn out to be a necessity 
for the successful outcome of the management of crisis-situations. Improvisation have been 
said to consist of: 
Combining existing procedures or plans or creating new plans underway. This is; 
 Adjusting existing procedures in accordance with prevailing and/or alternating 
circumstances 
 Deviation from existing procedures 
 
78 Fire doors: Doors between sections on ships preventing fire from spreading 
79 Watertight doord: Door between sections on ship preventing water from passing 
80 AIBN casualty report 2013 p. 91,92 
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 Creating new procedures – underway – considering prevailing and/or alternating 
circumstances86 
I find this view exemplified in an article by Mendonca et.al.: “In certain situations, no 
planned-for activities may be feasible, leading to the need to revise the plan. An unexpected 
event may evolve; so that implemented plans are no longer applicable. An unexpected event 
may be multi-faceted, requiring emergency response organizations (EROs) to combine many 
plans in unexpected ways”87. And supported by Hafting88 that states, by referring to Pine e 
Cunha, Miner & Antonacopoulo (2017 p. 560), that to improvise means that plan and 
initiating actions overlap in such a way that a new plan is adjusted in accordance with the 
situation. A new plan is usually based on a previous contingency plan in a way that 
improvising consists of intentional actions. 
This is also emphasized by Mendonca et.al.: “These response plans can rarely be executed as 
expected, … Flexible approaches to emergency management are therefore required. Any such 
approach must be able to deal with uncertain and changing environment and allow for 
revision of planned courses of action. Moreover, the approach must be able to support 
emergency managers in improvising when no standard operating procedure can alleviate the 
catastrophe”89.  
Monitoring within teams are described by Endsley90 as taking over or assist whole or parts of 
other team-members tasks.  
 Reorganizing resources at hand to handle a situation (Use of substitutes) 
Each individual of a team has their specified roles or tasks pursuant to their personal skills, 
knowledge and references. These are expected to be shared with the other members of the 
team so that individuals can survey, assist or take over tasks performed by other team-
members pursuant to Endsley91. In their article, Rankin et.al. 92. points out three ways of 
improving a team`s performance. One of these is taking responsibility for tasks or roles 
outside one`s specialized domain They also introduce the term resilience as the ability to deal 
with changes that goes outside the system tolerance which it is designed [planned] for. A 
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resilient system, referring to Hollnagel (2009), they claim to have the ability to anticipate, 
monitor, respond and learn. Furthermore, by referring to Lundberg and Johansson (2016), 
they define resilience not as a state but an adaptive process in which improvisation plays a 
part93.  
Weick and Sutcliffe presents three definitions to the term resilience94: 
1.The capability of a system to maintain its functions and structures in the face of 
internal and external change and to degrade gracefully when it must. 2.The 
amount of change a system can undergo (its capacity to absorb disturbance) and 
remain within the same regimen-essentially retaining the same function, structure 
and feed-back. 3.A resilient system is able effectively to adjust its functioning prior 
to, during or following changes and disturbances, so that it can continue to 
perform as required after a disruption or a major mishap and in the presence of 
continuous stresses. 
On resilience they claim that most systems are trying to anticipate errors or incidents (trouble-
spots) but higher reliability systems in addition to such anticipation also pay attention to their 
capacity when it comes to investigate, learn and act not knowing what trouble ahead to act 
upon. Reliable systems are, pursuant to Weick and Sutcliffe95, spending time on improving 
their ability or capacity to perform quick studies, developing swift trust, enhance just-in-time 
learning, imagining next steps in detail, recombining parts of relevant previous experience96. 
An HRO, they point out, is not free of errors. The clue is that errors cannot disable the HRO97.  
In this thesis, shipping organization is regarded as High Reliability Organizations, a 
understanding I find to be supported in the following statement by Weick and Sutcliffe 
describing resilience specific to the maritime domain: 
 “Maritime organizations are accustomed to resilience because most of their operations 
consists of blue-water cruising away from land, rescuers, spare parts and expert diagnoses. If 
a rudder breaks, if the power goes off, the crew is dependent on its own resourcefulness to do 
something right now”98.  
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Mindful organizing is a term used by Weick and Sutcliffe99. This term states that both 
anticipation and resilience are needed to manage unexpected disruptions. As this focusing on 
improvisation in crisis – management I find this term highly useful to explain my topic. To 
avoid incidents or accidents, it is crucial to create defences or barriers as described by Reason 
to catch up and stop minor incidents or failures to evolve or escalate into hazardous situations. 
“All defences are designed to serve one or more of the following functions: to create 
understanding and awareness of the local hazards [understand how things work to benefit 
improvisation]…to restore the system to a safe state in an off-normal situation [understand 
systems]…”100 Weick & Sutcliffe101 divides the five elements of mindful organizing in two 
main sections. The first three are named anticipation and can be looked upon as means of 
such barriers: 
1) Preoccupation with failure102: To avoid failure we must look for it and be sensitive to 
early signs of failure. 
2) Reluctance to simplify103: Labels and clichés can stop one from looking further into 
the events. 
3) Sensitivity to operations: Systems are not static and linear, but rather dynamic and 
non-linear in nature. As one result it becomes difficult to know how one area of the 
organization`s operations will act compared to another part104 
In my opinion mindful operation demands a certain amount of experience and skills, or what I 
prefer to label as expertise. “An expert generally knows what to do based on mature and 
practiced understanding. When deeply involved in coping with his [or her] environment, he 
[or she] does not see problems in some detached way and work at solving them, nor does he 
[or she] worry about the future and devise plans”105 These items have also been studied, 
described and presented as “Three levels of performance”; knowledge, skills and experience 
by James Reason. A modified figure based on James Reasons106 “Three Levels of 
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Performance” may be enlighten what is a foundation of improvisation:      
 
Figure 3 - Modified based on Reason 1997/2016 
Pursuant to Reason107, the skill-based level consists of routine and highly practical tasks per-
formed automatically, only checking progress now and then. He claims that people are doing 
well on this level most of the time. The rule-based level is described by Reason108 as a state 
where preprogrammed behavior needs to be modified due to changing situations. These 
modifications may be based on problems previously experienced, incidents trained to handle 
or ruled by procedures. The label rule-based arising from the need of using memorized or 
written rules to automatically respond to various signs and signals. Consciousness is used to 
consider whether actions taken are appropriate to serve their purpose. The third level of this 
model – knowledge based - is one Reason109 claims that people are reluctant to come to, while 
it demands some effort. Effort to think through things on the spot, a slow procedure useful 
given available time and in a forgiving environment and, trying, failing and considering 
options requires both time and mental effort. In a state of emergency people are not at their 
peak and time to act may be limited. Understanding of problems may be patchy or inaccurate 
or both. Consciousness will also be limited in capacity to hold information. Also fear 
represent a limiting influence concerning the issue here. It is important to notice that 
Reason110 point out that these three levels of performance are not mutually exclusive. They 
may appear simultaneously.  This, I believe would support the validity of the figure above. 
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(Fig. nr. 3). Even if there is limited time at hand to decide and lack of information, I believe 
that one also need to make some considerations based on knowledge, skills and experience to 
be able to improvise in an emergency in spite of people being reluctant to use effort in 
deciding.  
The theory of Reason111 above I find supported by Grech et.al. 112 describing different kinds 
of human behavior: Skill-based behavior: Due to skills, most tasks are well mastered causing 
performance by reflex. Mental resources are minimally in use or set to other activities. This 
kind of behavior is said by Grech.et.al to be sensitive to routine-errors and may lead to a low 
state of attention. Rule-based behavior: Tasks or operations are performed following at set of 
rules, instructions or procedures. Personnel in training situations to gain skills and experience 
focus very hard on what they are doing causing lack of attention on the surroundings. Another 
negative aspect here according to Grech et.al.113, is that these performers are exposed to work 
overload [and fatigue] and may tend to use the wrong rules due to limited understanding of 
the system they are supposed to handle. 
After the “Maxim Gorkiy” - incident in 1989114, the master of the rescuing coast-guard ship 
KV “Senja” said: “The crew of the KV “Senja” was working incredibly efficient, and were 
rapid in finding solutions when the situation demanded such… (I guess we had good training 
from numerous inspections, exercises and rescue-operations)”115. This statement support 
what is described above as it shows the foundation of improvising. 
Giving a more detailed description of this subject, Reason116 points out two different modes 
of ways in which people control their actions: Conscious mode117: A slow, sequential, 
laborious or error-prone way of action, although a possible smart approach. This approach 
may lead to that the focus on or paying attention to specific items or issues causes ignorance 
or missing other important ones. This mode also restraint or reduce the mental capacity of the 
individual(s) facing the need to make decisions. It is, however, suitable for problem-solving in 
general. Automatic mode118: This mode is unconscious and not aware of the process leading 
to a certain perception, idea or action. It is virtually limitless in capacity, fast, multitask-
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friendly, it does not demand much effort and is essential for the purpose of handling everyday 
recurrences. Not suitable as a general problem-solver mode though, as it is highly based on 
special knowledge structures119.  
Similarities to Reason are described by Grech et.al 120 is Automated behavior121: This kind of 
behavior is a necessity in many operations to be able to perform correctly and make the right 
actions in due time. A fall-pit is that auto-mated actions may be executed due to wrong 
perception of a situation or expectation bias. Such behavior has a potential to threaten safety. 
A second dimension, still referring to Reason, is the immediate situation as to where there is a 
need to solve a problem. The extremes of these dimensions are familiar everyday situations 
and entirely new ones. In between one can find problems especially trained for or solutions 
written down in procedures122.  
Supporting both Reason123 and the master of the KV “Senja”, I will refer to Robin M. Hogarth 
who has formulated some thoughts on the issue comparing expertise with intuition. He 
defines the content of intuition as a stock of knowledge and experience, and that intuition is 
like expertise in the way that intuition is acquired by domain-specific or relevant experience 
which may be improved by instruction and practice124. Rankin et.al. states: “Improvisation 
can be seen as a range of different behaviors – at one end as small deviations in intended 
courses of action and at the other end spontaneous actions based mainly on intuition” 125. 
Pursuant to Rankin et.al. 126 I believe to see the importance of intuition related to 
improvisation and the resemblance to expertise. Based on the statement above I find 
Hogarth127 as a relevant source to the understanding of how expertise can be engineered.  
In defining the term intuition, Hogarth128 refers to intuitive understanding, containing the 
expressions: immediate understanding or cognition, knowledge or conviction gained by 
intuition, the power of faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without rational 
thought and inference (lack of deliberate or rational thought process), quick and ready insight 
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(speed of knowing). Insight being defined as the ability or act to seeing into a situation and 
apprehend the inner nature og things or seeing intuitively129. In addition, there is the notion of 
knowledge built up through previous intuitions and insight. The process of intuition is 
characterized by a lack of awareness of how outcomes have been achieved or what 
judgements made during the process. Perception of a situation is acquired by [automatically] 
taking into account various cues in the surroundings. “What is meant is simply that non-
intuitive processes are deliberate and can be specified after the fact. Logic and analysis can 
be made transparent. Intuition cannot”130. In my view this compares to what Dreyfuss & 
Dreyfuss131 call expertise and what Reason132. name automatic mode of control, an effortless 
and fast way of solving problems Even though Reasons133 third level of performance includes 
deliberate considerations, he states that people reluctantly use the effort to perform such 
considerations. In an emergency there might not be time to much consideration either134. The 
intuitive process described by Hogarth135 above is a quick and effortless one. Hogarth136 also 
states that intuitive judgements are based on looking both backwards and forward in time. 
Backward-looking he describe as interpreting experience and forward-looking represents 
predictions inferred from hypotheses or beliefs, both using a stock of knowledge. Such 
knowledge may, in some cases be domain specific. “Intuition can also represent a stock of 
knowledge on which a person can call if necessary.… The basic idea here is that we all know 
many things intuitively and, when questioned, can provide a response without really knowing 
where it came from”137. 
For the purpose of the topic of this thesis, I find domain-specific knowledge to be a necessity, 
to solve complicated or complex problems. So, how do one reach such knowledge? Once 
again I turn to Hogarth`s138 thoughts and ideas on educating intuition in my search for 
answers. Being aware that the art of teaching or education have been discussed by several 
scientists and authors, I find Hogarth139 to give both sufficient and relevant insight to my 
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topic, given the topic of this thesis and the resemblance I mean to see to Reason`s140 and other 
authors covering contingency and emergency ideas. On this basis I intend to refer to him on 
the matter of understanding the engineering of crewmembers to reach the knowledge-based 
level of performance as described by James Reason141, a level I believe to be most fortunate 
concerning the ability to improvise. 
Hogarth defines intuition as quick and ready insight142. Based on this definition I find 
intuition to be very useful or a necessity when unfortunate incidents occur or in an emergency 
where time is a key issue, as described above. Hogarth continues by explaining the label; 
insight, as “the power or act to seeing into a situation apprehending the inner nature of things 
or seeing intuitively […] people suddenly become aware of the solution or part of it, to a 
problem with which they are confronted.” 143. Such insight, he claims, demands knowledge as 
a necessity to solve problems. Insight may also occur, he states, when looking at a problem 
from a certain angle144. Pursuant to Hogarth the information-processing systems of an 
organism [or human] are engaged constantly in processing internal regulation and external 
regulation. Evolution works, he states, by retaining processes or systems found satisfactory to 
provide acceptable solutions to problems of adaption145. Hogarth146 refer to this as layers of 
systems found to work and that new systems or processes are added to existing layers 
systems, not necessarily replacing them. I find it important to be aware of this when training 
crew in handling everyday problem-solving and hence building the knowledge I believe to be 
a necessity to enhance their ability to improvise when dealing with critical situations or 
unfortunate incidents.  
He claims that people learn from two sources, namely; What they are told by others and what 
they experience themselves. These two sources, however, interact with each other. What has 
been told may influence experience and experience may affect the interpretation of what one 
is being told. He continues by classifying two categories of learning; Content as knowledge of 
facts, how different variables are connected. This knowledge to be stored in the individual`s 
long-term memory. Rules, on the other hand, are knowledge on how to do things, both stored 
in the long-term and the short-term memory. Some rules, such as how to walk, will be stored 
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for ever while performing the operation of various kinds of equipment may be stored on a 
short-time basis147. [As equipment frequently changes demanding new operation-procedures].   
On the subject of learning, Hogarth148 names two key principles to learn from experience. 
First, people learn by noticing associations or contingencies. The more of such being 
observed, the more likely they are to be remembered. Secondly, sanctions and rewards are 
helpful as to remember some associations better than others. He defines associations and 
contingencies as things occurring together, such as noticing the connections between actions 
and reactions. Rules and content are learned by what one experience, not from what you do 
not experience149. Seeing connections are critical to learning from experience150. Actions 
made based on beliefs, even though working, may not be optimal, thus such experience may 
be misleading. By this it is meant that learning from what is observed but not considered in 
the aftermath whether other options would have been more appropriate151. I believe this 
statement underlines the importance of debriefs following exercises, incidents, accidents or at 
the completion or during routine operations.  
Still regarding intuition to be similar to expertise, I find, what Weick and Sutcliffe152. names 
as “deference to expertise”, to be relevant to the topic of this thesis. Expertise may be ignored 
or dismissed, they explain, conditioned by rank, due to self-interest or rendered next to 
prevailing routine. Reliable systems organize in a way that individuals in their own 
hierarchies are attracted to propose unanticipated solutions Weick and Sutcliffe153 makes it an 
important point not to regard deference as submission though. Deference, they explain, 
demands that both the person who do the deferring and he or she who being deferred to are to 
be regarded as experts containing wisdom. One person is not giving in to another, rather using 
the other person`s relative and domain-specific expertise sensitive to the context. Referring to 
Simon Dekker, they claim expertise to emerge “from people querying each other, supplying 
data, opinions and other input to conversations in which it can be rejected, deferred to, 
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modified, delayed and more. Expertise, in other words, is a co-production”154. They express 
this as: “Somebody provides an explanation to someone else who asked for it”155.  
As improvising may be sensible to making mistakes and errors, I find it relevant to give a 
further, although brief description of some erroneous behaviors and violations in this section. 
Minor errors and mistakes also have an educational effect in the process leading to experience 
and intuition, Hogarth156. As to human errors, these have been described by several authors.  
Reason157 defines human error as:” The failure of planned actions to achieve their desired 
ends-without the intervention of some unforeseen event”158. Three elements to this definition 
are presented by Reason: 1. A plan or intention containing both goal and means to secure 
achievement. 2. The plan initiating a sequence of actions, and 3. To what extent actions 
succeed in achieving the goals. 
He continues by presenting some reasons why actions may fail to fulfill the intentions: 
The plan is appropriate, but actions fail to work as planned caused by:   
- Slips: observable actions associated with attentional or perceptual failures159. 
- Lapses: Internal events or failure of memory160. 
Inadequate plan: Actions are performed according to plan, but no achievement of goal or 
intention. Failure lies at a higher level such as mental processes in: 
- Assessing available information, the planning itself, formulating intentions and 
misjudging the consequences of the actions planned161.  
 
Reason162 labels these errors as mistakes and divides those into two:  Rule-based mistakes: 
Misapplication of normally good rules, application of bad rules or failure to apply to good 
rules (Violation). Knowledge-based mistakes: Running out of prepacked solutions, problem-
solving on-line in situ which is sensible and potent to making mistakes. He also states that 
 
154 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015:116 
155 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015:116 
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157 Reason 2016:71 
158 Reason 2016:71 
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errors involve some kind of deviation, either from current intention or from adequate path163. 
Such deviation, still pursuant to Reason164. may have different causes such as deliberate or 
erroneous violation. Examples of deliberate violations would be that possible bad 
consequences are intentionally gained by action or the risk of such consequences are taken 
This I find comparable to the statements of Grech et.al.165above.  
 
The accuracy of risk-assessment may enhance correct or incorrect actions. Correct actions: 
based upon accurate risk-assessment as incorrect actions may be based upon in-accurate or 
inappropriate risk-assessment166.  This I believe point out the importance of using time and 
effort in performing risk-assessments both as bases of safe-job procedures and contingency 
plans, as well as including all relevant personnel in this work. One may also refer to Weick 
and Sutcliffe on deference to expertise167 to justify the use of a ship`s crew in planning. 
Performing this work will, in my opinion, represent a valuable arena of learning and building 
experience. Accepting the fact that SOPs and contingency plans cannot cover all possibilities 
of unsafe behavior. All hazards or combination of them cannot be anticipated. Bad-rule or no-
rule situations will always occur168.  
 
Successful actions are not necessarily correct actions, according to Reason (2016). 
Compliance to rules or procedures is not automatically correct as non-compliance incorrect. It 
depends on the circumstances, local conditions and the adequacy of the procedures. What is 
correct is not always known in advance169. To exemplify this, Reason170 refer in his book to 
the Piper Alpha – accident where emergency- procedures required personnel to muster in the 
galley-area of the accommodation. People in speech complied to the instructions and went to 
the pointed-out area. Most sadly this area was in the direct line of a fireball, causing the death 
of most of those who had acted in compliance with instructions.  
 
 
163 Reason 2016:71 
164 Reason 2016 p. 72 
165 Grech et.al. 2008:53-55 
166 Reason 2016 p. 73 
167 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015 p. 112-128 
168 Reason 2016 p. 74 
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On the other hand, successful violations are not equal to correct violation. Such violations 
create conditions sensible to promote dangerous misventions such as over-confidence in 
personal skills, and underestimation of hazards171.  
Reasons term erroneous performance describes, among others mistakes or misjudgments 
made by professionals based on knowledge. The latter I believe may be caused by the 
misjudge of a situation, which I find highly understand-able considering the limited oversight 
and information, as described in the next section here, at the occurrence of an incident or 
accident. These three kinds of performance will, according to Reason172, lead to an unsafe [or 
unsuccessful] outcome.  
James Reason173 presents, in his book, six kinds of rule-related behavior , including correct 
and erroneous performance. The way I interpret Reason here is as follows: 
Correct compliance: correct and (safe) performance achieved by handling a situation in 
accordance with appropriate instructions and procedures. Correct violation: correct 
performance by taking actions deviating from instructions and procedures according to safe-
operation-procedures (SOPs) or contingency-plans. Correct improvisation: actions performed 
where instructions and procedures covering the specific situation are absent although leading 
to a successful and safe outcome. Misvention: actions deviating from (established174) and 
appropriate safety-rules and performance errors leading to an unsafe (unfortunate) outcome. 
Mispliance: mistaken compliance with inappropriate or inaccurate procedures causing an 
unsafe (unfortunate) outcome. Mistake: knowledge-based action(s) or performance(s) 
following unsuitable plans due to lack of appropriate procedures. 
In addition to Reason`s175 erroneous performances, Weick and Sutcliffe176 present the term 
misjudgment. The response to frequently occurring, nonobvious breakdowns is based on what 
might be named first explanation. Such an explanation gives the impression of being in 
control but may turn out to be a serious misjudgment.  
 
171 Reason 2016 p. 75 
172 Reason 2016:75 
173 Reason 2016:75-79 
174 Referring to established SJAs 
175 Reason 2016:75-79 
176 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015:1,2 
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However: “…, compliance is not automatically `correct`, nor a violation incorrect. It all 
depends on the local conditions and the adequacy of the procedures”177.  
I recognize correct violation and correct improvisation, as described here, to be a version of 
the term improvisation. Pursuant to Webb and Chevreau on improvisation, individuals: 
“…often short-curcuit or bypass established procedures, assume responsibility for things 
over which they have no authority, violate broader community norms, use makeshift tools or 
materials and perform their roles in new places”178.   
Reason179 gives an example of successful improvisation by referring to the accident at Sioux 
City, US, where an airplane crashed after a flight without controlling all means to steer the 
plane due to a disintegration of one part of an engine. The crew were able to control the plane 
to a certain degree by using remaining engines. The pilots had to improvise due to the fact 
that there were no procedures at hand. Such an incident where considered by designers to be 
too unlikely to occur (“Black Swan” or “Wild Card”180). Hence no procedures to cover this 
kind of event had not been worked out.  
Concerning the maritime domain, I may refer to Colreg72, rule 2 – Responsibility181, where 
legislation requires improvisation in certain situations: 
 
To be able to deviate from the rules (improvise), in order to avoid collision, I believe it 
demands both knowledge and experience. This belief I find supported by James Reason`s182 
 
177 Reason 2016:73 
178 Webb and Chevreau 2006:68 
179 Reason 2016:79 
180 See definitions section in this thesis 
181 IMO: Colreg (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea) 1972, Rule 2 
182 Reason 2016:68-70 
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three levels of performance – knowledge-based performance in a sense that such ability is 
needed to handle unforeseen situations.  
As an example on misvention one may refer to a conclusion by Giustiano et.al. on the case 
concerning the “Costa Concordia” `s unhappy voyage on January 13, 2012: “The analysis of 
the collision of Costa Concordia displays how improvised actions can take place even in 
highly regulated environments and create organizational drift toward disastrous 
outcomes…”183. Established facts in the aftermath of this accident showed that the master 
deliberately deviated from the initial voyage-plan, resulting in a, not only unfortunate or 
unhappy outcome, but a tragic one. Even though this deviant behavior does not concern 
contingency in the first place, I still find it descriptive to illuminate that improvisation in itself 
provides no guarantee to a safe or happy outcome. 
Webb and Chevreau184 describes in their paper some organizational impediments to 
improvisation and creativity. They specifically mention bureaucracy as an obstacle in the 
sense that such organizations demand conformity and predictability. This in opposite to 
improvisation which involves alteration of patterns and routines185. In order to encourage 
improvisation, Webb and Chevreau186 investigates in what ways they discourage 
improvisation and find ways to enhance such behavior. They describe six characteristics of 
organizations that impedes creativity:  
Webb and Chevreau187 claims that organizations relay heavily on written rules and procedures 
describing in detail how different tasks should be performed, referring to Weber (1904 and 
1946), Goffman (1961) and Veblen (1921). On the positive side, they emphasize the benefits 
of stability and continuity as people starts and quits the organization. On the negative hand, 
reliance on established rules and procedures chokes the ability to think creatively and thus 
handle new situations or ambiguous ones. This is named trained incapacity. Referring to 
Weber (1904/1946), they argue that bureaucracies destroy the autonomy, compassion and 
creativity of individuals. The demand for conformity among its members, the organization 
devaluate and under-utilizing the reservoir of creativity within their staff, referring to 
Goffman (1961).  
 
183 Giustiano et.al. 2015:231 
184 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69,70 
185 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69,70 
186 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69 
187 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69 
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Another impediment is systematic divisioning and specialization of tasks. Positively these 
would contribute to increased efficiency, but also create some undesirable consequences. 
Most organizations are said to view upon safety, risk or crisis management as specialized 
functions. Except HROs, referring to Sagan (1993), Webb and Chevreau188. point at a 
tendency to diffusion of responsibility within organizations. Instead of engineering a safety-
culture engaging all members, one assumes that experts will come to the rescue in a crisis. 
This will not encourage all to consider their role or contribution to crisis-response  
The third characteristic is unrealistic crisis and disaster planning. Pursuant to Webb and 
Chevreau, referring to Tierney et.al. (2001), this phenomenon is based on the tendency or 
urge to emphasize contingency to the extent of mandatory requirements. These are unrealistic 
documents serving symbolic purposes, leaving the impression of control to the public and 
employees189. This will, pursuant to Webb and Chevreau190, lead to incompetence within the 
staff rather than creativity.  
Referring to Wybo (2004), the authors point out that learning in everyday work is an efficient 
way to prepare crisis management. Learning may also be carried out directly by training 
sessions and case-studies. Indirectly this can be achieved, referring to Chevreau and Denis-
Remis (2003) or indirectly by implementing risk-analysis tools, with reference to Chevreau 
et.al. (2006). However this must be built on trust and commitment of managers and not lead 
to punishment of people responsible for errors. This is the fourth impediment. 
Sanctions and the fear of such can prevent individuals from engaging in risk- and crisis-
management191. Referring to Fischer (1998) and Dynes (1994), organizations commonly 
subscribe to a disaster mythology Webb and Chevreau says and adapt a command and control 
approach or ideology. This is the fifth impediment to improvisation. Based on the belief that 
disasters create chaos breakdown and anti-social behavior, the response to crises by 
organizations is to impose order, exert control and centralize command. Referring to Tierney 
et.al. (2001), this paper upholds that such approach might [possibly] serve the interests of 
certain organizations but will be inappropriate to manage most crises. Crises demands 
flexibility and improvisation, not central command nor rigidity192.  
 
188 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69 
189 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69 
190 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69 
191 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69 
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The sixth and final impediment presented by Webb and Chevreau193 is the increasingly search 
for technological solutions as problem-solvers to problems of interley social nature. Western 
societies are said to be McDonaldized. Referring to Ritzer (2000), this paper explains this 
expression as the rewarding of predictability, efficiency and calculability. The replacement of 
humans by non-human technology is a part of this phenomenon, of which the crisis-arena is 
also affected by. Investments in computer-programs such as decision support systems are 
made to aid crisis response. Both public and private organizations are said to emphasize such 
investments194. Webb and Chevreau195 consider these as useful tools but not able to provide 
all answers. Tasks during crises, such as coordination, allocating and distributing resources 
and communication requires humans not technology. Pursuant to Webb and Chevreau196, 
technology may serve as supplement but not as substitute for human ingenuity, creativity and 
improvisation.  
Planning for improvisation when a crisis occurs; a real-life example  
 
In June 1989 the Russian cruise-ship, the “Maxim Gorkiy”, carrying 575 passengers and a 
crew of 379, ran into an icefield outside Svalbard, Norway. The impact from the ice caused a 
severe leakage in the forward part of the ship`s hull, and she started to sink at the bow as tons 
of seawater flushed inside. The situation was, after a short while, stabilized so that she was 
kept afloat. As a precaution concerning the situation to take a negative direction, the crew 
started to evacuate passengers in lifeboats and life-rafts to the floating ice-pads197.  The 
Norwegian coast-guard ship, the KV “Senja”, was on patrol in the area some three to four 
hours away from the position of the “Maxim Gorkiy”. The shipboard198 gathered to a meeting 
to establish action-plans and to distribute tasks. On a ship like this the crew has strictly 
defined tasks, but the KV “Senja” were a bit undermanned so some tasks had been distributed 
to the remaining crewmembers.  
There was no plan at hand for such a heavy situation, so further considerations had to be 
made. The single crewmember`s competence and experience from similar situations had to be 
 
193 Webb and Chevreau 2006:70 
194 Webb and Chevreau 2006:70 
195 Webb and Chevreau 2006:70 
196 Webb and Chevreau 2006:70 
197 Hovden 2012:29-33 
198 Shipboard: commander, the second in command, chief engineer, chief radio-officer, intendant, ships-doctor 
and the operational officer. 
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brought forth [deference to expertise199] and action-plans had to be made for the management 
of this specific crisis. The aim was to find a way of organizing the crew in order to perform 
the rescue as efficient as possible given the available resources.200. This work was considered 
of the utmost importance to the successful solution to a situation with bad odds to succeed. 
Information were minimal at this point of the process. Hence plans were made considering a 
worst-case scenario with many injured, suffering from hypothermia and dead. Within a short 
period of time, a plan for the distribution of responsibilities and tasks was ready. This plan 
covered predicted situations. They also felt the pressure of restricted time available.  
The excerpt of the real event above, serve to exemplify some of the theory on planning in 
general presented in this section. My aim by bringing this incident forth is to illuminate how 
even an organization as a coast-guard ship, who`s ordinary task among others is to manage 
crises at sea and develop contingencies for this, under certain circumstances need to 
improvise by making ad-hoc plans. It also, in my view, gives an insight in how creativity and 
flexibility can be implemented in the planning for crisis management. 
I find this to be a good example to Webb and Chevrau`s201 recommendation on planning for 
improvisation and flexibility as described belov in this thesis. 
Pursuant to Boin and McConnell it is almost a contradiction to plan for an event that, by 
nature, violates the regular patterns of which planners rely for the purpose to prevent it. 
“Developing plans that work for the endless array of complex, chaotic and destructive 
scenarios that arise from interlocking and often mutually dependent infrastructures may be 
all but possible”202.  
 
Many officials have a believe that order and rigidity are to be imposed as a part of their task 
during crises, even if the opposite – improvisation – is most needed during such events. Webb 
and Chevreau203 claims that there is a major gap between what researchers are upholding and 
what is being done during crises. They continue by presenting four recommendations for 
effective crisis planning: The most important is the first, namely planning for improvisation, 
by referring to Krebs (1991) and Weick (1998)204. Developing scripts covering all rapidly 
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changing events are impossible205. This seems to be supported by Reason206; all hazards or 
combination of them cannot be anticipated. Bad-rule or no-rule situations will always 
occur207.  
The recommendation is to create visions for their organization rather than writing numerous 
[contingency] scripts. This way to approach contingency will, pursuant to Webb and 
Chevreau208, lead to an acceptance of the complexities of crises and planning for flexibility. 
The second recommendation is to involve as many members of the organization in 
[contingency] planning. Due to the impact a crisis on an organization as a whole, planning 
should not entirely be performed by a few experts. Promoting a safety-culture throughout the 
organization should be considered an aim. Referring to Sagan (1993), Webb and Chevreau209 
claims that this have been achieved by HROs. Involving all members of an organization in 
planning will provide a wider range of individuals to perform a wider range of tasks as a crisis 
occur210.  
The third recommendation is that planners should enhance a generic approach when 
developing plans. Assuming that different incidents demands specific plans is only true to a 
certain degree. Research suggests that various incidents produce similar impacts. Generic 
plans should provide an organization the tools to manage or deal with a wider range of 
incidents211. Finally, computer technology should be used as supplement to, not the driving 
force behind planning. Various kinds of planning- or decision-support-systems may assist but 
can also contribute to a false sense of control. Technology may impede response by 
constraining the flexibility and creativity of crisis-responders. Hence such technology should 
not be over-stated but viewed upon in a realistic way212.  
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Efficiency and financial requirements versus safety 
 
“Then there is the matter of costs. The conversion of `paper plans` into organizational 
readiness through staff training and crisis exercises can be expensive and time 
consuming”213.  
Time to conduct risk-assessment and to perform exercises may be limited due to efficiency 
and financial requirements. This could lead to restrictions in the opportunities for the crew to 
build sufficient skills and experience and hence limit the abilities to improvise whenever 
needed.  
In the case of the grounding and following shipwreck of the MV “Costa Concordia” off the 
Italian coast 13. January 2012, Hafting states that the cruise-line company had ordered their 
captains to set efficiency above safety214. This may be an element of importance when it 
comes to find time and space for emergency-training.  
As to contingency the same was annotated by the committee that analyzed the fire on board 
the MV “Scandinavian Star” in April 1990215. The catering crew of such a ship has a vital role 
in evacuating passengers. The committee claims that this crew had limited time to get to know 
the ship were not allowed by the ships company given the workload to prepare the ship for 
operation and the period of time from the had embarked the ship until it sailed, “They were 
the group with by far the heaviest workload and therefore had limited time to get to know the 
ship” 216.  The same committee also criticized the abandoning ship and fire drills conducted 
prior to operation. “However, no drills were held, and other forms of training were either not 
practiced or were in many ways deficient” 217. Furthermore the report states regarding the first 
officer, a key person in states of emergency: “d) He had a short deadline and had other duties 
in connection with the preparation of the ship. e) His own knowledge of the ship and 
emergency-equipment was limited” 218. Based on the arguments above in this theory-section it 
is hard to see how the crew could have been able to improvise in an emergency given this 
background.  
 
213 Boin and McConnell 2007 p. 53 
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Grech et.al. name such behavior as Risk-taking behavior; Risk-based behavior: This behavior 
consists of taking calculated risks, where benefits are judged to outrank the risk. Hence errors 
or incidents may occur. Often this kind of behavior is a result of financial or operational 
pressure219 
Some recent studies on the topic 
 
Browsing the internet searching for literature or studies on the topic improvisation, have left 
me somewhat frustrated. I find that not much focus nor effort have been dedicated to this, in 
my opinion, obvious and important issue when it comes to emergency-management. To my 
relief I discovered that also far more sophisticated individuals have had the very same experi-
ence. I refer to Mendonca et.al.: “This capability of improvisation, or – real-time planning, is, 
we believe, a useful but neglected topic in the organizational foresight literature”.  
Pursuant to Frykmer et.al220 an event that does not require improvisation is probably not a 
disaster. They continue by stating: “One key reason why modern crises may be 
transboundary, for example, crossing both geographical and functional borders, is the 
increased interconnectedness of critical infrastructures (Cis) 221. A disturbance in one 
infrastructure can easily spread to the next, giving rise to a cascade of failures.” 222 This I 
find highly relevant to an organization as a ship, even if Frykmer et.al223 most certain focus on 
society as a whole, and focus on definitions of the term improvisation and questioning 
existing research. On board a ship the interconnection is very visible. It has shown that a 
failure or break-down of one system (or department) put a strain on the others. I believe that 
what I have shown above un this thesis confirms this.  
Trnka et.a224l have performed a study on the role of improvisation based on a simulated case 
founded on a real event. Although this case is not related to the maritime branch, I found it 
relevant to the scope of my thesis, as I have focused not only on real life response (on board), 
but also on simulation in this thesis by interviewing simulator instructors. Among other, they 
conclude: “…The proposed simulation exercise design made it possible to utilize an advanced 
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scenario and simulate dynamically developing situations which required improvisation 
during a response operation under progress…”225  
Summary 
 
In this section I would like to sum up some of the main arguments of the theory-section when 
it comes to contingency and crisis management. 
The section starts by describing contingency in general; how operational plans and other 
barriers are developed based on risk-assessments. Then it continues to show how residual risk 
(risk not possible to avoid by barriers) is managed by contingency plans and exercises. Some 
legal requirements concerning the topic are also presented. On improvisation there are some 
views on decision-making when crises arise. Here the focus is on limitation of time and 
information which causes difficulties when it comes to making wise decisions. Contingency 
plans may ease the decision process in a stressed situation and benefit the ability to improvise. 
As foundation of the ability to improvise, levels of human performance are described. Some 
theories on human behavior related to errors and mindfulness during operation are presented 
to give insight in how unfortunate events may be avoided. This item is described by various 
human errors. Mindfulness in everyday operation being partly depending on insight, 
knowledge and experience and hence contribute to the ability to improvise. 
An attempt to define improvisation: 
 Adjusting existing procedures in accordance with prevailing and/or alternating 
circumstances 
 Deviation from existing procedures 
 Creating new procedures – underway – considering prevailing and/or alternating 
circumstances 
Followed by theory on learning to obtaining expertise and intuition. Regarding the scope of 
this thesis, the contingency planning process as well as everyday operation might benefit 
learning, insight in and understanding of systems and building knowledge. Some impediments 
to improvisation have also been described.  
 
225 Trinka et.al. 2016:269 
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As an example of real-life planning for improvisation when an accident occurs, the K/V Senja 
rescue operation when the MV Maxim Gorkiy crashed into an icefield off Spitsbergen in 1989 
is briefly described.  
Efficiency and financial requirements versus safety are items briefly presented at the end of 
this section, as they may influence the topic of this thesis. 
Some recent studies on the topic ends this chapter. Such studies were not easy to find though. 
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METHOD 
Design 
Pursuant to Norman Blaikie226, the most important element of any research design are the 
research questions. Answering them directs research activities. “…the formulation of research 
questions is the real starting-point in the preparation of a research design.” 227. Questions 
should be stated clearly and concisely and reduced to “what”, “why” and “how”. Still 
referring to Blaikie, “what” - questions seek descriptions, “why” – questions are useful to 
explain and understand whilst “how” questions are suitable for developing recommendations 
for change. The strategy chosen is, according to Blaikie: “…the second most important 
research design decision” 228.  
In order to fulfill the purposes of this study, I have considered a qualitative design. I find this 
view supported by Blakie: “Social research is about asking questions”229. Although questions 
also may be asked by surveys, but I do not believe such an approach would get me into the 
depth f my topic. I found, based on the above-mentioned, interviewing personnel (inductive) 
actively occupied on contingency and crisis management in the maritime domain to be a good 
way to achieve relevant and updated information on the topic230. Interviews may bring forth 
topics not considered by this author and not reviewed in a survey. Due to my former 
experience and knowledge on the topic, I found an abductive approach to be suitable for my 
purpose of this study. As said by Blaikie: “The major characteristics of the research 
strategies are as follows… the Abductive strategy generates social scientific accounts from 
everyday accounts” 231. Interviewing participators and studying related literature I hold as 
good tools to answer my research question(s). An abductive strategy may answer all three 
kinds of questions according to Blaikie232.  
Studies of recent literature and research emphasizing improvisation in exercises and crisis-
management will be a necessity, in addition to interviewing informants, to get a view on the 
current state of contingency-exercise performance233. Such studies may be helpful to develop 
precise, relevant and up to date questions. This is held forth by Blaikie: “…a research design 
 
226 Blaikie 2015:18 
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should include a brief literature review.”234 This includes the use of the internet to find 
relevant information regarding the topic. Browsing the internet to find information is 
mentioned as a tool by Annette M. Markham in Silverman235. Hence the internet was used to 
gather information in this study. 
Sampling 
Norman Blaikie236 state that selecting the people, events or items from where data is 
collected, is a critical stage of a research. Keeping an eye on the possibility to generalize will 
be an important issue in his opinion. I agree to that, even though my research project is 
limited to the maritime domain, I hope some of the results may be transferred or used by other 
onshore based organizations. Based on Blaikie237 and as I look upon myself given the purpose 
and design of this study, I find three methods useful: 
- Quota sampling: A fixed number of respondents under certain criteria. This may or 
may not secure representativeness. 
- Judgemental sampling: A significant number of respondents may give 
representative feed-back. 
- Snowball sampling: Start with a few informants who may tip-off persons to speak 
with. This could secure representativeness. 
Here I believed that using the two first methods to find the few respondents for the latter, 
would be a suitable approach to secure representativeness. It seemed to me to be the way to 
do it, given an abductive strategy where questions may pop up during the research. To up-date 
my insight on the topic, this strategy also seemed to turn out as an appropriate method. 
Research-papers were found by searches on the following databases on the internet: Scopus, 
Web of Science and Google scholar by browsing the search words: crisis AND handling* 
AND improvis* AND contingency* AND exer* AND improvis*. Some literature and similar 
sources however are books recommended by various lecturers and hand-outs from courses 
passed. Articles on the internet, as mentioned before, also turned out useful for this purpose.  
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Selection of significant informants 
As stated above, my intention is to find a few respondents I hold to be significant. Then I seek 
to extend my informant-list during the interviews of these. Considering this, my initial list of 
respondents turns out to be as follows: 
- Masters or safety–officers of ships in the merchant marine  
(Passenger ship/Polar Cruise) 
- Instructors, and former naval officers, on HSC238 and ferry courses. 
- Instructor, and former naval-officer, on simulator-based contingency training.  
During the conversation with one of the masters, I was tipped off to talk to a rating who had 
experienced a real crisis on board the MV “Nordlys”, namely the fire described above in this 
thesis. To my fortune I succeeded in appointing an interview with the rating in speech as he 
was on shore-leave and had the opportunity and willingness to share his experience. I could 
not take this attitude for granted regarding the traumatic event a fire on board a ship 
represents. This interview lead to some very interesting statements. 
- Rating on explorer passenger ship. He participated in the evacuation of passengers 
from a coastal steamer on fire. 
In my opinion these persons should be considered able to bring me valuable information to 
renew my insight on the topic as well as lead me on to further questioning. The intention 
leading to my decision as to choosing personnel serving in the passenger and polar-cruise 
trades, were based on two main reasons. First, operating in polar waters demands special 
attention to safety and contingency due to the remoteness as to achieve shore-based 
assistance. The only immediate or close enough to provide helpful external assistance to 
unfortunate incidents or accidents would be other ships in the area. Restricted amount of such 
ships though being the reality. Secondly passenger ships in general represents a more complex 
organization due to a larger number of crewmembers and the variety of operations on board. 
My attempt to secure as vast a range of insight and experience as possible, as recommended 
by Howard Becker239, is were fulfilled to the best of my knowledge by also interviewing 
personnel other than senior naval officers. This relates to one of the advices in Miles et.al: 
“…But it is also important to work a bit on the peripheries…”240.  Talking to persons 
 
238 HSC: High Speed Craft (In this context; passenger-ship in domestic trade) 
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240 Miles et.al. 2014:36 
 47 
currently not so central in decision-making on board like experienced simulator-instructors 
seems to meet this advice. The latter due to the tendency over the last years is that a great deal 
of contingency training is performed by using simulators. This is a trend that seem to expand 
to shore-based – such as company staff and public service organizations - contingency 
training. An example to this is the newly established “Nordlab” 241 situated at Nord university 
in Bodø.  
A grand total of respondents I anticipated to six to eight persons, relying on the tip-off given 
and the information gathered during the research. This number I find sufficient and realistic to 
handle given the frames and scope of this thesis. Initially I aimed to also seek information 
from to officers serving on board Norwegian Coast Guard ships, other shore-based personnel 
as JRCC – operators and designated persons on company officers. Thinking a bit further on 
this issue. I found that exercises, including contingency training, represents most of their daily 
work in opposite to common merchant shipping. Due to this, I found information given by 
such informants not to be quite relevant to the scope of this thesis. Off course such personnel 
would be able to provide tips and advice, but the settings as to acquiring their experiences 
differs a good deal from the merchant trades settings. Bearing in mind the purpose of this 
thesis. The same may be argued when it comes to JRCC- personnel although some of them 
are former naval-officers and are in contact with ships as part of their normal work. Never-
theless their on-board experience may be somewhat outdated and their contact with sailing 
personnel might not be sufficient to compensate this remoteness in time. When it comes to 
designated persons situated on company-offices, their regular cooperation with ship officers 
would, in my opinion, not provide relevant information differing from that I expect to gain 
from the informant I have chosen. 
Analysis 
 
In the aftermath of the sampling, it has been vital to organize the information given. Sorting 
out key-labels underway and the relation between them was an important issue in this work. It 
has been useful to review and refine labels as the work proceeded, to secure precision. This 
has also been stated by Miles et.al242. I have also considered to what extent the information 
 
241 Nordlab: Simulator serving training to on-shore organizations in charge of contingency. 
242 Miles et.al. 2014:81 
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and labelling have given me sufficient answers to my research questions and served the 
purpose of my study. All this following Silverman`s243 advice.  
Quality 
Have the research been performed in a careful, thoughtful way, and in accordance with 
established and accepted standards244. This I believe to have achieved by searching for 
relevant literature, papers and letting the informants read and comment transcripts of their 
statements in interviews. The only reservation has been made by one respondent, after having 
read the transcription of the actual interview, to read what I intend to use before I use it. I find 
this to be acceptable and understandable due to his statements regarding an actual accident 
with casualties of a fatal kind. Follow-up interviews were performed with three respondents. 
Reliability  
Data from literature-studies and interviews must be thrust-worthy. Pursuant to Becker245 
social scientists uses information of others, resulting that what theses providers have ruled 
out, will be hidden..  In this study this represents a potential limitation to the information I 
gather. Another pitfall in this study, is my former experience and knowledge on the topic, as 
well as my relation to some of the respondents. As the field from which I have selected 
informants is a relatively narrow one, Norwegian maritime domain consists of a relatively 
limited number of professionals, there is a certain risk that the researchers unfortunate 
influence may diminish the value of the information. Jacobsen246 discuss this issue, holding 
forth that the ideal of eliminating or minimizing the researcher`s effect on what is studied. A 
positivistic ideal. An objective reality was to be studied, a reality not to be disturbed by the 
scientist. Au contraire, he claims that research never can eliminate what is called the research-
effect, that is the researcher influencing the result. Totally removing the relationship between 
researcher and object is not possible, pursuant to Jacobsen247. On the other hand, he continues, 
it is claimed that the weight on distance between researcher and object [informants] has made 
research poorer. Such distance prevents the researcher from going deeper into the single 
individual`s understanding and interpretation. What is needed, he claims, is to be close – 
preferably equal to those he or she are doing research on and make efforts to understand them 
on their own premises I was extremely conscious on this bias during interviews or tried to use 
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my knowledge in a positive way. For instance to ask the right questions while speaking with 
the informants and to evaluate answers validity concerning this study as a mean to steer the 
interview in an appropriate direction for my purpose. My selection of informants may have 
both positive and negative effects. As described before in this thesis, the Norwegian maritime 
branch does not consist of numerous individuals. Hence it is quite inevitable not knowing 
available and relevant informants. In this case I knew all of them from near and not so near 
past. Some of them have been former students, colleagues or people I have known most of my 
lifetime. The positive effect due to me knowing the informants, is that I know their 
experience, their devotion to the maritime branch in general, ships in special and their 
dedication to maritime contingency. A negative aspect would probably be that, given my 
former experience and the above-mentioned knowledge of the informants, the information 
given may be too influenced by my own experiences and opinions. Total avoidance of such 
influence I do not find realistic, but I it was reduced by me as questioner being aware of this 
effect during the interviews. Miles et.al248 presents some biases to be aware of. Two of these I 
found relevant here even though they are described as biases to presenting fieldwork. Personal 
bias: the researcher`s personal agenda, demons. Going native: Losing perspective and being 
co-opted into the perceptions and explanations of participants.  
Restraint to information given and/or me seeking confirmation to my preoccupations may also 
be an issue arising from the relatively close relation between the interviewer and the infor-
mant as described above. The informants were off course well informed and updated on my 
experience and my degree of devotion to the branch. They were also aware of the limitations 
to my knowledge due to the time spent working away from active at sea service. This bias is 
described by Miles et.al. as: “Do not casually show off how much you know; this is a covert 
plea for confirmation that deludes only the person making it”249. In this case also how much 
the informants believed me to know may have influenced the interview as to the confirmation 
issue. The danger of mutual confirmation, I fear will be present, due to some common beliefs 
acquired by having been and still parts of the same maritime culture. Anyway, I rely on 
Silverman`s words: “…good interview material should be viewed as `reliable enough` under 
the circumstances”250.  
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Validity 
Findings must be relevant to the purpose of the study. One must ask oneself if the research 
questions relevant for measuring what we think we measures. Jacobsen251 describes short 
internal validity as a question if our findings can be proven and continues defining external 
validity as a question whether the results from a limited context or research area may be valid 
for other areas or contexts. Anssi Peräkylä in Silverman defines validity: “The validity of 
research concerns the interpretation of observations: whether or not `the researcher is 
calling what is measured by it`s right name”252. When it comes to the validity of the research 
as basis for this thesis, I may refer to the discussion under reliability above, as I find this of 
importance also to the validity of this study. This I hold to be supported by Anssi Peräkylä in 
Silverman “Reliability and validity are the technical terms that refer to the objectivity and 
credibility of research”253. Due to my former and present insight in the topic of this thesis, I 
believe me to be able to consider whether the statements given by my informants are relevant 
or not. As to reliability and validity I find no reason to believe that the informants have been 
laying too much restraints on their statements. One might assume that their own eventual 
mistakes are likely to be hidden or mitigated. I do not find this to be a mentionable problem 
though. To my satisfaction openhearted statements have been given with no limitations as to 
serve my purpose.  
Generability 
An abductive strategy or approach normally tend to give understanding, rather than expla-
nation. To generalize is not a goal in itself under this strategy. One seeks the participants 
understanding of reality and their organization – their tacit knowledge. The results of such a 
strategy will lead to so called thick descriptions and concepts254. Hence, as mentioned before 
in this thesis, it might be difficult to generalize given an abductive strategy. Nevertheless, it 
should be possible to give advice, suggestions and recommendations on how to implement 
improvisation, as the theory described in this thesis concerns HROs and social society in 
general and have shown similarities to the statements from my respondents serving in the 
maritime domain. I hold my findings and conclusions to have some value to other 
organizations. 
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FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this section I present both findings from interviews and analysis. I have chosen to do so as I 
find it suitable to perform an analysis with direct reference to feed-back from respondents in 
comparison to theory on the topic. To make it easier to get an overview findings and analysis 
are presented in sub-sections covering various categories. Due to the very nature of operation 
on board ships – overlap between different sections and operations – there will be some 
overlap between sub-sections in this section. 
Interviewing six respondents and having their statements transcribed, I feel confident to have 
obtained answers and achieved valuable insight concerning the topic of this thesis. The 
informants have willingly offered time and consideration to my project and sheared both their 
knowledge and experience. The information gathered I also believe to be up to date and 
relevant to how contingency planning, education and training are performed in the present as 
the persons who have shared their thoughts and experiences have been “in action” over the 
last years and still working in various maritime related positions on board and ashore. As all 
interviews have been performed in Norwegian, they are translated into English by the author 
of this thesis 
Literature – books and papers – have given valuable information on the subject, both 
concerning the necessity of improvisation and how to achieve the required level of expertise 
and intuition to enable personnel serving on ships to improvise whenever needed. 
On contingency 
 
To manage unfortunate incidents or crises, considerations has to be made on how to manage 
possible critical situations. Such considerations are supposed to end up in plans to avoid 
unfortunate incidents – barriers - and plans for managing when a crisis occurs – contingency. 
In this section I will present some of the information I gathered from my informants on 
contingency in general and some theory on the topic. Mostly it concerns contingency-
planning and the use of debriefs as an aid to revise plans. Hence the section “On debriefs” 
below, must regarded as a part of this one. On the importance of contingency, one of my 
informants stated: “Far away from help, yes. It is not for nothing we are not allowed to carry 
more than 200 passengers as we sail. But that is in the summertime.” - Master of polar 
explorer cruise-ship.  
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This I find to very similar to one of Weick and Sutcliffe`s255 definition of an HRO as referred 
to above in this thesis. None of the respondents characterized their ship or operation as HRO 
as such though. 
As described above in this thesis, there are rigid and quite specified international and national 
regulations concerning engineering of contingency-plans. These legislations stated in the   
SOLAS includes risk-assessments and including the ship`s crew in the developing of such 
plans. It is also important to be aware of the fact that some companies have their own 
regulations beyond mandatory requirements given by international and national regulations. 
As one of my respondents put it: “…we are a bit beyond the SOLAS – requirements […] [The 
Polar Code] demands survival for five days without [any assistance] …” - Master of polar 
explorer cruise-ship 
My first impression after informant-interviews is that there are various ways of developing 
and organizing contingency-plans. Some seems to be following plans made by company 
personnel whilst others are more involved in the engineering of plans. To exemplify my initial 
impression on developing plans, I may refer to a rating: “It is something that has come from 
the company.[…] I have never been involved in the developing, to put it like that […] I very 
much believe that it is cunning  people […] Yes well I do not think that it is how it works […] 
there are people on the company assigned to that you might say. And off course I would have 
agreed on that, it would not have been no problem, I do have many opinions…” - Bosun 
explorer cruise. 
By this statement it may look as if the crew are not quite certain as to how and where the 
contingency-planning takes place but have a clear understanding that this is a company task. 
When been asked in another way, he stated: “…I have been asked to join in the building of 
safety-manuals and to say a bit risk-assessments and such, I have done that yes. And 
especially…I am not sure in the domestic trade, but what I am speaking of as I have 
participated in and been asked of my opinions and such, it is the operation you…You are 
asked of your opinion and if you have something to add.” - Bosun explorer cruise. 
Webb and Chevreau256 claims that involving all members of an organization should be 
involved planning to provide a wider range of individuals to perform a wider range of tasks 
when a crisis occurs. They also hold forth that planning should not entirely be performed by a 
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few experts. It is likely to believe that similar thoughts are the basis of legal requirements 
stated in international (SOLAS) and national (Skipssikkerhetsloven) legislation on mandatory 
participation of crew as to risk-assessment and planning. They also claim, referring to 
Reflecting on this statement I get the impression that in the informant`s understanding of the 
term contingency also includes safe operations in general. He does not distinguish between 
safe operations, or barriers, and the actual plans to follow when an incident has occurred. The 
same impression I also got from a statement given by one of the masters: “It is developed by 
the company […] we do not have risk-assessments on that situation [contingency]…”             
- Master of polar explorer cruise-ship 
Hogarth257 describes ways to engineer intuition. Learning is obtained by being told by others 
in interaction with experience. One important issue he says is that they learn contents and 
rules by what they experience, not by what they do not experience258. As risk-assessment and 
contingency planning not only deals with former experiences but focus on what one may 
experience in the future (“Black Swans” for instance) it would be a good way to learn and to 
build intuition by participating in both assessment and planning. Weick and Sutcliffe259 names 
deference to expertise as a main issue in contingency. Companies neglecting to follow 
regulations requiring the participation of ship crew in risk-assessment and planning are 
missing the benefits of both using the expertise on board and the benefits of assessment and 
contingency planning as tools for learning and building knowledge, skills and experience vital 
to improvisation in a crisis. Intuition, as described by Hogarth260, demands domain-specific 
stock of knowledge which is likely to be held by a ship`s crew rather than the land-based staff 
even if such personnel have sea-experience.  Luckily as shown by the following statements, 
not all companies neglect to involve their ships crew in this work. 
In the other end a master gives another statement as to risk-assessment, developing and 
maintenance of plans: “No, we do that on board […] If something new has come up we 
discuss it on internal operations-meetings we have, the shipboard. And then the chief officer 
and the hotel-manager, the chief engineer and the first engineer, they take if there is 
something there then we make such together and then we get it approved at the end. Then we 
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send it to QA261 just letting them know that it has been made.” - Master of polar explorer 
cruise-ship 
On involving the crew of his ship, as required by international legislation, he continues by 
stating: “Yes. And I include them in the department-meetings. And they are to be revised 
annually, risk assessment […] it is a job on the STAR262 that pops up once a year. […] So 
than all are included…and if new equipment arrives it is to be performed. And if procedures 
are changed to such a degree that it is necessary to alter risk assessment or see through it, 
then this is done too. And then there is risk assess following exercises…” - Master of polar 
explorer cruise-ship 
In this case it seems that mandatory legal requirements are met and that that what is 
performed on board supports the thoughts of both Webb and Chevreau263 and Hogarth264 
when it comes to participation and learning as described above. Chevreau and Denis-Remis265 
states that learning may be carried out indirectly by implementing risk-analysis tools. 
Another master has got another view on contingency plans: “There lies the whole planning-
tool and all in the software as we use for wages and all […] If a man has lost an exercise then 
it will be revealed. It is under electronic surveillance as well, so it is not only the safety-
officer surveilling […] We have special people controlling.” - Master of polar explorer cruise-
ship  
Here it might be appropriate to repeat the words of Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss on computer-based 
systems: “…In a crisis competence is not good enough.266”. Also Webb and Chevreau267 have 
some thoughts on using computer technology in contingency. They recommend computers as 
supplement, but not the driving force behind planning. It may appear as that is what is done 
regarding the latter two statements above, it seems to be a mix of using computer technology 
and live personnel. 
As stated by an informant: “…When I speak of risk-assessment here, as I mentioned, then it is 
concerning the job that we do…” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship, former rating in the 
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Norwegian Coast-Guard, gas-tanker and as deck officer on off-shore supply ships and 
passenger-liners. 
The same informant continues by explaining his view on risk-assessment: “You ask about 
risk-assessment, then I think risk-assessment concerning work, the operation of the boat […] 
You talk of the total safety of the boat versus the personal safety, operational safety. They are 
very, very alert on this…on individual safety when they perform their daily tasks.[…] you get 
a good operation that way, then you have already built up barriers for much of what may 
happen in time to come […] Yes, it is about doing it properly. That you shall reveal if 
something is wrong […] If it has been some time since a task have been performed […] They 
take a handful of risk-assessments and talk them through. It is…it works” - Master of polar  
explorer cruise-ship 
This statement points out quite clearly the opposite of what Webb and Chevreau268 holds forth 
as an impediment to improvisation; organizations tendency to view upon safety, risk or crisis 
management as specialized functions. 
It must be said that the term risk-assessment is also used for the developing of Safe-Job -
Procedures (SOP`s). This is by some labelled as safe-job-analysis and is, off course, a vital 
part of safe operation. Such procedures are parts of what Reason269 labels “Swiss Cheese”; 
barriers to prevent unfortunate incidents or accidents. This is not contingency as such but is 
very tightly connected to the issue and plays a vital part of the whole risk-assessment and 
planning process toward contingency. 
Another vital part of an appropriate contingency is the knowledge of one`s ship. By this I 
mean knowing the surroundings on board, where to find safety-equipment and escape-routes, 
including alternatives. It also has to do with the understanding of technical and environ-
mental systems. One informant had some views and an example: “Yes. And we have given 
them a responsibility by giving them a thorough knowledge to the boat, what it looks like and 
where they may go and where they have a second option and where they have a third option 
[…] So every Saturday they look through all the equipment here, and they have to come up to 
sign that torches works. Head-torches are there…and keys and all that. And the notes we 
place on doors for evacuation and all this shall be in roper place according to the list, list of 
contents, and it shall be in good order […] These are things you must never slip out of hand. 
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[…] We shall save our own and the passenger`s lives […] I say that when have let go from 
the quay; we are on our own…” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship 
On the same topic, another informant had some views when comparing the system in different 
trades. It seems to be a trade-specific issue: “…inshore passenger I think has a better system 
than I am used to in the off-shore branch, it is that they have this checkout. There is checkout 
on the route a checkout on the vessel and that checkout is not limited in time. That checkout 
lasts as long as the simple individual needs to be cleared for service. That kind of checkout I 
never experienced in offshore. Not in such a formalized system […] as for me the first time I 
was captain I told the company that I would like a fortnight over-lap with the existing captain. 
I am entering a new role, I am serving a new company, I am serving a new customer, so I 
want at least a fortnight. But it is on the personal level […] Off course it is a bit challenging 
to perform route checkouts on a supply-vessel in the spot-market where you do not know what 
the next step is. It becomes impossible. But at least a vessel checkout so that you know the 
vessel and in a way a system-checkout so that you know the systems on board. Only there the 
main job has been done…” – Simulator instructor 
I find it appropriate to refer to Hogarth270 on intuition here when he speaks of a “stack of 
knowledge”. It is that persons may act intuitively or improvise by using specific knowledge of 
limited domains. The statements above supports what may be called domain-specific 
expertise. Knowing your environment, systems and the organization in which one operates is 
what I would call a domain-specific stack of knowledge. In this case on board ships. In the 
maritime domain one finds various complicated and complex systems and equipment that 
calls for special education and training to operate – this requires a very limited yet crucial 
stack of knowledge on top of common knowledge of the domain. 
On improvisation 
 
This section presents statements from informers in comparison to theory on improvisation. It 
describes why improvisation may be a necessity when an unfortunate incident or a crisis 
occurs and what it takes to be able to improvise. 
Crises demands flexibility and improvisation, not central command and rigidity it is claimed 
by Webb and Chevreau271. The real-life example of the KV Senja – MV Maxim Gorkiy 
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rescue above272 describes the importance and acknowledgment of improvisation when facing 
uncertain situations. Another example is the fatal accident of the MV Nordlys presented in 
section; “On the MV Nordlys accident” in this thesis.  
The issue of improvisation where enlightened by some of the informants. The importance of 
improvisation where stated by one informant:“…it is better that people do something and do it 
wrong instead of doing nothing, because they are afraid make a mistake[…]it is better that 
people do something, then you better occasionally make a mistake, within reason though.”     
- Simulator instructor 
This I also find supported by referring to, among others mentioned in this thesis, Weisæth and 
Kjeserud273 and Webb and Chevreau274 given the restricted time to act and limited 
information as the nature of a crisis. In my view also Reason`s theory on correct – and 
erroneous performance support the thought of doing something as stated by my respondent275. 
Hafting has some thoughts on the same issue too; namely that even if decisions to act are not 
optimal, it is better to initiate actions to reduce damages caused by the crisis276. Also Reason 
has some thoughts that support the statement as he speaks of various kinds of correct and 
erroneous performance, describing how knowledge-based mistakes made by people running 
out of prepacked solutions and problem-solving in situ opens up for making mistakes as bad-
rule or no-rule situations always might occur277. Leadership as the statement above shows, are 
a contradiction to Webb and Chevreau278 descriptions of impediment by demanding 
conformity. 
What comes clear by all who have contributed to my inquiry, is that to be able to improvise 
one need a foundation consisting of knowledge, skills and experience. As one respondent put 
it: “I am a bit focused on that if you shall exercise improvisation you need a foundation. And 
that foundation is knowledge. You cannot improvise without knowledge […] And skills. And a 
bit of experience […]and what I see so incredibly clear it is that theory is so incredibly well 
connected to improvisation. It is a close connection between having a solid theoretical 
platform and the ability to improvise […] if you are to improvise you need to have built the 
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theory[…] You need tools. You need something to hang on the racks to be able to improvise in 
a way that you do things right.[…] I am very concerned on improvisation, to keep it the in 
back of our heads how you…intuition […] The way we carry on with search – and rescue or 
exercising man over board , I see how important it is to think alternatively, how important it 
is to improvise actually, that we cannot follow the checklist then,…” - Simulator instructor  
There were also some views on how experience and skills for the use of improvisation can be 
achieved. The main view by my informants where that such skills were built by improvising 
in during daily operations: “You get a bit experience on improvising during everyday 
operation. And then I think you can bring it on to exercises […] Yes I believe you really have 
to look at the operation of the boat in general. If you are used to improvise in the everyday 
operation then you will be able to improvise in an exercise and off course, in a crisis situation 
too.” - Simulator instructor 
Daily operations often consist of minor repairs and adjustments, also known as “Firefighting”. 
This was viewed upon as a way of increasing one`s repertoire and enhance the ability to im-
provise.: “…yes, it [`firefighting`] may teach you that there are several ways of fixing a 
problem […] Yes, off course, then you build up, in a way, a repertoire of solutions. And that is 
what you need, it is a repertoire of solutions […] That is where you form the foundation…”         
- Simulator instructor 
These statements I find comparable to the theories on building experience given by 
Reason`s279 “Three levels of performance”, Hogarth280 on building intuition (expertise) and 
Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss281 on various ways of performance from Novice to Expert presented in 
this thesis. Both theory and statements from informants shows the importance of knowledge, 
skills and experience to be able to improvise whenever needed. There is also a resemblance as 
to how experience and hence intuition is achieved. Namely through the daily operation by the 
solution of minor incidents and other challenges where improvisation might be a necessity for 
a safe and desirable outcome. Rankin et.al. 282 claims that improvisation can be seen as a 
range of different behaviors, small deviations at one end and spontaneous actions based on 
intuition at the other end. This I find as descriptive to the nature of building the knowledge, 
skills and experience necessary to enable improvisation. 
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On exercises 
 
In this section I aim to present some of the informant`s views, reflections and examples on 
exercises in comparison to theory on the subject. This also includes contingency exercises 
performed at land-based simulators. Various kinds of exercises, their purpose and benefits are 
described by Løvik283and referred to in the theory section of this thesis. Webb and 
Chevreau284 points out that learning may be carried out directly by training sessions [drills], 
[exercises] and case-studies [table-top exercises]. 
I wish to start with a rating who gave an overview on how exercises are organized on his ship. 
He also addresses safety during exercises by rendering some interesting thoughts: “It has been 
five weeks since I attended an exercise285. […] We do have exercises weekly. It has changed a 
bit […] this week it is about fire, that week it is lifeboat and […] it is a new routine in the 
company that we shall take…the chief engineer is concerned a bit on fire, the hotel manager 
is responsible for a bit hospital and evacuating cabins and stuff. And then there is the 
navigation officer taking care of…lifeboat and that part […] It has been distributed to avoid 
that all is laid on the safety officer. So we get more responsibility, that week you are in charge 
of the exercise and plan and […] they think of new elements and then we speak about what to 
do and what to train […] and then there is the physical part, to launch lifeboats, prepare 
lifeboats and such that is easily forgotten because every time we do that exercise we launch 
the lifeboat […]There are launching wires that may hang up, they might get locked…What do 
you do. This they have to watch, it is not something you learn by reading about it […]One 
thing is knowing how to do it and then it is another thing to watch for things that may go 
wrong […] If you do not know then you are just standing there. […] It is a good thing that 
you launch the MOB once or twice too much…that you get that training, that you know what 
you are doing., That it is not forgotten.” – Bosun explorer cruise 
This statement supports both Weick & Sutcliffe on preoccupation with failure286 and 
Hogarth`s287 theories on learning and building experience as described in the theory section of 
this thesis. Also Reason`s288 theories on levels of competence seem to be relevant here. 
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Building experience and competence is an ongoing process of watching things being done, 
following rules and procedures and performing various tasks. 
He also mentions that crewmembers may get tired of repeatedly exercising. Especially in the 
passenger trade where the frequency of exercises is high due to mandatory minimum 
standards regulated by strict international legislation: “…exercises…quite certain I have 
experienced that exercise is a good thing. Many are annoyed about exercises […] those you 
sit with have 20 to 25 years of experience […] so you got sick and tired of these exercises; 
Like ` But I do know this, this I do no need to`…afterwards I have realized that it helps you, 
that this here is […] one day it might…that you realize that this here is crucial. You need 
exercises…”  - Bosun explorer cruise. 
Another informant stated that in the offshore support branch the chief officer usually created 
the exercises; different exercises on different ships. A system of rotation on board where 
different departments participated in creating exercises were launched. He explained why they 
did so and his view on the outcome of this system: “…but it will be some differences from 
vessel to vessel, but the vessels I served on and got the systems under my skin, there we made 
a rotation arrangement where different departments participated in creating exercises […] So 
my role as chief officer, an incredibly important role on board, it was newer rehearsed […] 
But when throwing the ball around a bit…and involve the whole crew, then elements were 
trained on in a totally different way […] Yes, they saw things, challenges with their own eyes 
that me as chief officer was not aware of at all…and then they conducted the exercise […] the 
feed-back on the ships where this worked, was that these were the best exercises. We all had 
the impression I guess that the more connection to the exercises, the better the exercises and 
the more you gain from them. […] especially the departments who had participated in 
developing these exercises […] they felt that they had an extra and good outcome. But when 
you over the year rotated on all departments on board then…During a longer period of time 
they all got to exercise their things. […] I believe it is a model that might be…it is very 
important […]and we have all experienced that the eager of participating on exercises may 
vary. But when you involve the crew, they engage in the exercises too.” – Simulator instructor  
This was also mentioned by the bosun in explorer cruise: “…You might make the exercises 
more attractive, that people see things more accurate…”  - Bosun explorer cruise 
Tiredness of repeatedly exercising might be a consequence following the negligence of 
involving crew in the planning of contingency required by national and international 
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regulations289. As stated above, this can be mended to a certain degree by involving the crew 
in planning exercises. This is supported by Webb and Chevreau290 as to involving all in 
planning. As to a rotating system, it seems to have a potential of increasing the crew`s ability 
to improvise as they get insight to a certain degree in other department`s issues. Also here I 
find support in Webb and Chevreau291 claiming that to involve all members in planning gives 
a wider range of individuals a wider range of tasks in a crisis situation. 
Three of the informants have their most recent experience from the passenger trade. They 
have slightly different views on contingency and exercises although not to the extreme. The 
other respondents show more variations in how exercises are performed. It seems to be trade-
dependent and related to the experience of the personnel who attend the exercise. Simulator 
instructors had some ideas on this issue. It mainly concerned the use of manuscripts or just 
initiating an incident and let the rest of the exercise live its own life. To illuminate this, some 
statements are presented below. The first two respondents quoted, mainly serve as instructors 
on simulator based training and re-training of experienced personnel. It is important to be 
aware that these instructors have performed sea service themselves and have achieved solid 
practical sea service experience: “I do not think we could have performed the kind of exercises 
that we do based on a manuscript. We would not have got anywhere really. We are depending 
on… […] Yes it [exercises by manuscripts] is very much repeating things. You might drill 
many such specific things during the exercise, getting good at that […] The point is that there 
is no absolute correct answer […]it is a bit like how we play too and what they consider [...] 
The outcome of the exercise will turn out totally different as to where they start…Right, it is a 
consideration for the single individual to make […] and then you may discuss the choices  
afterwards, if it was wrong or right. And off course it is depending on the situation. The 
weather plays a part… […] it is clearly depending on each person […] depending on each 
person in the sense that…they are the decisions they mean is the best ones, what to take of 
care first and foremost” - Simulator instructor 
He explains this by saying that a sketch for the exercise has been developed prior to com-
mencing but it is the considerations and actions of the participators that set the course to what 
the direction and incidents might be. The instructors just play along pursuant to the develop-
ment of the exercise. The outcomes of equally initiated exercises, even with various incidents 
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and decisions, are not necessarily better or worse for any of them. It must be said that the 
participators on these exercises are skilled and experienced sailors: “We performed that 
exercise four times before we started getting close to the outcome we had thought of prior to 
launching the exercise the first time. And then I am not saying that exercise 1, 2 and 3 were 
poorer or better exercises. They were all equally good exercises.” - Simulator instructor  
These two statements I find to exemplify the challenges arising when an incident or accident 
occurs. Such challenges are described by, among others, by Weisæth and Kjeserud292 and 
Hafting293. Experienced personnel are to demonstrate and train their ability to improvise to 
manage complex situations to achieve a safe and successful outcome. One may also refer to 
Hogarth294on intuition and Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss on expertise295. 
The third one of the instructors mainly train student with no or some experience. He had a 
different approach to exercises. His focus was on theoretical knowledge and building skills, 
practical knowledge and experience bit by bit. This, he stated, would benefit their ability to 
improvise: “…During the first year they [naval students] shall in many ways be done on this 
instrument-part. And during the second year it should only be focused on decision-making. It 
should only be focused on communication, situational awareness, improvisation […] 
Planning off course […] the more knowledge I have achieved myself, then I build the 
exercises in a totally different way […] you are not supposed to learn it all in one bit, you 
shall build it up slowly and carefully […] ending up doing all-included exercises […] And it 
gives them the possibility to actually improvise […]I also see that simulators are insanely 
good pedagogic tools” - Simulator instructor  
This statement should, in my opinion, serve to illuminate the theories of Hogarth 296and 
Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss`s theories on how to build intuition and expertise provided to be able to 
improvise to manage incidents and accidents to obtain a fortunate outcome297. Both 
Hogarth298 and Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss299 describes the necessity of learning bit by bit. 
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Especially Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss300 describes how less- or no experienced personnel are 
depending on rules and procedures in the beginning of their way to expertise. 
Speaking of complexity in exercises, there were some concern on performing too complex 
exercises or performing full-scale exercises too soon. The issue was that those participating in 
such exercises were to hold some degree of knowledge, skill and experience. One of the 
simulator instructors and one of the explorer masters had similar views on this. Words like 
crashing and killing came up: “…the more complex you make the exercises the cleverer the 
crew gets after a while…you give them a task to solve.[…] And it can be as simple as putting 
a piece of paper on the table containing five difficult questions. They do not know what to face 
in an exercise. It might be a list of questions […] there shall be an element of surprise. But at 
the same time the level of difficulty must not be so high that you crash them on the first…that 
is not the intention of the exercise” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship 
When asked if there were dangers by running full-scale exercises too soon, the simulator 
instructor responded: “Yes, yes…and then we come back to not being able to improvise. […] 
You kill it all…only a few will have a good outcome after such an [complex] exercise.”                   
- Simulator instructor  
These statements I also find as fine descriptions of how to build experience and expertise 
pursuant to Hogarth301 and Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss302. There is a danger of speeding up learning 
to fast to achieve the desired level of expertise and intuition to make people able to improvise. 
Making exercises to complex at any stage may cause an increased dependency of procedures 
rather than contribute to building intuition and expertise needed to improvise. 
When it comes to trade-dependent exercises, the most significant differences seem to be 
between offshore support vessels and passenger ships. One of my informants, who have 
served on both categories, names this as different regimes. Ferries uses pre-defined exercises 
based on manuscripts written down in Excel-sheets. Further-more all ferries are training the 
same elements he stated: “The same system and the same kind of exercises to be followed by 
all vessels in the company.” - Simulator instructor 
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Maintenance of skills rather than expanding repertoire were an issue held forth by one of the 
informants: “…as I see it a bit in Norway and many other places it is that, especially on the 
contingency side, it is that one in many ways exercises known elements, that have been 
trained several times before. It becomes like routine exercises […] And then I am afraid that 
if you do not expand then you are not able to become a good improviser. You have to 
emphasize unpredictability, you must keep on with elements of uncertainty etc.” - Simulator 
instructor 
I both agree and disagree to this statement. Variation of challenges, as mentioned above in 
this thesis, are crucial to train improvisation. However, to learn you have to repeat. Hogarth 
states: “The frequency with which a connection is observed affects what we learn” 303 
The term improvisation was also discussed by another of my informants. He would like to call 
it testing people by making situations close to reality where people, all of a sudden get their 
hands full. This by giving them several tasks and reduce their resources: “…I would rather 
call it diversity of the aspect of exercises.…what you set them to train.”  -Master of polar 
explorer cruise-ship 
On debriefs 
 
In the aftermath of an exercise it is commonly accepted to arrange debriefs to correct errors, 
organization and to evaluate whether existing procedures are appropriate to achieve their 
purposes and goals. What is spoken in such debriefs would be the basis for revising 
contingency plans. Hence I have asked my informants on this issue. It shows to be a bit less 
variation on this issue in views and systems.  
Here it has been focused on table-top exercises, as described above in this thesis, as a fine 
way of improving contingency and learning due to participators have the option to ask 
questions underway in the exercise. Such learning may benefit the ability to improvise in a 
state of crisis. Dividing exercises into limited sectors followed by immediate discussion also 
seems to be looked upon as good settings to gain experience from exercises. This might be 
table-top exercises where questions and discussions are subjects underway. It may also be 
talking things through immediately after having performed sectorized exercises: “…But in 
most cases when an exercise has been performed, either a practical or table-top, that people 
may ask and dig during the exercise, or we perform a pure smoke-diving exercise where they 
 
303 Hogarth 2001 p. 77 
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fill up a room with smoke [...] Then it is out again and talk things through, what have we 
done, what can be done better. It is that debrief that is the most important […] I know when I  
served in the Coast guard then we had a debrief every time after a main exercise then it was 
small groups roaming around performing various tasks and had a debrief on that.” -  Master 
of polar explorer cruise-ship 
This statement I find to fulfill the thoughts of Hogarth304 on learning from experience. He 
emphasizes that learning from what you experience might not be optimal. One may also learn 
from what one not experience by considering in the aftermath whether other actions would 
have shown to be more appropriate305.  
Plans are presumably vital to a successful management of critical situations or unfortunate 
incidents. They must, however, be frequently practiced in order to provide any help. My 
informants had some views on this topic. One respondent gave an example of how con-
tingency and competence can be maintained. In this case it concerns aid to passengers suf-
fering from cardiac arrest and/or respiratory failure (passengers heart stops beating and/or 
passenger stops breathing): “…and the same system we have on CPR306. There is the doctor 
and the nurse and there is the safety-officer arranging regular updates on CPR. And then it is 
doll and everybody through the same procedure, blow in the doll and all this, the whole ritual 
[…] It is very important because it is those downstairs and around the boat working that 
meets this first, not us on the bridge or those situated in the engine-control room.” - Master of 
polar explorer cruise-ship 
As another respondent stated: “…The thing about getting people to understand that our safety 
runs through the everyday from morning to evening, what you see and what you do […] Yes, 
and it is fresh goods.[…] It has to be focused on all the time:” – Master of polar explorer 
cruise-ship 
 
On reduced resources 
 
Another issue in this thesis, as described in the introduction, is the case of reduced resources 
when a crisis occurs; both human and equipment. In this section some thoughts from 
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respondents are presented. The respondents were asked on their experiences on this matter as 
to exercises in particular. A simulator instructor had this view on the issue: “Both on cruise, in 
the coast guard and in oil while I was there it was quite normal to remove vital persons so 
that…And it was really an element of surprise where you in many ways…he who was to be a 
leader all of a sudden, he was not aware of that…then the exercises were good. It was… some 
of the best exercises when you removed a vital…the captain or the chief engineer fell out and 
…the second in command or the first engineer had to enter and…Yes then this about 
improvisation appeared very clear […] But it is obvious that the problem of doing such things 
is that it require more, more effort to do things not by the book. That is the problem.”             
- Simulator instructor  
The matter of effort, time and taking charge in situations where described by two masters in 
the passenger trade and a former master of an offshore vessel: “…so I can say that we are 
more or less there…not on every exercise, but say every second or third exercise people are 
dismissed from participation [...] Then we take out a leader somewhere so that the next 
person gets to step in, then we observe if that happens, if people take responsibility…So we 
are quite alert on this that if no one turns up something must happen anyway. Someone has to 
take responsibility before the whole organization freezes a couple of steps below.” - Master of 
polar explorer cruise-ship  
The same were held forth by another master: “Yes. We do train with…not when we do the big 
contingency-exercises, then there is a full crew…For as a rule the most will…if not something 
giant has happened on board then the most will be available. […] Then you have to replace 
the first engineer for the chief and the chief-officer for the captain and vice versa […] it might 
be that we have to move both zone-leaders and those who perform evacuation too.” - Master 
of polar explorer cruise-ship 
In the offshore trade this is an issue in exercises as well: “In the offshore trade we are pulling 
out, but they were perhaps afraid of pulling out people in important positions. Maybe we 
pulled out someone easy to replace […] we did not pull out those who had the important 
roles. In the aftermath I see that it was…we should have done that yes…but it is on the alarm-
instructions, then you see who is dedicated stand-in to the various positions. If that one falls 
out then the other one stand-in and so on. So it was not totally randomized then. There is a 
connection and it would be rare if both the chief engineer and the first engineer for instance 
should be out of the game. Well yes, it has happened though.” – Simulator instructor  
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Various roles are also an issue when training on simulators during exercises.: “…You are 
fewer people. He is gone. He is in charge of communication. And he shall handle, he shall be 
briefed and […] you lose resources all along. At the end you are alone on the bridge […] 
They must really know how to improvise.” - Simulator instructor 
When it comes to limitations or loss of available equipment and technical resources, this was 
mentioned as an element in simulator exercises. This might be difficult to conduct when in 
service on board. “We remove a bit such critical things. That we lecture on, and then we 
remove critical tings for them. For instance that they lose a rudder. They may lose the drift-
line307, they might lose the gyro308...” – Simulator instructor  
These statements seem to fulfill one of the recommendations made by the AIBN in their 
report 2013/02, after having investigated the fatal fire on board the MV Nordlys, on 
contingency and training with crewmembers out of action. Some informants also point out the 
matter of effort required to improvise as described by Reason`s309 third level of performance – 
one informant hold this forth as a problem. 
On time to perform exercises 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this thesis, time to conduct exercises in various trades was 
mentioned as a possible challenge. The informant`s response to this question was that they did 
not see this as an appreciable problem. Although depending on various trades. It seems as the 
offshore trade provides more space for exercise than the passenger trade. As stated by a 
former master of an offshore ship: “Yes I will put it like on many of the boats you often had 
spare time between missions. Or you were stand-by as we call it. So I feel that when it comes 
to time to perform exercises it is more of a challenge to perform good exercises in this ferry 
trade concerning their busy days than in offshore. I felt that we had more…yes we could use 
the time we wished to perform good exercises […] I never felt a pressure of time in offshore.” 
- Simulator instructor 
A master in the passenger trade put it like this: “Time to perform exercises, that is…But you 
take your time…” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship 
 
307 Drift-line: Propulsion 
308 Gyro: Compass 
309 Reason 2016:70 
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Supported by another master of a similar ship: “…it is on a boat like this that we have a 
certain number of hours…we use the hours we are allowed by law to work…” - Master of 
polar explorer cruise-ship 
When it comes to exercise various operational tasks, there might be restrictions of time: “So 
they…I was to say that most, the very most of them are used to stand by the tender-pit looking 
down in the sea watching the ice drift past. They are known of our operation and have seen 
the lifeboats being launched. Everyone has seen this, but to go from there to actually doing it, 
there…then we return to the time-factor. It would not be a problem to let them do it, but we do 
not have the time nor the opportunity.” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship. 
The last of the statements indicates that efficiency requirements as to operation limits the 
opportunities of performing practical exercises as one might have wanted. As said above, this 
seems to be trade dependent. Passenger-ships may have tighter schedules than others. As 
described in the theory chapter in this thesis, efficiency might be a priority above safety as 
hold forth by Hafting on the MV Costa Concordia accident310. A company`s or shipboard`s 
policy may be compared to what Grech et. al. 311 labels risk-based behavior. The statements 
of my informants above contradict to a certain degree that efficiency has the top priority. One 
must be aware however that resources spent on contingency are based on a cost versus benefit 
analysis – as low as reasonable possible - ALARP.312  
On alternating jobs or roles 
 
In this chapter the focus is on expanding one`s repertoire beyond the specific profession or 
role of each crewmember. This may increase the ability to step-in for others when needed, as 
described in the AIBN – report on the MV Nordlys fire313. Alternating jobs or rotating tasks 
have been mentioned as an important way to achieve the knowledge needed for relevant 
improvisation. As one respondent put it: “And then I believe a bit on rotation…You rotate, 
you do not watch the mantle-wire314 for 24 years. You are not to stand on one place for 25 
years […] you have to move a bit and then you must know what is going on elsewhere on the 
boat […] But clearly, if you enter a ship and you are fixed at one place, you only get 
experience from that place […] if you get new personnel on board it is a bit important to 
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rotate them so that they do not only know one thing […] because it might be that those 
standing there performing that task they are not there., they might be gone. I have 
experienced that […] no one were situated where they were supposed to.” - Bosun explorer 
cruise 
The masters of the passenger ships held forth that they used the crew to perform various tasks 
during normal operations: “We are a crew under the operation down there. And they rig out 
and they rig in. They tidy it all […] They are trained and […] They know exactly what is 
going on down there [on deck] […] Yes, it is people from the galley, people from the 
restaurant, and people from the bar. They are involved in all this. Putting on life-
wests…helping the passengers” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship  
A similar example given by another master: “The waiter, he is not only a waiter, he might 
also have to stand by at the tender-pit315, he will have to join other tasks around the boat. 
…on our ship the crew is very much used around the boat to whatever needs to be done […] 
bartender helping them in and out of the boat316 […] It is ordinary working-tasks for 
them…the most important tasks are about fire, average and operation. They [the crew on 
explorer cruise-ships] are doing many things much more sporty than ordinary ship-
operations. Take people out on a tender-pit in on hell of a weather and perhaps wind blowing 
at 20 m/s. Throw them in an inflatable boat and ship them ashore. It is blowing so hard that 
penguins are coming rolling down the shore. They still operate, because we have…we are still 
within our safety-limits. It…I think people attending this operation becomes sharper when a 
crisis occurs” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship. 
All the statements above seems to contradict one of Webb and Chevreau317 impediments to 
improvisation, namely systematic divisioning and specialization of tasks.  
The training on simulator is also concerned with the variation of tasks:  “…Then we exercise a 
bit on that we pick out maybe three of the crew or two of the crew gets occupied on taking 
care of a passenger problem then it is the matter of who is left on the bridge. And let us say 
that the chief engineer is left on the bridge then he might have to enter the chief officer`s role. 
And that may be for instance external communication … That is communication against a 
coast-station or other ships […] Yes, one of the navigators leaving the bridge. And then it is 
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about who steps-in…And then you are vulnerable for a start related to that on handling a 
boat and handle communication […] So we are more and more over to the bit of challenging 
all on different tasks…”  - Simulator instructor and captain on HSC318 
Regarding the same issue, the size of the ship and crew where experience is built was also 
regarded to be important, as to the possibilities to achieve such.: “…you may consider a thing 
like…he is standing on a small freighter […] the crew there they hang on the bridge. They 
have been in the engine-control room, they have been around to watch.…hanging on the 
bridge and listen…they know the systems, they know the panels…all of them have some 
peripheral knowledge on what is going on…it was on the coast where we performed circular-
training […] divided the crew in three and then they had twenty minutes at the fire-station, 
and then twenty minutes at the evacuation…on the lifeboat-deck […] and some of those who 
had been sailing on the Coastal steamer for years said that they had never been taken in 
at…and did not know what was going on there. It might be some of the philosophy that one 
knows the entire organization to the top, and the cook knows…or he who is in the middle of 
the organization knows the entire organization downwards and all…then you will have better 
odds if you lose personnel in drift or in crises.” - Master of polar explorer cruise-ship 
On variation of tasks, an experienced bosun stated: “…My opinion was that it was just the 
ABs who should deal with the boats, because then you were sure that they knew it. Do not put 
an AB on the fire-fighting team, rather put the cook at the fire-fighting team then we ABs care 
of the boats. But after the Nordlys-fire I changed my mind. It is bloody ok to know that the 
cook is able to do it. That it might well be that he is not there and he is not there, and then it is 
bleeding sad if the ABs all of a sudden are occupied doing others tasks, are gone, then there 
are no one who knows […] Yes it is good to know that all knows what is going on...” - Bosun 
explorer cruise 
These statements indicate that the term domain-specific includes not only the single crew-
members specific tasks but has a wider meaning as to the ship as a system. Although 
Hogarth`s319 term talks of intuition similar to Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss320and Reason321 on 
expertise, improvisation by a reduced crew also demands some knowledge and skills outside 
one`s primary profession. Such knowledge and skills can be achieved through the daily 
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operations on board. Referring to Wybo (2004), Webb and Chevreau322 points out that 
learning in everyday work is an efficient way to prepare for crisis – management. 
On competence and experience 
 
In this section the matter of competence and experience as foundations of improvisation is 
discussed by comparing informant views and experiences to theory on the topic. 
As one of the informants put it: “Yes, I think that is important to hold forth, that the more 
experienced people the more hooks they have to hang it on, the more tools they have in their 
tool-box […] So experience…yes I think that is a key-word.” - Simulator instructor 
This I find supportive to Reason`s323 three levels of performance and Hogarth324 on 
engineering intuition. It is vital to be aware of the quality of experience though. This concerns 
in what trade the experience has been achieved: “…it is off course about experience. But it 
has also a bit to do where their experiences come from. What trade they have served in before 
and where they are normally sailing and such things plays a role […] The ferries seem to 
have some more time. That is, they have more time to think things through, while HSC then it 
is…things are to happen very rapidly.[…] It has off course something to do with the 
speed...Because they work perhaps more against the clock then for instance a ferry […] So we 
see a clear difference on how fast they react to things and the decisions how rapidly they are 
made…” - Simulator instructor 
This statement supports Hogarth`s325 thoughts on domain specific knowledge. It seems like 
intuition depends not only on where one`s expertise has been achieved, but on the specific 
operations it has been engineered as well.  
As to exercises, the simulator instructors had the opinion that experienced personnel working 
tighter with less experienced ones, had a fortunate effect to learning: “...then they have 
attended together with experienced people and got to act as crew, navigators, no captain`s 
role at all, and then they get to take over that role the last two weeks of the course. And the 
they get to train on […] It is a real situation […] we see that it has a very good learning-
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effect that they exercise together with experienced people as chief officers.” - Simulator 
instructor 
This was supported by a former master: “… We use to speak of the mix of crewmembers. And 
it is not optimal just to have experienced crew. It is not optimal to have only new. But having 
the mix of experienced and new, then you achieve that exchange of experience from the old 
ones to the new there. And then I truly believe that you will see more of improvisation when 
you have…the greater the amount of experienced people, the greater degree of 
improvisation.” - Simulator instructor 
This I find supported by Hogarth: “Humans learns about the world from two sources: what 
others tell them and their own experiences. Moreover, there is strong interaction between 
these two sources. What other people say can direct what people experience, and what people 
experience can affect how they interpret what they have been told”326 
The matter of knowledge and experience is also a question when it comes to the repertoire 
you may expect by stand-ins. Some technical equipment might be too complex to be handled 
by ratings or officers from all departments. The statement below narrows the term domain 
specific knowledge as described by Hogarth327.  
 “.…It will be very difficult to fill in the missing competence of the ship-board” - Master of 
polar explorer cruise-ship 
The time required to build experience were pointed out by an experienced bosun: “You cannot 
expect a one-year apprentice to know that. My experience as I have been building, I have 
built over many years. You cannot demand that […] that they can see what they are doing…it 
is only one thing; doing it, it is exercise and it is training. You need to have it in your fingers. 
And you cannot get experience just by reading […] It has to be done manually.” – Bosun 
explorer cruise 
Hogarth328 has some thoughts on learning. He mentions learning by noticing associations or 
contingencies. The more of such one observes the likelihood og remembering is increasing. 
Associations and contingencies defined as things occurring together, noticing actions and 
 
326 Hogarth 2001 p. 19 
327 Hogarth 2001 
328 Hogarth 2001 
 73 
reactions. Seeing connections are critical to learning from experience329. This will take some 
time as I find to be described in the statement above. 
On experience versus procedures 
 
Over the last three or four decades, the use of procedures for operation has been more and 
more common in shipping. This might lead to dependency of procedures impeding 
improvisation. 
The informants were asked of their view on using procedures versus experience. The answers 
have shown similar opinions on this specific topic. As one stated: “…No, obviously, if you 
shall be shaped in a way that whatever occurs you must in and read what the solution shall 
be…If you are not able to think by yourself, you are very much ruled by a frame-work like 
that.[procedures]” – Simulator instructor 
They reveal a tendency that the dependency of procedures and checklists are decreasing with 
a growing experience. As one informant put it: “Well these days…let`s take offshore, and 
maybe passenger trade too, then you have procedures from arrival to departure. And the less 
experience you have the more I think you relay on that procedure to in a way give a 
confirmation to yourself that I am doing the right thing, because it is written. In a way you 
quit using your head and the other things you have learned through education […] the 
procedures they are off course a tool to make us perform a work operation in a safe way. I 
was about to say that the dependence of having a procedure I have felt and seen a bit that it is 
greater the more unexperienced you are. You are always supposed to use a procedure, no 
matter how experienced you are, but if you are experienced then you use, in a way, 
procedures as support. If you are new and unexperienced it is the procedure that leads you 
through…” - Simulator instructor 
I find the statement above illustrative to Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss330 description of human 
behavior as they develop from novice to expert. Reason`s331  three levels of performancemay 
also be supportive to the content of the statement as it describes human approach to various 
tasks; namely routine (skill-based), adjusting or modifying (rule-based) and thinking things 
 
329 Hogarth 2001 p. 20 and 75 
330 Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss 1986:16-52 
331 Reason 2016:70 
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through on the spot (knowledge-based) appearing simultaneously. Also Grech et.al.332 on 
rule-based behavior may be said to be exemplified by this statement. 
He continues by questioning the relevance of procedures developed by companies for the use 
on board ships. There is also a tendency to skip procedures not quite suitable for a ship`s 
operations instead of getting them corrected by a dialogue with the personnel on-shore who 
have made them. This he claims is a matter of willingness to use effort. “…it is up to the 
users of the procedures to have a dialogue with those who create the procedures, that you get 
a procedure that fits to what you are doing. And it is perhaps a bit there the maritime 
directorate and…are a bit lazy, the issue that this is what we have got from the company, and 
that point does not fit, that does not fit, that does not fit…so they skip them. Instead of having 
a dialogue with the company, that we need to have a procedure fitted for our system […] but I 
think it is like baked in or ingrown in the systems that what we get from the company is what 
we shall do, instead of having it and play the ball back and forth. […] Right. Instead of 
playing the ball back and forth to get it fitted to the system […] in a way one skip reporting 
due to it demanding too much effort.” - Simulator instructor 
The demand to use procedures, as the informant above suggests, were supported by another 
informant: “And that is a typical sign for this age, especially this in the procedure-age, the 
demand that all things shall be described. You may not have trust upon that people are doing 
their job. It has to be specified […] Because you are taught to read a procedure” - Simulator 
instructor 
These statements support one of Webb and Chevreau`s333 impediments to improvisation – the 
tendency of organizations relaying on written rules and procedures describing in detail how 
different tasks should be performed. They claim that reliance on established rules and 
procedures chokes the ability of creative thinking. Organizations demand for conformity 
devaluates the reservoir of creativity within their crew. Mendonca et.al. also have a view on 
this item as they claim that in certain situations no planned-for activities may turn out feasible 
to manage such events334. 
Another of the informants labelled the dependency to procedures to be a problem although he 
emphasized the importance of such: “… They get scared, they are very focused on the 
 
332 Grech et.al. 2008:53 
333 Webb and Chevreau 2006:69,70 
334 Mendonca et.al. 2001 
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checklist and procedures then they lock themselves to…yes they become very static […] I am 
eagerly supporting these checklists, having them as a background…that they lay there, that 
you have them” - Simulator instructor  
The same respondent had made some observations when performing exercises using a 
navigational simulator. Diverting from procedures he found to have a positive effect on the 
outcome of an exercise. “…what we have seen when performing these man over board 
exercises that those who have shown to be most effective and have performed the best man 
over board exercise, are those who actually have put the check-lists away not using it point by 
point…” - Simulator instructor  
On this issue I find it appropriate to mention Hogarth`s335  theory on intuition as a quick way 
of solving or managing events demanding ad-hoc actions due to limited time available. One 
may also here look upon Reason`s three levels of performance336 as checklists and procedures 
(rule-based behavior) are used as support to decisions and actions and put away if the 
situation requires so (knowledge-based behavior). Even though Reason337 holds forth the 
knowledge-based performance as a conscious, slow one depending on time I believe that 
improvisation within a limited time-frame in a crisis, as described by Weisæth and 
Kjeserud338, some deliberate considerations will have to be done in combination with intuition 
and automatic mode. 
On safety attitude 
 
A good and healthy safety attitude seems crucial both to avoid and to manage crises. Hence I 
like to present some of my informant`s views on this issue: “…I am old school when it comes 
to HMS339 and…I am very like that…over the last five years I have had to change my attitude 
concerning a lot when it comes to HMS and safety and such…” - Bosun and AB coastal 
freighter, coastal steamer and for the present explorer cruise 
A master on a passenger ship put it like this: “First we got a bunch on board in Bergen, drove 
them through the safety-bit and then on the operation-bit, you sharpen the gang. […] After a 
while we checked out the status […] this was forgotten. And not caused by people never mind, 
 
335 Hogarth 2001:8 
336 Reason 2016:70 
337 Reason 2016:70 
338 Weisæth and Kjeserud 2008:23,24 
339 HMS: Helse, miljø og sikkerhet [Health, Environment and Safety] 
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but the focus was not there […] new gang on board in Bergen, so you have to go straight on 
to build attitude on safety […] `And you shall not only stand here chopping sausages and 
make salad, you are a fire-fighter on board as well`. The thing about getting people to 
understand that our safety runs through the everyday from morning to evening, what you see 
and what you do […] Yes, and it is fresh goods. […] It has to be focused on all the time.”       
- Master of polar explorer cruise-ship. 
These statements I find to be highly supportive to Weick and Sutcliffe`s340 theories on mind-
fulness. Especially on the items Preoccupation with failure341 and Sensitivity to operations342 
the informants exemplifies the theory in a practical way, both from a personal and a 
management or leadership point of view. 
On the MV Nordlys accident 
 
In the beginning of this thesis I referred to the AIBN-report 2013/02, after the fire on board 
the coastal steamer the MV “Nordlys”. The official report focused on dedicated stand-ins for 
performing various tasks, such as closing valves in this case. Evacuating passengers were not 
covered in this report. One of my informants attended this very unfortunate incident and 
shared some of his experiences.  
I find it exemplifying to the scope of this thesis to present some of his experiences: “Yes, it 
was bad…when it happens so rapidly. You have got fifteen minutes from everything fine to all 
is black. […] Virtually all were dining at the time. It was breakfast […] no one were where 
they were supposed to be. No one […] The starboard side was out, it was filled with smoke, it 
was impossible to evacuate from there. Hence it all happened on the port side. It is my site on 
the port side operating the MOB. But we had sent off the MOBs carrying the casualties. It 
was what we…and we had contact with people up on the deck. They were so burned and…It 
was just a matter of getting them ashore, it was our first thought. But as a rule the MOB shall 
work as a backup when the lifeboats are launched and if you are to assist […] But a decision 
was made there and then that we start with the wounded […] [procedures] were deviated, 
because our routine is that the MOB is to be like…let us say that something happens to the 
lifeboats or something else, push them away or etc. so it shall be launched as the first and 
assist lifeboats if needed. Help them away if the engine does not start. It is to be launched 
 
340 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015 
341 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015:45-62 
342 Weick and Sutcliffe 2015:77-94 
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anyway if something happens. It could be the case of people falling over board or…It is a 
backup to pick them up or […] It was the first engineer and the repair-man who was burned 
as much that they had to be sent ashore…” - Bosun explorer cruise.  
He continues relating the incident to what he had experienced during years of exercising and 
using procedures: “Yes it was nothing like an exercise. No one were where they were 
supposed to be …this happens in ten – fifteen minutes from it starts until it is an inferno…that 
things happens… there is no time to think […] what was good was that it was experienced 
sailors knowing what to do, how to do it, and […] It was the guys who were free to use […] It 
was just using your head, but when you have experienced it you see that it is ok, you exercise 
things, but you see how it works, you see how it works, and off course, if you change roles and 
see you will get some insight on what to do and such. One tries to make the best out of it. 
There is nothing in my instructions for me to enter the dining salon to fetch people in 
wheelchairs and to get them up on the boat-deck. […] I did that…it is written that you are to 
count the passengers on board [into the lifeboats] and all, but if there is a fire under your … I 
believe you throw those people on board quickly as h…That counting and that organization 
and all it might…But you shall try it off course. But what happens if it is… Let us say if it is 
burning under your […] My task is to operate that MOB, the one I shall out in […] No one 
can anticipate what happens […] I took a lifeboat…It was because he who were in charge of 
that lifeboat …well he was not present. He did not show up. And…I took the one lifeboat. Me 
and a chef, two lifeboats carrying passengers. And we were inside the port, so it was just 
around the quay and so…I left the boat there due to people were standing by to take care of, 
rescue-team. And I got a message from the chief officer on the radio to show up `asap`. So I 
just ran down to the quay, because then the Redningsskøyta343 came to push her in and…then 
I started to speak with the fire-fighters344, to explain how, what I had seen and…So those fire-
fighters were standing on the quay…Then it was to embark to show the fire-fighters the way 
to the engine. They went in by the poop-deck345 and then down and into the control room346. 
But say it like this that when […] all were in the dining-room.” - Bosun explorer cruise   
This should very clearly confirm the necessity of improvisation in crisis management. 
 
343 Redningsskøyta: Rescue vessel 
344 Fire-fighters: Shore – based official fire-fighting brigade (RITS) 
345 Poop-deck: The deck aft of a ship 
346 Control-room: Engine control-room 
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CONCLUSION 
 
General 
 
This study has revealed that most crises demands rapid actions to manage and to achieve a 
safe and desirable outcome. Such actions are often based on decisions and improvisation in a 
state of chaos due to limited time and information. Critical situations tend to escalate or 
change requiring reconsiderations. There may probably not be time to find optimal solutions. 
Hence so called “good enough” actions may be appropriate to manage a critical situation. To 
make sound and relevant decisions and to improvise it takes knowledge, skills, expertise and 
intuition. Enhancing improvisation should be consider an important barrier concerning safety 
and contingency. The notion that the more experienced the crew are the better the change for 
improvisation are shining through both in statements by informants and theory. 
It has come forth that knowledge, skills, expertise and intuition may be engineered in several 
ways. This inquiry has shown some of these ways. 
In this section I aim to answer the research question:  
How may improvisation be enhanced in contingency and crisis-management on board ships? 
My study of literature and the information that has been given by my informants, have been 
enlightening and have given me expanded insight in the topic of this thesis; Enhancing 
improvisation in crisis management. The most outstanding and important, in my view, insight 
it has brought forth, is that contingency is not only engineered by contingency plans and 
exercises alone. These observations or experiences though does not, to my conviction, 
diminish the value of such exercises. Being able to improvise prior to and during crises 
management depends on expertise and intuition to make relevant and rapid decisions and 
executing actions in chaotic situations where time and information are limited. Contingency 
and the ability to improvise also seems to be a part of everyday work, by building knowledge, 
skills and experience and through everyday work and the fixing of minor problems or 
incidents. It is also important to notice that technology as for instance computer programs 
designed for crisis management are useful supplements not the solution as a whole. 
Contingency planning including risk-assessment, the brainstorming, the actual work on plans 
and revisions will benefit the crew`s understanding of how things work and by that increase 
their ability to improvise. Such plans should be as generic as possible to ease adjustment to 
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specific situations and benefit the ability to improvise. When acknowledging improvisation as 
crucial to crisis management on must also accept the possibilities of misvention, mispliance 
and mistakes. 
The dedication to the topic shown by my informants have convinced me that safety and 
contingency are highly acknowledged by both active sailors and instructors, improvisation 
being a vital part of it. At least in the part of the Norwegian maritime domain this study 
includes it seem to be so. 
Enhancing improvisation through everyday operations 
 
An important element is to alter tasks for the crew to perform or watch being performed in 
daily operation. In other words, the building of a contingency is a continuous process. This I 
find highly supported by the statements of the one respondent who has a real-life experience 
from a fatal accident – the MV Nordlys fire. Alteration of roles or tasks in daily work seem to 
enhance improvisation needed when crewmembers are absent during crises.  
Those of my informants who have been and still are serving on board ships, as officers and 
ratings, have brought to my notion that the engineering of contingency and improvisation is 
very much based on managing different events in the daily operations. Both routine and minor 
incidents are regarded as basis or a necessity for developing ability of improvisation in crises. 
Some of the literature has left me with a similar understanding, concerning the different 
stages of building of experience, expertise and intuition. Experience is said to be key word 
although it may be trade dependent and domain specific. The necessity of time to build 
experience has also been emphazised.  
A crew of experienced and less experienced members are said to be an advantage that benefits 
the exchange of experience. This will be a vital part of the way from novice to expert and 
building intuition.  
Enhancing and maintaining safety attitude are mentioned as vital to managing crises. It is said 
that maintaining the focus on safety is crucial. Otherwise it is easy forgotten. Safety has been 
described as fresh goods.  
Mindfulness or awareness to early signs of possible dangerous failures are mentioned as a 
way of gaining knowledge and experience. Daily work is considered a part of contingency 
and contingency considered a part of a ship`s total safety. 
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Enhancing improvisation by contingency-exercises on board 
 
It is likely to believe that engaging the whole crew when planning exercises, giving them an 
ownership to them, would benefit the eager for exercising and eliminate the feeling of 
exercises as boring and disturbing tasks. Reduced personnel during exercises by discharging 
persons are said to be a good way to train and enhance improvisation. It is also recommended 
by maritime experts in accident reports. One must be aware though, that some tasks demands 
special knowledge not easy to replace. Hence there may be few alternatives as to stand-ins. 
Debriefs after exercises are regarded important to the development of understanding and 
experience. 
Table-top exercises are said to be suitable for enhancing improvisation as they open for 
discussions around the table on solving imaginary situations. They are also a forum for 
evaluating and improving contingency plans. 
Time given to perform contingency exercises, as suggested in this thesis, are not considered to 
be an appreciable problem pursuant to my informants. There seems to be given sufficient 
space for exercises pursuant to mandatory national and international regulations. Some 
companies have set their own standards beyond mandatory regulations. 
Use of shore-based simulators in exercises 
 
Simulators are said to be excellent tools for training contingency and improvisation. 
Statements by those of my informants who serve as instructors on contingency education and 
training using shore-based simulators, have brought me to a closer understanding of the 
different levels of such training based on the level of knowledge, skills and experience of the 
participants attending courses. They also prefer to perform exercises with a mix of 
experienced and less experienced participators to achieve exchange of experience. Some 
simulator exercises also include discharging participators to train improvisation as they have 
to alter roles and tasks. It is important also not to make exercises too complex as it is believed 
to diminish the outcome. This, off course, also goes for exercises on board ships. 
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Ordinary training of maritime students is building knowledge, skills, experience and intuition 
bit by bit to enable them to improvise and consider abandoning check lists if necessary. Such 
training includes both relevant theory and practice on simulators. 
Impediments to improvisation 
 
My inquiry shows that involving the crew in contingency planning, as required by 
international rules, varies among different ships. Negligence of involving ship`s crew in 
contingency planning do not seem to enhance the building knowledge, skills, experience, 
expertise and intuition needed to be able to improvise to manage unfortunate incidents, 
emergencies or crisis situations. 
Conformity and specialization are also said to limit the ability to improvise. The demand of 
documentation and to follow procedures may lead to a dependency of such and diminish the 
eager and ability to improvise. Procedure dependency is said to be decreasing with growing 
experience. As to specialization it is a necessity onboard most ships of today due to highly 
specialized operations and complicated or complex technology and may be difficult to avoid. 
Dependency of procedures have been mentioned. The request to follow procedures and the 
demand of things to be described have been said to be a possible problem to ship`s crew. 
Focus on following checklists may make people static and reduce situational awareness in the 
surroundings and hence impede improvisation. Deviating from procedures have shown to 
have a positive effect in simulator exercises. Dependency of procedures are however said to 
be decreasing with growing experience. 
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FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Automation in ships operation: 
Over the years more and more operations are automized, leaving the crew to be surveyors 
watching instruments. Examples on automation are Dynamic Positioning and ships sailing 
themselves pursuant to pre-defined routing. Fewer operations are depending on manual 
conduction. This may cause less possibilities for ship`s crew to practice manual handling and 
building experience. This issue is, in my view, a highly relevant and important topic to take a 
closer look upon. Some of my respondents made statements on this issue that should be taken 
seriously regarding the present expanding focus on digitalization and automation of 
operations. How will this influence the possibility for humans to achieve knowledge, skills 
and experience? I base this question on statements given through the work on this thesis. 
One statement: “Yes quite clear. Just that is a bit of a scary picture because when you 
have…if we speak of external factors like weather, wind and sea and when you are handling a 
ship you get this in many ways in your fingers. If you are to dock and undock ships. Semi-
autonomic ships, then it is clear that these naval officers never get this in their fingers. So if 
automation should fail you would in many ways react more slow and your ability to improvise 
will become poorer due to not getting the opportunity to […] Some bells should ring […] it 
scares me a bit.”  - Simulator instructor  
Asked whether automation has an influence on the ability to improvise, another respondent 
stated: “Yes I believe so. Because maybe you trust upon instruments too much, right. And then 
I believe that people may not know the system well enough either […] You may look upon 
sailing on track347, right. How many are reluctant to leave the track? [...] they do not know 
how to get back on track again…people are afraid to […] If you automize for instance a boat 
to dock and undock people will struggle to override it. That is; you will get less practice on 
what is your original task […] you are to monitor something and then you shall…you 
basically get less practice […] Yes and especially on DP-boats348, right…they are not able to 
handle a boat because it is a system doing it. And it has been criticized that they do not 
understand…they are in a way not able to maneuver a boat from one rig manually anymore 
because they are used to the DP doing it for them…” - Simulator instructor 
 
347 Sailing on track: The ship automatically follows a predefined route by instruments actually perform the 
operation under way 
348 DP: Dynamic Positioning systems – ships maneuvered entirely by computers 
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ENCLOSURES 
 
I Definitions 
 
- Able bodied seaman (AB): Fully experienced deckhand 
- Accidents349: Severe or fatal injuries to personnel, shipwreck, fires, collisions, 
environmental damage due to spill etc. leading to the involvement of on-shore-based 
organizations, such as authorities, rescue-centers, police, public healthcare and media. 
- ALARP: As low as reasonable possible; the range of crisis-countermeasures (barriers) 
considered within the limits of what is physically, organizationally and financially 
possible or beneficial taking into account the levels of consequences and probabilities. 
- Barriers: Organization, equipment, procedures, job-instructions and training to avoid 
unfortunate incidents and/or accidents. 
- “Black Swans”: Incidents and/or accidents most unlikely or occur and therefore not 
considered nor included in contingency-plans. Hence there are no procedures available 
to handle such incidents or accidents. Also named “Wild Cards” 
- Cis: Critical infrastructures. 
- Contingency: Procedures, plans and training to handle various unfortunate incidents 
and accidents. 
- Contingency-plan: See section “Developing contingency-plans” below. 
- CPR: Cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
- Crisis-management: The operative in-situ handling of an incident or accident 
including organization on management-level such as; providing external resources, 
handling communications towards media, next of kin, authorities, business associates 
and other similar organizational tasks performed by the on-shore organization. 
- Designated person: Safety officer on a shipping company. Dedicated to serve as 
liaison between ship and company and in charge of the company safety management. 
- DPA: Designated Person Ashore – the company`s safety officer. 
- Equipment: Tools to aid the protection of ship and crew/passengers from dangers 
caused by unfortunate incidents or accidents, like fire-extinguishers, life-rafts etc. 
- Exercises: See section; Developing contingency-plans” below. 
 
349 Sea-accident defined by FOR-2008-06-27-744 – «Forskrift om melde- og rapporteringsplikt ved sjøulykker og 
andre hendelser til sjøs» [Prescription on the duty of reporting accidents and other incidents at sea] 
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- Experience: Learning by fixing minor problems underway during the years, leading to 
understanding of how things works – developing an; “Understanding of the systems”. 
- Improvisation: See section “A preliminary view on the topic – improvisation” below 
in this thesis. 
- “Firefighting”: Mending of equipment failures and minor unwanted incidents. 
- Learning by doing: Drills on procedures and handling of various equipment. In this 
context the term differs from experience – see above 
- Maritime domain: Off-shore and onshore organizations according to the context of 
this thesis – see below. 
- MOB: Man Overboard Boat – small rescue craft situated on board ships 
- Naked analysis: Considering limited risk- or vulnerable-areas without taking into 
account existing barriers. 
- Off-shore: At sea. In this context, on-board ships. 
- Offshore: Vessels serving the petroleum branch at sea 
- On-shore: In this thesis; shipping-companies, authorities, rescue-centers, fire-brigades, 
medical-care and similar organizations. 
- Organization: Plans containing specific tasks for individual positions and rank of 
crewmembers and onshore staff. These plans include responsibility, authority, 
authorization and proxies. 
- Procedures: Step by step instructions on how to deal with certain incidents or 
accidents as well of the use of various equipment. 
- RITS – Rescue Efforts at Sea [Rednings Innsats Til Sjøs]. On-shore based Fire-
brigades specially trained to fight fire or assist firefighting on board ships. 
- ROS: Risk assessment (Risk = Consequence x Probability) 
- SMS: Safety Management System 
- Unfortunate incidents (adverse events): Minor injuries to personnel, environmental 
hazards (spills), and other incidents leading to time spill causing financial loss. 
- Wild Card: Incident not likely to happen although possible (comparable to Black 
Swans) 
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II Interview – Guide 
 
1. How do you perform risk-assessments? 
- Are all crewmembers engaged in the risk-assessments? 
2. How do you organize and plan contingency exercises? 
3. What is/are your experience(s) on the outcome of such exercises? 
4. Do/does your exercises require participants to improvise? 
5. Do you plan for improvisation? 
6. To what extent do you experience schedules and efficiency as restraints? 
7. If so, to what extent? 
8. What do you expect to gain by enhancing improvisation when training contingency? 
9. If not, why is that so? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90 
III List of figures 
 
Fig. 
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IV Statements by informants used in this thesis 
 
Original text in Norwegian Page Translation into English by author 
“Langt ifra hjelp, ja. Det er jo ikke for 
ingen ting at ikke vi har lov å ha mer enn 
200 passasjerer når vi går rundt. Men det 
er på sommeren.”  
 
51 “Far away from help, yes. It is not for 
nothing we are not allowed to carry more 
than 200 passengers as we sail. But that is 
in the summertime.” 
…vi i overkant av det som SOLAS-
kravene er [...] Kravet er at du skal 
overleve 5 dager uten [noen assistanse] … 
52 “…we are a bit beyond the SOLAS – 
requirements […] [The Polar Code] 
demands survival for five days without 
any assistance…” 
“Det er noe som er kommet fra rederiet. 
[…] jeg har i hvert fall ikke vært med å 
utarbeide de, for å si det sånn […] jeg går 
jo sterkt ut fra at det er folk som har 
peiling på det. […] Ja altså jeg tror jo ikke 
det er sånn det fungerer […] det er jo folk 
i rederiet som er ansatt til det kan du si. 
Og jeg må si at klart jeg skal ha gått med 
på det, det hadde ikke vært noe problem, 
jeg har jo masse meninger …» 
52 “It is something that has come from the 
company.[…]I have never been involved 
in the developing, to put it like that […] I 
very much believe that it is cunning  
people […] Yes well I do not think that it 
is how it works […] there are people on 
the company assigned to that you might 
say. And off course I would have agreed 
on that, it would not have been no 
problem, I do have many opinions…” 
«… jeg har … blitt forespurt i oppbygging 
av sikkerhetsmanualer og litt å si at jeg 
har hatt risikovurderinger og litt sånne 
greier, det har jeg vært med på ja. Og 
særlig … jeg vet ikke sånn på kysten, men 
altså det jeg snakker om som jeg har vært 
med på og blitt spurt om hva jeg mente og 
sånn, det er den operasjonen som man … 
Altså du har blitt spurt hva du mener og 
om du har noe å komme med.» 
52 “…I have been asked to join in the 
building of safety-manuals and to say a 
bit risk-assessments and such, I have done 
that yes. And especially…I am not sure in 
the domestic trade, but what I am 
speaking of as I have participated in and 
been asked of my opinions and such, it is 
the operation you…You are asked of your 
opinion and if you have something to 
add.” 
«Den er jo satt opp av rederiet […] vi har 
jo ikke noen risikovurderinger på akkurat 
den situasjonen [beredskap] …» 
53 “It is developed by the company […] we 
do not have risk-assessments on that 
situation [contingency]…”   
«Nei det gjør vi om bord. […] Er det noe 
nytt som er kommet fram så tar vi det 
gjerne opp på de interne 
operasjonsmøtene som vi har, 
skipsledelsen. Og så tar da over-styrmann 
og hotellsjefen, maskinsjefen, 
førstemaskinisten, de tar da hvis at det er 
noe der så lager vi en sånn i lag og så blir 
den da godkjent til slutt. Så sender vi den 
inn til QA bare så de vet at det er laget.»  
 
53 
54 
“No, we do that on board…If something 
new has come up we discuss it on internal 
operations-meetings we have, the 
shipboard. And then the chief officer and 
the hotel-manager, the chief engineer and 
the first engineer, they take if there is 
something there then we make such 
together and then we get it approved at 
the end. Then we send it to QA just letting 
them know that it has been made.” 
Ja. Og de har jeg jo også oppe i 
departementsmøtet. Og de skal jo 
revideres årlig, risk assessment […] der 
ligger det en jobb på Star som kommer 
opp en gang i året. […] Så da er alle mann 
med på… Og kommer det nytt utstyr om 
bord så skal det også lages. Og hvis 
54 “Yes. And I include them in the 
department-meetings. And they are to be 
revised annually, risk assessment […] it is 
a job on the STAR that pops up once a 
year. […] So than all are included…and if 
new equipment arrives it is to be 
performed. And if procedures are changed 
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prosedyrer blir forandret i en sånn grad at 
det blir nødvendig å forandre risk 
assessment eller gå igjennom den, så blir 
det også gjort. Og der er jo også risikorert 
øvelser ...“ 
to such a degree that it is necessary to 
alter risk assessment or see through it, 
then this is done too. And then there is 
risk assess following exercises…” 
«Der ligger hele planleggingsverktøyet og 
alt sammen i samme programvaren som vi 
kjører hyrer og hele hurrameien. […] Hvis 
et er en mann som har mistet en øvelse så 
vil det komme fram. Det er overvåket 
elektronisk også, det er ikke bare en 
sikkerhetsoffiser som sitter og følger med. 
[…] Og vi har egne folk som sitter og 
følger med det»   
54 “There lies the whole planning-tool and 
all in the software as we use for wages 
and all […] If a man has lost an exercise 
then it will be revealed. It is under 
electronic surveillance as well, so it is not 
only the safety-officer surveilling […] We 
have special people controlling.” 
“… Når jeg snakker om risikovurdering, 
det som jeg nevnte i sted, så er det i 
forhold til den jobben vi gjør …» 
54 “…When I speak of risk-assessment here, 
as I mentioned, then it is concerning the 
job that we do…” 
Du spør videre risk assessment, da tenker 
jeg jo risikovurdering […] i forhold til 
arbeid, driften av båten. […] 
Da snakker du om den totale sikkerheten i 
båten kontra den personlige sikkerheten, 
operasjonelle sikkerheten. De er jo veldig, 
veldig frempå med denne … til den 
individuelle sikkerheten når de jobber i 
hverdagen. […] får en god drift på den 
måten, så har du allerede demmet opp for 
veldig mye av det som kanskje videre. 
[…] Ja det er jo at du gjør det ordentlig. 
Og det er da du skal avdekke om det er 
noe som er feil. […] hvis det er lenge 
siden de har gjort det […] Da tar de en 
liten neve med risikovurderinger og så 
prater de igjennom. Det er … det virker.» 
55 “You ask about risk-assessment, then I 
think risk-assessment concerning work, 
the operation of the boat […] You talk of 
the total safety of the boat versus the 
personal safety, operational safety. They 
are very, very alert on this…on individual 
safety when they perform their daily tasks. 
[…] you get a good operation that way, 
then you have already built up barriers 
for much of what may happen in time to 
come […] Yes, it is about doing it  
properly. That you shall reveal if 
something is wrong […] If it has been 
some time since a task have been 
performed […] They take a handful of 
risk-assessments and talk them through. It 
is…it works”   
«Ja. Og dermed så har vi lagt et ansvar på 
dem med det at de får en grundig 
innføring i båten, hvordan den ser ut og 
hvor de kan gå og hvor de har second 
option og hvor de har third option. […] Så 
hver lørdag så går de gjennom alt utstyret 
her, og det må de opp og signere på at 
lyktene virker. Hodelykter er der jo og der 
er … ja nøkler og alt dette her. Og disse 
lappene som vi henger på dørene for 
evakuering og alt dette her det skal være 
på plass alt, det skal stemme etter lista, 
innholdsfortegnelsen, og det skal være i 
orden. […] Det er en ting du aldri må 
slippe. Nei. […] Vi skal berge livet på oss 
selv og passasjerene. […] For jeg sier når 
vi har sluppet tampene og gått ifra kai så 
er vi vår egen hjelp nærmest …» 
56 
57 
“Yes. And we have given them a 
responsibility by giving them a thorough 
knowledge to the boat, what it looks like 
and where they may go and where they 
have a second option and where they have 
a third option […] So every Saturday they 
look through all the equipment here, and 
they have to come up to sign that torches 
works. Head-torches are there…and keys 
and all that. And the notes we place on 
doors for evacuation and all this shall be 
in roper place according to the list, list of 
contents, and it shall be in good order 
[…] These are things you must never slip 
out of hand. We shall save our own and 
the passenger`s lives […] I say that when 
have let go from the quay; we are on our 
own…” 
“innenriks passasjer synes jeg et bedre 
system enn det som jeg er vant til i 
offshore, det er at de har denne utsjekken. 
57 “…inshore passenger I think has a better 
system than I am used to in the off-shore 
branch, it is that they have this checkout. 
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Du har utsjekk i ruta og du har utsjekk på 
fartøyet, og den utsjekken er ikke 
tidsbegrenset. Den utsjekken er så lenge 
som den enkelte trenger for å bli 
utsjekket. Den type utsjekk var jeg aldri 
borti i offshore. Ikke i sånn formalisert 
system […] sånn som for min del, første 
gangen jeg var kaptein så sa jeg til 
rederiet at jeg vil gjerne ha 14 dager 
overlapp med han som er kaptein. Jeg skal 
inn i en ny rolle, jeg skal inn i et nytt 
rederi, jeg skal inn for en ny kunde, så jeg 
vil jo ha i hvert fall 14 dager da. Men det 
er liksom på det personlige plan da, hva 
den enkelte ønsker. […] Det er klart det 
kan jo være litt utfordrende å kjøre 
ruteutsjekk på en supply-båt som er i 
spotmarkedet der du ikke vet hva neste 
steg er for noe. Det blir jo umulig. Men i 
hvert fall en fartøysutsjekk og på en måte 
en systemutsjekk sånn at du kan fartøyet 
og du kan systemene om bord. Bare der så 
har du gjort grovjobben.” 
There is checkout on the route a checkout 
on the vessel and that checkout is not 
limited in time. That checkout lasts as 
long as the simple individual needs to be 
cleared for service. That kind of checkout 
I never experienced in offshore. Not in 
such a formalized system […] as for me 
the first time I was captain I told the 
company that I would like a fortnight 
over-lap with the existing captain. I am 
entering a new role, I am serving a new 
company, I am serving a new customer, so 
I want at least a fortnight. But it is on the 
personal level […] Off course it is a bit 
challenging to perform route checkouts on 
a supply-vessel in the spot-market where 
you do not know what the next step is. It 
becomes impossible. But at least a vessel 
checkout so that you know the vessel and 
in a way a system-checkout so that you 
know the systems on board. Only there the 
main job has been done…” 
«… det er bedre at folk gjør noe og gjør 
feil istedenfor at de ikke gjør noen ting, 
fordi at de er redde for å gjøre feil […]det 
er at det er bedre at folk gjør noe, så får en 
heller bare gjøre en feil en og andre 
gangen innenfor rimelighetens grenser 
ja.» 
58 “…it is better that people do something 
and do it wrong instead of doing nothing, 
because they are afraid make a 
mistake[…]it is better that people do 
something, then you better occasionally 
make a mistake, within reason though.” 
“Men jeg er jo litt sånn opptatt av at skal 
du kunne holde på å øve improvisasjon så 
er du nødt til å ha et grunnlag. Og 
grunnlaget er kunnskap. Du kan ikke 
improvisere uten å ha kunnskap […] Og 
ferdighet. Og også faktisk litt erfaring. 
[…] og det jeg ser så utrolig tydelig det er 
det at teori henger så utrolig godt i forhold 
til dette med improvisasjon. Det er en nær 
sammenheng mellom det å ha en god 
teoretisk plattform og det med å kunne 
improvisere […] Altså, skal du kunne 
improvisere så er du nødt til å ha bygget 
opp teorien. […] Du må ha verktøy. Du 
må ha noe å henge knaggene på for å 
kunne improvisere sånn at du faktisk 
klarer å gjøre ting riktig. […] Jeg er 
veldig opptatt av improvisering, at vi skal 
ha det i bakhodet hvordan du … 
magefølelse. […] Sånn som vi driver på 
med en søk- og redningsaksjon eller vi 
driver på med en mann over bord, så ser 
jeg hvor viktig det er å tenke alternativt, 
hvor viktig det er å improvisere faktisk, at 
vi kan ikke følge sjekklista da, …» 
58 
59 
“I am a bit focused on that if you shall 
exercise improvisation you need a 
foundation. And that foundation is 
knowledge. You cannot improvise without 
knowledge […] And skills. And a bit of 
experience […]and what I see so 
incredibly clear it is that theory is so 
incredibly well connected to 
improvisation. It is a close connection 
between having a solid theoretical 
platform and the ability to improvise […] 
if you are to improvise you need to have 
built the theory […] You need tools. You 
need something to hang on the racks to be 
able to improvise in a way that you do 
things right.[…] I am very concerned on 
improvisation, to keep it the in back of our 
heads how you…intuition […] The way 
we carry on with search – and rescue or 
exercising man over board , I see how 
important it is to think alternatively, how 
important it is to improvise actually, that 
we cannot follow the checklist then,…” 
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«Du får litt sånn erfaring med å 
improvisere i den daglige drifta. Og da 
tror jeg egentlig at du kan ta det med deg 
også i øvelsessammenheng. […] Ja jeg 
tror egentlig at du må se på drifta av båten 
generelt. Er du vant med å improvisere i 
hverdagen så vil du kunne improvisere i 
øvelse og selvfølgelig i en krisesituasjon 
også.»  
 
59 
 
“You get a bit experience on improvising 
during everyday operation. And then I 
think you can bring it on to exercises […] 
Yes I believe you really have to look at the 
operation of the boat in general. If you 
are used to improvise in the everyday 
operation then you will be able to 
improvise in an exercise and off course, in 
a crisis situation too.” 
«…jo da, det [`brannslokking`] kan nok 
lære deg til at det er flere måter å ordne 
opp et problem på. […] Ja, Joda, det er 
klart, da bygger du jo opp på en måte et 
repertoar av løsninger. Og det er jo 
nettopp det du må ha, det er jo et repertoar 
av løsninger. […] Det er der du legger 
grunnlaget …” 
59 “…yes, it [`firefighting`] may teach you 
that there are several ways of fixing a 
problem […] Yes, off course, then you 
build up, in a way, a repertoire of 
solutions. And that is what you need, it is 
a repertoire of solutions […] That is 
where you form the foundation…”          
«Sist det er en 5 ukers tid siden jeg var på 
den siste øvelsen […] Vi har jo ukentlige 
øvelser. Det har jo forandret seg lite grann 
[…] den uka tar vi brann, den uka tar vi 
livbåt og […] det er jo nytt i rederiet da at 
vi skal ta … chiefen har en del med brann, 
hotellsjefen får ansvar for litt hospital og 
evakuering av lugarer og litt sånne greier. 
Og så er det jo da navigasjons-offiserer 
som tar det som er … livbåt og den delen. 
[…] Det er fordelt så ikke alt skal ligge på 
en sikkerhetsoffiser, så at vi får mer sånn 
ansvar, den uka så er det du som tar den 
øvelsen og legger opp og […] de finner på 
nye ting og så prater om hva vi skal gjøre 
og hva vi skal trene på. […] og det er jo 
den fysiske delen, å sette ut livbåter, 
klargjøre livbåter og sånt som går litt i 
glemmeboka fordi bestandig når vi har 
den øvelsen så setter vi ut livbåten. […] 
Det er jo låringswirer som kan henge seg 
opp, det kan kile seg … Hva gjør du. 
Dette her må de se, det er ikke noe du kan 
lese deg til. […] Det er en ting å vite 
hvordan du gjør det, og så er det en ting å 
følge med det som kan gå galt, og så er 
det en ting; hvordan skal en gjøre det når 
det går galt. […] Hvis du ikke vet det så 
blir du bare stående og se. […] det er bra 
at du setter ut båten to ganger for mye 
eller en gang … altså får noe treningen 
der, at du vet hva det er du holder på med. 
At det ikke blir sånn at du glemmer det 
av.» 
60 “It has been five weeks since I attended an 
exercise. […] We do have exercises 
weekly. It has changed a bit […] this week 
it is about fire, that week it is lifeboat and 
[…] it is a new routine in the company 
that we shall take…the chief engineer is 
concerned a bit on fire, the hotel manager 
is responsible for a bit hospital and 
evacuating cabins and stuff. And then 
there is the navigation officer taking care 
of…lifeboat and that part […] It has been 
distributed to avoid that all is laid on the 
safety officer. So we get more 
responsibility, that week you are in 
charge of the exercise and plan and […] 
they think of new elements and then we 
speak about what to do and what to train 
[…] and then there is the physical part, to 
launch lifeboats, prepare lifeboats and 
such that is easily forgotten because every 
time we do that exercise we launch the 
lifeboat[…] There are launching wires 
that may hang up, they might get 
locked…What do you do. This they have 
to watch, it is not something you learn by 
reading about it […] One thing is 
knowing how to do it and then it is 
another thing to watch for things that may 
go wrong […] If you do not know then 
you are just standing there. […] It is a 
good thing that you launch the MOB once 
or twice too much…that you get that 
training, that you know what you are 
doing., That it is not forgotten.” 
«Men øvelse er altså helt sikkert at det har 
jeg erfart, at øvelse det er bra. Det er 
mange som er irritert på øvelser […] og 
61 “…exercises…quite certain I have 
experienced that exercise is a good thing. 
Many are annoyed about exercises […] 
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de som man sitter i lag med har 20-25 års 
fartstid [...] så ble man lei av de øvelsene. 
Si sånn «dette her kan jeg jo», dette her 
trenger ikke jeg å … Jeg har jo skjønt det i 
ettertid at det hjelper deg jo […] en dag 
kan det komme til … at du ser at dette her 
det er nøye. Øvelse må man ha.” 
those you sit with have 20 to 25 years of 
experience […] so you got sick and tired 
of these exercises; Like ` But I do know 
this, this I do not need to`…afterwards I 
have realized that it helps you, that this 
here is […] one day it might…that you 
realize that this here is crucial. You need 
exercises…”      
“… men nå blir det litt sånn forskjell ifra 
fartøy til fartøy da, men de fartøyene som 
jeg var på over lengre tid og ble litt 
innarbeidet i systemene, der laget vi til en 
liten sånn rotasjonsordning der de 
forskjellige departementene var med på å 
planlegge øvelsene […] Så min rolle som 
overstyrmann, som er jo en utrolig viktig 
rolle om bord, han ble aldri øvet, aldri 
prøvet […] Men ved å kaste denne her 
ballen litt sånn rundt til dekk, litt til 
maskin, litt til bysse og involvere hele 
mannskapet så ble det øvd på momenter 
på en helt annen måte […] Yes, de så ting, 
utfordringer, med sine øyne som ikke jeg 
som overstyrmann i det hele tatt var klar 
over [...] ja de båtene de fikk det der til, 
det var egentlig ens enighet om at dette 
her var av de beste øvelsene. Vi har vel 
alle et inntrykk av at jo mer tilhørighet de 
fikk til øvelsene, jo bedre ble øvelsene 
mere utbytte har vi av øvelsene også [...] 
spesielt de departementene som hadde 
vært med på å utforme de enkelte 
øvelsene. […] følte at de hadde ekstra og 
godt utbytte. Men når du over året roterte 
på alle departementene om bord så … 
Under en lengre periode så fikk alle på en 
måte øvd på sitt. [...] Ja, det tror jeg kan 
være en modell som kan være ja det er 
veldig viktig. […] ja vi har vel alle erfart 
at den iveren etter å være med på øvelser 
den har vel kanskje gått veldig i sånn berg 
og dalbaner. Men når du involverer 
mannskapet mer i øvelsene så er de mer 
involvert i øvelsene også.» 
61 “…but it will be some differences from 
vessel to vessel, but the vessels I served on 
and got the systems under my skin, there 
we made a rotation arrangement where 
different departments participated in 
creating exercises […] So my role as chief 
officer, an incredibly important role on 
board, it was newer rehearsed […] But 
when throwing the ball around a bit…and 
involve the whole crew, then elements 
were trained on in a totally different way 
[…] Yes, they saw things, challenges with 
their own eyes that me as chief officer was 
not aware of at all…and then they 
conducted the exercise […] the feed-back 
on the ships where this worked, was that 
these were the best exercises. We all had 
the impression I guess that the more 
connection to the exercises, the better the 
exercises and the more you gain from 
them [...] especially the departments who 
had participated in developing these 
exercises […] they felt that they had an 
extra and good outcome. But when you 
over the year rotated on all departments 
on board then…During a longer period of 
time they all got to exercise their 
things.[…] I believe it is a model that 
might be…it is very important […]and we 
have all experienced that the eager of 
participating on exercises may vary. But 
when you involve the crew, they engage in 
the exercises too.” 
“… Man kan gjøre øvelsene mer 
attraktive, at folk ser mer nøye i de 
greiene der.» 
61 “…You might make the exercises more 
attractive, that people see things more 
accurate…” 
«Jeg tror ikke vi kunne ha drevet den 
typeøvelser som vi gjør med noe 
dreiebok. Vi hadde ikke kommet noen vei 
med det egentlig. Vi er avhengige av … 
[…] Ja det er veldig repetering av ting. Du 
kan jo øve sikkert på mange sånne 
spesifikke ting under øvingen, altså bli 
god på det da. […] Nei det er jo akkurat 
62 “I do not think we could have performed 
the kind of exercises that we do based on 
a manuscript. We would not have got 
anywhere really. We are depending on… 
[…] Yes it [exercises by manuscripts] is 
very much repeating things. You might 
drill many such specific things during the 
exercise, getting good at that […] The 
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det som er. Det er ikke et fasitsvar. […] 
… det er jo litt sånn hvordan vi spiller 
også og hva de vurderer […] Utfallet i 
øvelsen vil jo bli helt forskjellig ut ifra 
hvor de begynner hen […] … det er jo en 
vurdering som hver enkelt må gjøre. […] 
Så kan man jo heller si at man kan 
diskutere valgene etterpå, om det var rett 
eller galt. Og det er jo selv-følgelig 
situasjonsavhengig. Været spiller jo inn. 
[…] Ja det er klart det er personavhengig. 
[…] Ja altså personavhengig det er jo 
egentlig fordi at det er ikke noe… altså 
det er jo de vurderingene som de mener er 
den beste, hva er det de skal ivareta først 
og fremst.» 
point is that there is no absolute correct 
answer […] …it is a bit like how we play 
too and what they consider [...] The 
outcome of the exercise will turn out 
totally different as to where they 
start…Right, it is a consideration for the 
single individual to make […] and then 
you may discuss the choices afterwards, if 
it was wrong or right. And off course it is 
depending on the situation. The weather 
plays a part […] …it is clearly depending 
on each person […] depending on each 
person in the sense that…they are the 
decisions they mean is the best ones, what 
to take of care first and foremost” 
«Kjørte vel den øvelsen 4 ganger før at vi 
begynte å nærme oss det utfallet som vi 
hadde tenkt oss før vi startet øvelsen 
første gangen. Og da sier jo ikke jeg at 
øvelse 1,2 og 3 var dårligere eller bedre 
øvelser. Men de var med et helt annet 
utfall. Alle var like gode øvelser.» 
63 “We performed that exercise four times 
before we started getting close to the 
outcome we had thought of prior to 
launching the exercise the first time. And 
then I am not saying that exercise 1, 2 and 
3 were poorer or better exercises. They 
were all equally good exercises.” 
«For på første året så skal de på mange 
måter være ferdig med denne 
instrumenteringsbiten. Og på andre året så 
bør det egentlig kun være fokus på 
beslutningstaking. Det skal kun være 
fokus på kommunikasjon og det skal være 
fokus på situasjonsforståelse, 
improvisasjon […] Planlegging skal 
selvfølgelig gjøres […] jo mer kunnskap 
jeg selv har fått så bygger jo jeg opp 
øvelsene på en helt annen måte […] du 
skal ikke lære alt på en gang, du skal 
bygge det sakte men sikkert […] der du på 
mange måter kulminerer når vi kommer til 
april nå med mer helhetlig øvelser […] 
Og det gir dem jo også muligheten til 
faktisk å kunne improvisere […] 
Ja men så ser jeg også det at simulator er 
jo et sinnsykt bra pedagogisk verktøy.» 
63 “…During the first year they [naval 
students] shall in many ways be done on 
this instrument-part. And during the 
second year it should only be focused on 
decision-making. It should only be 
focused on communication, situational 
awareness, improvisation […] Planning 
off course […] the more knowledge I have 
achieved myself, then I build the exercises 
in a totally different way […] you are not 
supposed to learn it all in one bit, you 
shall build it up slowly and carefully […] 
ending up doing all-included 
exercises[…]And it gives them the 
possibility to actually improvise […] I 
also see that simulators are insanely good 
pedagogic tools” 
«…jo mer kompleks du gjør øvelsene, jo 
flinkere vil jo folket bli etter hvert […] 
altså du gir dem en oppgave å løse. […] 
Og det kan være så enkelt som at du 
legger et ark på bordet med 5 vanskelige 
spørsmål.  Vet ikke hva de får i øynene 
når de har øvelse. Det kan være spørreliste 
[…] altså det skal være et 
overraskelsesmoment. Men samtidig så 
må ikke vanskelighets-graden være så høy 
at du kjører dem i grøfta på første… det er 
jo ikke hensikten med øvelsen.» 
64 “…the more complex you make the 
exercises the cleverer the crew gets after 
a while…you give them a task to solve. 
[…] And it can be as simple as putting a 
piece of paper on the table containing five 
difficult questions. They do not know what 
to face in an exercise. It might be a list of 
questions […] there shall be an element of 
surprise. But at the same time the level of 
difficulty must not be so high that you 
crash them on the first…that is not the 
intention of the exercise” 
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«Og da er vi tilbake til det at da er du ikke 
i stand til å kunne improvisere. […] 
Du dreper alt. Og det er på mange måter 
… det er bare noen få som får noe utbytte 
av den øvelsen.» 
64 “Yes, yes…and then we come back to not 
being able to improvise. […] You kill it 
all…only a few will have a good outcome 
after such an [complex] exercise.”  
«De bruker et sånn ferdig oppsett i et 
Excel-skjema der du får ut hva slags 
øvelse du skal ha. […] Det er vel ikke 
laget på hvert enkelt fartøy, det er det vel 
ikke. Det er vel i rederi-ånden at det er 
laget. Så jeg mener at hvert enkelt fartøy 
har samme systemet …» 
64 “The same system and the same kind of 
exercises to be followed by all vessels in 
the company.” 
“ …sånn som jeg ser det litt i Norge og 
mange andre plasser det er jo det at 
spesielt i beredskap- siden det er jo at det 
øves på mange måter på ting som de kan, 
som har vært øvd på mange ganger før. 
Det blir sånn rutinepreget øvelser. […] Og 
da er jeg så redd for det at når du ikke drar 
det hakket videre så klarer du heller ikke å 
få dette å bli flink å improvisere. Du må 
holde på og ha uforutsigbarhet, du må 
holde på og ha usikkerhets-momenter osv 
… 
 “…as I see it a bit in Norway and many 
other places it is that, especially on the 
contingency side, it is that one in many 
ways exercises known elements, that have 
been trained several times before. It 
becomes like routine exercises.[…] And 
then I am afraid that if you do not expand 
then you are not able to become a good 
improviser. You have to emphasize  
impredictability, you must keep on with 
elements of uncertainty etc.” 
«… men der vil jeg heller bruke 
mangfoldet i øvelsesaspektet, hva du 
setter dem til å øve på.» 
65 “…I would rather call it diversity of the 
aspect of exercises.…what you set them to 
train.” 
«Men i de aller fleste tilfeller når de kjører 
en øvelse så er den enten som sånn 
praktisk/table top, at folk kan spørre og 
grave underveis, eller så kjører vi en ren 
røykdykkerøvelse der de fyller et rom 
med røyk […] Så er det ut igjen og så er 
det å samsnakkes, hva er det vi har gjort, 
hva kan vi bli bedre på. Det er jo den 
debriefen som er det viktigste […] Jeg vet 
når jeg var i kystvakten så hadde vi jo 
hver gang vi kjørte storøvelse så var vi jo 
små grupper som for rundt og gjorde ulike 
oppgaver og hadde debrief på det.» 
65 
66 
“…But in most cases when an exercise 
has been performed, either a practical or 
table-top, that people may ask and dig 
during the exercise, or we perform a pure 
smoke-diving exercise where they fill up a 
room with smoke […] Then it is out again 
and talk things through, what have we 
done, what can be done better. It is that 
debrief that is the most important […] I 
know when I served in the Coast guard 
then we had a debrief every time after a 
main exercise then it was small groups 
roaming around performing various tasks 
and had a debrief on that.” 
«Og samme gjennomgangene har de på 
hjerte/lungeredning. Der er doktor og 
nurse og der arrangerer 
sikkerhetsoffiseren og doktoren og nursa 
de arrangerer faste oppkjøringer for 
hjerte- og lungeredning. Og da er det 
dukke og da er det alle sammen igjennom 
samme prosedyren, blåse dukka og alt 
dette her, hele ritualet. […] Det er veldig 
viktig for det er jo de som er nede og 
rundt om i båten og arbeider som kommer 
borti dette her først, det er jo ikke vi som 
sitter på brua og det er ikke de som sitter i 
kontrollrommet.» 
66 “…and the same system we have on CPR. 
There is the doctor and the nurse and 
there is the safety-officer arranging 
regular updates on CPR. And then it is 
doll and everybody through the same 
procedure, blow in the doll and all this, 
the whole ritual. […] It is very important 
because it is those downstairs and around 
the boat working that meets this first, not 
us on the bridge or those situated in the 
engine-control room.” 
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“Det å få folk til å forstå at sikkerheten 
vår går igjennom hverdagen fra morgen til 
kveld, hva du ser og hva du gjør. […] Og 
det er ferskvare. […] Det må purres på 
hele tiden.» 
  
66 “…The thing about getting people to 
understand that our safety runs through 
the everyday from morning to evening, 
what you see and what you do […] Yes, 
and it is fresh goods.[…] It has to be 
focused on all the time:” 
“Både på cruise og i kystvakta og i olja 
mens jeg var der så var det helt vanlig å ta 
bort vitale personer sånn at … Og det var 
egentlig et sånn overraskelsesmoment der 
du på mange måter … han som da skulle 
plutselig bli leder han var egentlig ikke 
klar over det. […] da ble det faktisk gode 
øvelser. Det var faktisk noen av de bedre 
øvelsene det var når du tok bort en vital 
… kapteinen eller chiefen gikk bort, der 
på mange måter NKen eller 
førstemaskinisten måtte inn og… Ja da 
kom plutselig dette her med 
improvisasjon veldig tydelig. Da ble dette 
her med å trene på improvisasjon det kom 
veldig tydelig fram. […] Men det er klart 
at problemet med å gjøre sånne ting det er 
at ofte det krever mer, det er mer 
energikrevende å gjøre ting som ikke er 
etter boka. Det er det som er problemet.» 
67 “Both on cruise, in the coast guard and in 
oil while I was there it was quite normal 
to remove vital persons so that…And it 
was really an element of surprise where 
you in many ways…he who was to be a 
leader all of a sudden, he was not aware 
of that…then the exercises were good. It 
was… some of the best exercises when 
you removed a vital…the captain or the 
chief engineer fell out and …the second in 
command or the first engineer had to 
enter and…Yes then this about 
improvisation appeared very clear […] 
But it is obvious that the problem of doing 
such things is that it require more, more 
effort to do things not by the book. That is 
the problem.” 
«… så kan jeg jo si det at vi er jo der mer 
eller mindre … ikke på hver øvelse, men 
si nå at vi er på hver annen eller hver 
tredje der det blir tatt ut folk. […] Da tar 
vi ut gjerne en leder en eller annen plassen 
sånn at nestemann får hoppe inn, så ser vi 
om det skjer, om folk tar ansvaret. Så vi er 
ganske frampå om dette med at hvis det 
ikke kommer noen så må det skje noe 
likevel. Noen må ta ansvar, før hele 
organisasjonen fryser et par hakk lenger 
ned.»  
67 “…so I can say that we are more or less 
there…not on every exercise, but say 
every second or third exercise people are 
dismissed from participation [...] Then we 
take out a leader somewhere so that the 
next person gets to step in, then we 
observe if that happens, if people take 
responsibility…So we are quite alert on 
this that if no one turns up something must 
happen anyway. Someone has to take 
responsibility before the whole 
organization freezes a couple of steps 
below.” 
“Ja. Vi øver jo med … ikke når vi har de 
store beredskapsøvelsene, da har vi fullt 
mannskap. […] For som regel så skal det 
jo … hvis det ikke har skjedd noe 
kjempestort om bord så er jo de fleste 
tilgjengelige. […] Da må du bytte inn 
førstemaskinisten for chiefen og 
overstyrmann for skipperen og så 
omvendt. […] det kan jo være at vi må 
flytte på både soneledere og de som 
foretar evakuering og.» 
67 “Yes. We do train with…not when we do 
the big contingency-exercises, then there 
is a full crew…For as a rule the most 
will…if not something giant has happened 
on board then the most will be 
available.[…] Then you have to replace 
the first engineer for the chief and the 
chief-officer for the captain and vice versa 
[…] it might be that we have to move both 
zone-leaders and those who perform 
evacuation too.” 
“Du er færre folk. Han er borte. Han skal 
ha kommunikasjonen. Og han skal kjøre, 
han skal orienteres og […] du mister 
ressurser hele veien. Til slutt så sitter du 
68 “…You are fewer people. He is gone. He 
is in charge of communication. And he 
shall handle, he shall be briefed and […] 
you lose resources all along. At the end 
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alene på brua. […] Da må de virkelig 
kunne improvisere.» 
you are alone on the bridge […] They 
must really know how to improvise.” 
“Vi plukker ut litt sånn ting som er 
kritiske. Altså vi har en forelesning om 
det, og så tar vi bort kritiske ting for dem. 
For eksempel at de mister et ror. De kan 
miste fremdriftslinje, de kan miste gyro.»  
68 
 
“We remove a bit such critical things. 
That we lecture on, and then we remove 
critical tings for them. For instance that 
they lose a rudder. They may lose the 
drift-line, they might loose the gyro...” 
«Ja jeg vil jo si det sånn at mange av de 
båtene så hadde du ofte ledige tider 
imellom oppdragene. Eller at du lå på en 
måte i stand by som vi kaller det for. Så 
jeg føler vel når det gjelder tid til å ha 
øvelser så er det mer utfordrende å få til 
en god øvelse innenfor denne 
passasjerfarten og den travle dagen de har 
eller i offshore. Jeg følte at vi hadde mer 
… ja vi kunne egentlig bruke den tiden 
som vi ville bruke til for å få til gode 
øvelser. […] Jeg følte aldri at det var et 
tidspress i offshore 
68 “Yes I will put it like on many of the boats 
you often had spare time between 
missions. Or you were stand-by as we call 
it. So I feel that when it comes to time to 
perform exercises it is more of a 
challenge to perform good exercises in 
this ferry trade concerning their busy days 
than in offshore. I felt that we had 
more…yes we could use the time we 
wished to perform good exercises […] I 
never felt a pressure of time in offshore.” 
«Tid til øvelse det er jo en … Men du tar 
deg tiden.»  
68 “Time to perform exercises, that is…But 
you take your time…” 
« … det er en gang sånn på en sånn båt at 
vi har et visst antall arbeidstimer …det 
bruker vi maksimal det vi får lov til å 
jobbe» 
69 “…it is on a boat like this that we have a 
certain number of hours…we use the 
hours we are allowed by law to work…” 
«Så de.. jeg skulle til å si at de aller, aller 
fleste av dem er vant til å stå på tender-
piten og se rett ned i havet, se isen dra 
forbi. De er jo kjent med operasjonen vår 
og har jo sett livbåtene bli satt ut. Alle har 
jo sett det, men å gå derfra til at de har 
faktisk fysisk gjort det, der … da kommer 
vi inn på den der tidsfaktoren. ikke noe 
problem å gjøre det, men har ikke tiden og 
anledningen.»  
 
69 
 
“So they…I was to say that most, the very 
most of them are used to stand by the 
tender-pit looking down in the sea 
watching the ice drift past. They are 
known of our operation and have seen the 
lifeboats being launched. Everyone has 
seen this, but to go from there to actually 
doing it, there…then we return to the 
time-factor. It would not be a problem to 
let them do it, but we do not have the time 
nor the opportunity.” 
«Og så har jeg også litt tro på at rullerer 
lite grann på dette her. Det ville jeg ha 
gjort altså. Du rullerer på at … Altså du 
skal ikke stå ved mantelen i 25 år. Du skal 
ikke stå på en plass i 25 år […] du må 
flytte litt på deg og så må du vite hva som 
foregår andre plasser på båten. […] Men 
så klart, hvis du kommer om bord i en båt 
og du blir satt på en plass, så får du jo 
bare erfaring fra den plassen der. […] men 
får du nye folk om bord så er det litt viktig 
å flytte på dem rundt omkring, at de ikke 
bare vet én ting. […] for at det kan hende 
at de som står der og gjør den jobben de er 
ikke der, de kan være borte. Og det har 
jeg opplevd […] Det var ingen som var 
der de skulle være.  
69 
70 
“And then I believe a bit on rotation…You 
rotate, you do not watch the mantle-wire 
for 24 years. You are not to stand on one 
place for 25 years […] you have to move 
a bit and then you must know what is 
going on elsewhere on the boat […] But 
clearly, if you enter a ship and you are 
fixed at one place, you only get experience 
from that place […] if you get new 
personnel on board it is a bit important to 
rotate them so that they do not only know 
one thing […] because it might be that 
those standing there performing that task 
they are not there., they might be gone. I 
have experienced that […]no one were 
situated where they were supposed to.” 
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«Vi er mannskap der nede. Vi er 
mannskap under operasjonen av båten der 
nede. Og de rigger ut og de rigger inn. De 
tar i sammen alt og rigger inn og kjører 
inn og skalker og […] De er opplært og 
[…] De vet akkurat hva som foregår der 
nede. […] 
Ja, det er folk ifra byssa, det er folk ifra 
restauranten og det er folk ifra baren som 
han sier. De er involvert i dette her, alt. 
Påkledning av redningsvester og alt dette 
her det har de, å hjelpe passasjerene» 
70 “We are a crew under the operation down 
there. And they rig out and they rig in. 
They tidy it all […] They are trained and 
[…] They know exactly what is going on 
down there [on deck] […] Yes, it is people 
from the galley, people from the 
restaurant, and people from the bar. They 
are involved in all this. Putting on life-
wests…helping the passengers” 
«Kelneren han er ikke bare kelner, han må 
kanskje stå på tender-piten, han må være 
med og gjøre andre arbeidsoppgaver rund 
omkring i båten. De er mye mer rundt om 
i båten enn for eksempel det jeg innbiller 
meg de er på en cruisebåt. veldig mye der 
du bruker hele besetningen rundt i hele 
båten til hva det skal være […] bartender 
der som hjelper dem inn og ut av båten. 
[…] at jeg mener er den viktigste 
oppgaven går på brann og havari og det 
går på drift. De gjør jo en masse ting som 
er kanskje mye mer sporty enn vanlig 
skipsdrift. 
Tar folk ut på en tender-pit i et helvetes 
vær og kanskje blåser 20 sekundmeter. 
Fyr de i en gummibåt og kjør de på land. 
Det blåser så pingvinene kommer rullende 
nedigjennom fjæra. De operer likevel, 
fordi at vi har … vi er innenfor 
sikkerhetsmarginene våre. Det … jeg tror 
at folk som holder på med dette her blir 
kvassere når det smeller.»  
70 “The waiter, he is not only a waiter, he 
might also have to stand by at the tender-
pit, he will have to join other tasks around 
the boat. …on our ship the crew is very 
much used around the boat to whatever 
needs to be done […] bartender helping 
them in and out of the boat […] It is 
ordinary working-tasks for them…the 
most important tasks are about fire, 
average and operation. They [the crew on 
explorer cruise-ships] are doing many 
things much more sporty than ordinary 
ship-operations. Take people out on a 
tender-pit in on hell of a weather and 
perhaps wind blowing at 20 m/s. Throw 
them in an inflatable boat and ship them 
ashore. It is blowing so hard that 
penguins are coming rolling down the 
shore. They still operate, because we 
have…we are still within our safety-limits. 
It…I think people attending this operation 
becomes sharper when a crisis occurs” 
“… du kan ta en sånn ting som … han står 
på en frakteskute. […] besetningen der de 
er om bord på brua. De har vært i 
maskinkontrollen, de har vært rundt og 
sett. […] henge på brua og høre på … de 
kjenner systemene, de vet panelene […] 
alle sammen har en eller annen perifer 
kjennskap til hva som foregår. […] det var 
på kysten  der vi hadde sirkeltrening, […] 
delte mannskapet i tre, og så hadde de 20 
minutt på brannstasjon og så hadde de 20 
minutt på utsettings altså på … 
livbåtdekket […] og det var av de som 
hadde reist i mange år på hurtigruta og sa 
de hadde aldri vært tatt inn på … hva 
egentlig som foregikk der. Det kanskje er 
noe som er av den filosofien at en kjenner 
hele organisasjonen til topps, og kokken 
kjenner… eller han som er midt i 
organisasjonen kjenner hele 
70 “…you may consider a thing like…he is 
standing on a small freighter […] the 
crew there they hang on the bridge. They 
have been in the engine-control room, 
they have been around to 
watch.…hanging on the bridge and 
listen…they know the systems, they know 
the panels…all of them have some 
peripheral knowledge on what is going 
on…it was on the coast where we 
performed circular-training […] divided 
the crew in three and then they had twenty 
minutes at the fire-station, and then 
twenty minutes at the evacuation…on the 
lifeboat-deck […] and some of those who 
had been sailing on the Coastal steamer 
for years said that they had never been 
taken in at…and did not know what was 
going on there. It might be some of the 
philosophy that one knows the entire 
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organisasjonen ned og hele vil du stille 
mye sterkere hvis du får et frafall drift 
eller i kriser» 
 
organization to the top, and the cook 
knows…or he who is in the middle of the 
organization knows the entire 
organization downwards and all…then 
you will have better odds if you lose 
personnel in drift or in crises” 
“… Jeg hadde den formening at det var 
bare matrosene som skulle ha med båtene 
å gjøre, for da var man sikker på at de 
kunne det. Ikke ta en matros og sette han 
på brannlaget, sett heller kokken på 
brannlaget så tar vi matroser båter. Men 
etter Nordlys-brannen så forandret jeg 
mening. For at det er jo jævlig greit å vite 
at kokken kan også det. At det kan jo godt 
hende at han er ikke der og han er ikke 
der, og da er det jævlig synd hvis 
matrosene plutselig er opptatt med et eller 
annet, er borte, så er det faen ikke andre 
som kan. […] Ja altså det er bra å vite at 
alle vet hva som foregår …» 
70 “…My opinion was that it was just the 
ABs who should deal with the boats, 
because then you were sure that they 
knew it. Do not put an AB on the fire-
fighting team, rather put the cook at the 
fire-fighting team then we ABs care of the 
boats. But after the Nordlys-fire I changed 
my mind. It is bloody ok to know that the 
cook is able to do it. That it might well be 
that he is not there and he is not there, 
and then it is bleeding sad if the ABs all of 
a sudden are occupied doing others tasks, 
are gone, then there are no one who 
knows[…] Yes it is good to know that all 
knows what is going on...” 
“ … Så vi øver jo litt på at vi plukker ut 
kanskje 3 av besetningen eller 2 av 
besetningen blir opptatt med å ta seg av 
noe med passasjerer så er det jo hvem som 
er igjen på brua. Og la oss nå si at 
maskinsjefen er igjen på brua så kan det jo 
hende at han må ta en styrmann sin rolle. 
Og det kan jo for eksempel gå på det som 
går på ekstern kommunikasjon. Ikke sant. 
Altså, for eksempel dette med 
kommunikasjon oppimot en kystradio 
eller andre båter. […] Ja det er jo en av 
navigatørene som går ned. Og da er man 
jo i utgangspunktet sårbar i forhold til det 
som går på du skal både håndtere en båt 
og du skal håndtere kommunikasjon. […] 
Så vi er mer og mer over på den biten at 
vi utfordrer alle på forskjellige oppgaver.» 
70 
71 
“…Then we exercise a bit on that we pick 
out maybe three of the crew or two of the 
crew gets occupied on taking care of a 
passenger problem then it is the matter of 
who is left on the bridge. And let us say 
that the chief engineer is left on the bridge 
then he might have to enter the chief 
officer`s role. And that may be for 
instance external communication…That is 
communication against a coast-station or 
other ships […] Yes, one of the navigators 
leaving the bridge. And then it is about 
who steps-in…And then you are 
vulnerable for a start related to that on 
handling a boat and handle 
communication […] So we are more and 
more over to the bit of challenging all on 
different tasks…” 
“Ja jeg tror det er litt viktig å få fram, at jo 
mer erfarne folk, jo mer knagger de har å 
henge dette på, jo mer verktøy har de i 
verktøykassa si. […] Så erfaring … ja det 
tror jeg er et nøkkelord.” 
72 “Yes, I think that is important to hold 
forth, that the more experienced people 
the more hooks they have to hang it on, 
the more tools they have in their tool-box 
[…] So experience…yes I think that is a 
key-word.” 
“… det har selvfølgelig masse med 
erfaring å gjøre. Men det har også litt med 
hvor erfaringene deres kommer ifra. Hva 
slags type fart har de vært i før og hvor 
trafikkerer de hen vanligvis og sånne ting 
som spiller inn. […] Fergene der har jeg 
inntrykk av at de har litt mer tid. Altså de 
har litt mer tid å tenke igjennom ting før 
… altså de tar seg mer tid til å tenke 
igjennom, mens hurtigbåt så er det… ting 
72 
73 
“…it is off course about experience. But it 
has also a bit to do where their 
experiences come from. What trade they 
have served in before and where they are 
normally sailing and such things plays a 
role […] The ferries seem to have some 
more time. That is, they have more time to 
think things through, while HSC then it 
is…things are to happen very rapidly. 
[…] It has off course something to do with 
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skal skje veldig fort. […] Det har 
selvfølgelig noe med farta å gjøre. Ja det 
har det. Fordi at de jobber kanskje mer 
imot klokka enn for eksempel ei ferge. 
[…] Så vi ser helt klart en stor forskjell på 
hvor fort de reagerer på ting og de 
avgjørelsene hvor fort de blir tatt.» 
the speed...Because they work perhaps 
more against the clock then for instance a 
ferry […] So we see a clear difference on 
how fast they react to things and the 
decisions how rapidly they are made…” 
“… da har de egentlig gått i lag med 
erfarne folk og fått være mannskap, 
styrmenn, ikke skipperrolle i det hele tatt, 
og så får de ta over da den rollen der de to 
siste dagene. Og da får de øvd på […] Det 
er en reell situasjon […] vi ser også at det 
er veldig lærerikt at de går i lag med 
erfarne folk som styrmenn gjør da.» 
73 “...then they have attended together with 
experienced people and got to act as 
crew, navigators, no captain`s role at all, 
and then they get to take over that role the 
last two weeks of the course. And the they 
get to train on […] It is a real situation 
[…] we see that it has a very good 
learning-effect that they exercise together 
with experienced people as chief 
officers.” 
«Vi bruker jo å prate om miksen av 
mannskap. Og det er ikke bra å ha bare 
erfarne folk. Det er ikke bra å ha bare nye. 
Men å ha den miksen av erfarne og nye, 
da får du på en måte den 
erfaringsoverføringen fra de gamle til de 
nye der. Og da tror jeg nok at du ser en 
større grad av improvisasjon når du har … 
jo større innslag du har av erfarne folk, jo 
større grad av improvisasjon.» 
 
73 “… We use to speak of the mix of 
crewmembers. And it is not optimal just to 
have experienced crew. It is not optimal to 
have only new. But having the mix of 
experienced and new, then you achieve 
that exchange of experience from the old 
ones to the new there. And then I truly 
believe that you will see more of 
improvisation when you have…the greater 
the amount of experienced people, the 
greater degree of improvisation.” 
«… Du vil jo ikke grei å oppfylle den 
kompetansen som du mister når de 
skipsledelsen begynner å fall. Det vil være 
veldig vanskelig.»  
73 “…It will be very difficult to fill in the 
missing competence of the ship-board” 
“Du kan jo ikke forlange at en lærling på 
ett år skal vite det. Den erfaringen som jeg 
har opparbeidet den har jeg opparbeidet i 
løpet av mange år altså. Du kan ikke 
forlange at […] at de ser hva de holder på 
med. […] det er bare en ting; å gjøre det, 
det er øvelse, og det er trening. Du må ha 
det i fingrene. Og erfaring går det ikke an 
å lese seg til. […] Det må gjøres for hand.  
 
73 “You cannot expect a one-year apprentice 
to know that. My experience as I have 
been building, I have built over many 
years. You cannot demand that […] that 
they can see what they are doing […] it is 
only one thing; doing it, it is exercise and 
it is training. You need to have it in your 
fingers. And you cannot get experience 
just by reading […] It has to be done 
manually.” 
“… Nei da, det er klart, hvis du skal være 
sånn anlagt at uansett hva som oppstår så 
må du inn og lese hva som skal være 
løsningen … Hvis du ikke skal være i 
stand til å tenke selv, så blir du veldig 
styrt av et sånn rammeverk som det der.» 
74 “…No, obviously, if you shall be shaped 
in a way that whatever occurs you must in 
and read what the solution shall be…If 
you are not able to think by yourself, you 
are very much ruled by a frame-work like 
that.[procedures]” 
“Altså i dag på … la oss nå ta offshore, og 
kanskje passasjerfart også, så har du jo 
prosedyrer ifra ankomst til avgang. Og jo 
mindre erfaring du har, jo mer tenker jeg 
at du støtter deg til den prosedyren for å 
på en måte gi en bekreftelse til deg selv at 
jeg gjør det rette, for det står der. Du på en 
74 “Well these days…let`s take offshore, and 
maybe passenger trade too, then you have 
procedures from arrival to departure. And 
the less experience you have the more I 
think you relay on that procedure to in a 
way give a confirmation to yourself that I 
am doing the right thing, because it is 
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måte slutter å bruke hodet og det øvrige 
du har lært under utdanning. […] Ja det er 
jo … prosedyrene de er jo selvfølgelig et 
verktøy for å skal få oss til å kunne gå 
igjennom en arbeidsoperasjon på en trygg 
måte. Jeg skulle til å si den avhengigheten 
av å ha en prosedyre har jeg vel følt og 
sett litt at den er større jo mer uerfaren du 
er. Du skal jo alltid bruke en prosedyre, 
uansett hvor erfaren du er, men hvis du er 
erfaren så bruker på en måte prosedyre 
bare til lite grann sånn støtte. Er du ny og 
uerfaren så er det prosedyren som leder 
deg igjennom …» 
written. In a way you quit using your head 
and the other things you have learned 
through education […] the procedures 
they are off course a tool to make us 
perform a work operation in a safe way. I 
was about to say that the dependence of 
having a procedure I have felt and seen a 
bit that it is greater the more 
unexperienced you are. You are always 
supposed to use a procedure, no matter 
how experienced you are, but if you are 
experienced then you use, in a way, 
procedures as support. If you are new and 
unexperienced it is the procedure that 
leads you through…” 
“…da er det jo opp til de som bruker 
prosedyrene å ha en dialog med de som 
lager prosedyrene, at man får en 
prosedyre som passer til det man holder 
på med. Og det er vel kanskje litt der 
sjøfart og … er lite grann slapp, det at 
dette her har vi fått ifra rederiet, og det 
punktet passer ikke, det punktet passer 
ikke, det punktet passer ikke … så de 
hopper vi over. Istedenfor å ha en dialog 
med rederiet, at vi må ha en prosedyre 
som er tilpasset vårt system. […] men det 
tror jeg er litt sånn innarbeidet eller 
inngrodd i systemene at det vi får ifra 
rederiet det er på en måte det vi skal 
forholde oss til, istedenfor å ha det og 
spille ballen frem og tilbake. […] Ikke 
sant. Istedenfor å spille ballen frem og 
tilbake og så få et som er systemtilpasset. 
[…] Ja det kan nok være noe der, at en lar 
være å melde det inn på en måte eller at 
det er for arbeidskrevende.» 
75 “…it is up to the users of the procedures 
to have a dialogue with those who create 
the procedures, that you get a procedure 
that fits to what you are doing. And it is 
perhaps a bit there the maritime 
directorate and…are a bit lazy, the issue 
that this is what we have got from the 
company, and that point does not fit, that 
does not fit, that does not fit…so they skip 
them. Instead of having a dialogue with 
the company, that we need to have a 
procedure fitted for our system […] but I 
think it is like baked in or ingrown in the 
systems that what we get from the 
company is what we shall do, instead of 
having it and play the ball back and forth. 
[…] Right. Instead of playing the ball 
back and forth to get it fitted to the system 
[…] in a way one skip reporting due to it 
demanding too much effort.”  
“Og det der er jo egentlig et typisk i tiden, 
spesielt dette her i prosedyretiden, det at 
alt skal være beskrevet. Du kan liksom 
ikke stole på at folk gjør jobben sin. Det 
skal være spesifisert. […] For at du er 
innlært til å lese en prosedyre.» 
75 “And that is a typical sign for this age, 
especially this in the procedure-age, the 
demand that all things shall be described. 
You may not have trust upon that people 
are doing their job. It has to be specified 
[…] Because you are taught to read a 
procedure” 
«… De blir redde, de er veldig opptatt av 
sjekklista og prosedyrer da. De låser seg 
veldig fast i … ja, de blir veldig statiske. 
[…] … jeg er veldig tilhenger av disse 
sjekklistene, å ha det som en sånn 
bakgrunns … at de ligger der, at du har 
dem.» 
 
75 
76 
“… They get scared, they are very focused 
on the checklist and procedures then they 
lock themselves to…yes they become very 
static […] I am eagerly supporting these 
checklists, having them as a 
background…that they lay there, that you 
have them” 
“… det vi har sett når vi har kjørt disse 
mann over bord-øvelsene at de som har 
vært mest effektiv og gjort den beste 
76 “…what we have seen when performing 
these man over board exercises that those 
who have shown to be most effective and 
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mann over bord-øvelsen det er jo de 
faktisk som har på mange måter har lagt 
sjekklisten til side og ikke brukt den 
slavisk …» 
 
have performed the best man over board 
exercise, are those who actually have put 
the check-lists away not using it point by 
point…” 
“… jeg er jo av den gamle skole også når 
det kommer til HMS og … Jeg er veldig 
sånn … i de siste kan du si 5 årene så 
måtte jo jeg ha forandret innstilling på 
ganske masse år det kommer til HMS og 
sikkerhet og alt slags …»   
76 “…I am old school when it comes to HMS 
and…I am very like that…over the last 
five years I have had to change my 
attitude concerning a lot when it comes to 
HMS and safety and such…” 
“Først fikk vi en gjeng om bord i Bergen, 
kjører de opp på sikkerhetsbiten og på 
driftsbiten, så kvesser du gjengen. […] 
Men vi gjorde jo den sjekken på bakgrunn 
av at … for å se hvordan rikets tilstand 
var. […] det der det ble avglemt. Og det 
var ikke gjort fordi at folk ga seg faen, 
men det var fordi at fokuset var ikke der.  
nytt gjeng om bord i Bergen, så … du er 
nødt å gå rett på det med en gang det med 
holdningsskapning overfor sikkerheten 
[…] `Og du skal ikke bare stå og hakke 
pølser og lage salat, du er faktisk 
brannmann om bord også`. Det å få folk 
til å forstå at sikkerheten vår går igjennom 
hverdagen fra morgen til kveld, hva du ser 
og hva du gjør. […] Og det er ferskvare. 
[…] Det må purres på hele tiden.  
76 
77 
“First we got a bunch on board in Bergen, 
drove them through the safety-bit and then 
on the operation-bit, you sharpen the 
gang. […] After a while we checked out 
the status […] this was forgotten. And not 
caused by people never mind, but the 
focus was not there […]…new gang on 
board in Bergen, so … you have to go 
straight on to build attitude on safety […] 
`And you shall not only stand here 
chopping sausages and make salad, you 
are a fire-fighter on board as well`. The 
thing about getting people to understand 
that our safety runs through the everyday 
from morning to evening, what you see 
and what you do […] Yes, and it is fresh 
goods.[…] It has to be focused on all the 
time.” 
“Ja det var ille. Altså når det skjer så fort. 
Du har et kvarter ifra alt er sånn som det 
skal være til alt er svart. [...]  
Så å si alle satt og spiste da. Det var 
frokost … […] For det var ingen som var 
der de skulle være. Ingen. […] Styrbord-
siden var jo ute, det var jo røyklagt, der 
var det umulig å evakuere ifra. Så alt 
skjedde jo via babord-siden. Så det er jo 
min plass var jo på babord side med mob-
båt. Men vi sendte jo først mob-båtene av 
gårde de som var skadet. Det var det vi … 
og vi hadde kontakt folk oppe på dekket. 
De var så forbrent og … Det var bare å få 
de på land, det var det vi tenkte på først. 
Men som regel så skal jo mob-båten 
fungere som en backup når livbåtene gikk 
ut og hvis du skal hjelpes til. […] Men det 
ble jo tatt en avgjørelse der og da at vi 
begynner med de skadde. […] Ja de ble 
fraveket, fordi vi har det jo sånn at mob-
båten skal jo være sånn … la oss nå si 
hvis det skjer noe på livbåtene eller et 
eller annet, skyve dem ifra eller etc. så 
skal jo han ut først og bistå livbåter hvis 
det er noe som skjer. Hjelpe de ifra hvis 
77 
78 
“Yes, it was bad…when it happens so 
rapidly. You have got fifteen minutes from 
everything fine to all is black. […] 
Virtually all were dining at the time. It 
was breakfast […] no one were where 
they were supposed to be. No one […] 
The starboard side was out, it was filled 
with smoke, it was impossible to evacuate 
from there. Hence it all happened on the 
port side. It is my site on the port side 
operating the MOB. But we had sent off 
the MOBs carrying the casualties. It was 
what we…and we had contact with people 
up on the deck. They were so burned 
and…It was just a matter of getting them 
ashore, it was our first thought. But as a 
rule the MOB shall work as a backup 
when the lifeboats are launched and if you 
are to assist […] But a decision was made 
there and then that we start with the 
wounded […] [procedures] were deviated, 
because our routine is that the MOB is to 
be like…let us say that something happens 
to the lifeboats or something else, push 
them away or etc. so it shall be launched 
as the first and assist lifeboats if needed. 
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ikke motoren starter. Han skal i hvert fall 
ut hvis det skjer noe. Det kan jo hende at 
folk detter i havet eller … Det er et 
backup der for å ta de opp eller […] Det 
var førstemaskinisten og reparatøren som 
var så forbrent at de ble sendt i land.» 
Help them away if the engine does not 
start. It is to be launched anyway if 
something happens. It could be the case of 
people falling overboard or…It is a 
backup to pick them up or […] It was the 
first engineer and the repair-man who 
was burned as much that they had to be 
sent ashore…” 
“Ja altså det var ikke noe som lignet en 
øvelse. Det var ingen som var der de 
skulle være. […] dette her det skjer på ti 
minutter/et kvarter ifra det starter til at det 
er et inferno … at ting skjer. Så du har 
ikke tid å tenke deg om. […] det som var 
bra det var at det var jo erfarne sjøfolk 
som visste hva de skulle gjøre, hvordan de 
skulle gjøre det, og […] Det var de karene 
som var ledig til rådighet. […] Det er jo 
bare å bruke hodet altså, men altså når 
man har opplevd det så ser man jo det at 
det er jo greit, man øver jo på en ting, men 
man ser jo hvordan det fungerer, man ser 
hvordan det fungerer, og så klart, bytter 
man på rollene og ser så får man jo innsikt 
i hva man kan gjøre og sånn. Man prøver 
å gjøre det beste av det. Det står ikke ting 
i min instruks at jeg skal dra i spisesalen 
og hente folk i rullestol og få dem opp på 
båtdekket. […] Ja jeg gjør jo det … det 
heter seg jo det at du skal telle 
passasjerene om bord og alt, men hvis det 
brenner under ræva på deg så tror jeg du 
hiver de folkene inn i fort som faen altså. 
Den tellingen og den organiseringen og alt 
den kommer kanskje til … Men du skal jo 
prøve å gjøre det så klart. Men hva som 
skjer hvis det er … La oss nå si hvis det 
brenner under …  […] Jeg har den mob-
båten, den er min, den skal jeg ut i. […] 
Altså det er ingen som kan forutse hva 
som skjer. […] jeg tok en livbåt … Det 
var fordi at han som hadde den livbåten 
han … ja han var ikke til stede for å si det 
sånn. Han dukket ikke opp. Og … så jeg 
tok den ene livbåten. Jeg og en 
kjøkkensjef, to livbåter med passasjerer. 
Og vi var jo inne i havna, så det var jo 
bare rundt kaia og så … Jeg levnet jo 
båten der for det var jo folk som stod og 
tok imot, hjelpekorps. Og jeg fikk jo 
beskjed hos overstyrmann på radio om å 
innfinne meg så fort som mulig. Så jeg 
sprang jo bare ned på kaia, for da lå jo 
redningsskøyta og trykket henne inntil og 
… Så jeg begynte å snakke med 
78 
 
“Yes it was nothing like an exercise. No 
one were where they were supposed to be 
…this happens in ten – fifteen minutes 
from it starts until it is an inferno…that 
things happens… there is no time to think 
[…] what was good was that it was 
experienced sailors knowing what to do, 
how to do it, and […] It was the guys who 
were free to use […] It was just using 
your head, but when you have 
experienced it you see that it is ok, you 
exercise things, but you see how it works, 
you see how it works, and off course, if 
you change roles and see you will get 
some insight on what to do and such. One 
tries to make the best out of it. There is 
nothing in my instructions for me to enter 
the dining salon to fetch people in 
wheelchairs and to get them up on the 
boat-deck. […] I did that…it is written 
that you are to count the passengers on 
board [into the lifeboats] and all, but if 
there is a fire under your … I believe you 
throw those people on board quickly as 
h…That counting and that organization 
and all it might…But you shall try it off 
course. But what happens if it is… Let us 
say if it is  burning under your […] My 
task is to operate that MOB, the one I 
shall out in […] No one can anticipate 
what happens […] I took a lifeboat…It 
was because he who were in charge of 
that lifeboat …well he was not present. He 
did not show up. And…I took the one 
lifeboat. Me and a chef, two lifeboats 
carrying passengers. And we were inside 
the port, so it was just around the quay 
and so…I left the boat there due to people 
were standing by to take care of, rescue-
team. And I got a message from the chief 
officer on the radio to show up `asap`. So 
I just ran down to the quay, because then 
the Redningsskøyta came to push her in 
and…then I started to speak with the fire-
fighters to explain how, what I had seen 
and…So those fire-fighters were standing 
on the quay…Then it was to embark to 
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brannfolkene, å forklare hvordan, hva som 
jeg hadde sett og … Så de brannfolkene 
stod jo på kaia da, å gjorde dem … Så var 
det jo om bord og vise brannfolk veien til 
maskin. De gikk inn via poppen og så ned 
og så inn i kontroll-rommet. […] var alle i 
spisesalen.» 
show the fire-fighters the way to the 
engine. They went in by the poop-deck 
and then down and into the control room 
But say it like this that when […] all were 
in the dining-room.” 
“Ja det er helt klart. Akkurat det der er 
faktisk litt sånn skremselsbilde fordi at når 
du har … hvis vi snakker om ytre faktorer 
som vær, vind og sjø, og når du står og 
holder på med skipshåndtering så får du jo 
på mange måter dette litt inn i fingrene. 
Hvis du da begynner å skal la båter gå til 
og fra kai, halvveis autonome skip, så er 
det klart at da får jo aldri disse 
skipsoffiserene dette her i fingrene. Så 
skulle det plutselig være sånn at 
automatikken svikter så vil du på mange 
måter kunne reagere senere og din evne til 
å improvisere vil jo på mange måter bli 
dårligere på grunn av at du da ikke får 
[…] Det bør jo ringe noen bjeller […] det 
skremmer meg litt.» 
83 “Yes quite clear. Just that is a bit of a 
scary picture because when you have…if 
we speak of external factors like weather, 
wind and sea and when you are handling 
a ship you get this in many ways in your 
fingers If you are to dock and undock 
ships. Semi-autonomic ships, then it is 
clear that these naval officers never get 
this in their fingers. So if automation 
should fail you would in many ways react 
more slow and your ability to improvise 
will become poorer due to not getting the 
opportunity to […] Some bells should 
ring […] it scares me a bit.” 
“Ja det tror jeg. Fordi at du stoler kanskje 
for mye på systemene, ikke sant. Og så 
tror jeg nok at folk kanskje ikke kjenner 
systemene godt nok heller. […] Der kan 
du for eksempel ta det der med track-
seiling, ikke sant. Hvor mange kvier seg 
jo for å gå ut av tracket. […] de vet ikke 
hvordan de kommer seg inn. […] det med 
at folk er redde for å … […]. Du går i et 
spor. […] Hvis man automatiserer for 
eksempel en båt til å gå til og fra kai, det 
gjør jo at folk vil slite med å overkjøre 
det. Altså du vil jo få mindre trening i det 
du egentlig skal gjøre. […] Så du skal 
liksom sitte og se og overvåke noe og så 
skal du … du får jo mindre trening rett og 
slett. […] Ja, og spesielt på DP-båter, ikke 
sant. De klarer … de kan ikke handtere en 
båt fordi at det er et system som gjør det. 
Og det har jo vært kritikk imot at de 
forstår … de kan liksom ikke ta en båt 
manuelt til en rigg lenger fordi at de er så 
vant med DP-systemet gjør det.» 
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“Yes I believe so. Because maybe you 
trust upon instruments too much, right. 
And then I believe that people may not 
know the system well enough either […] 
You may look upon sailing on track, right. 
How many are reluctant to leave the 
track? [...] they do not know how to get 
back on track again…people are afraid to 
[…] If you automize for instance a boat to 
dock and undock people will struggle to 
override it. That is; you will get less 
practice on what is your original task […] 
you are to monitor something and then 
you shall…you basically get less practice 
[…]Yes and especially on DP-boats, 
right…they are not able to handle a boat 
because it is a system doing it. And it has 
been criticized that they do not 
understand…they are in a way not able to 
maneuver a boat from one rig manually 
anymore because they are used to the DP 
doing it for them…”              
 
